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v 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals issued a decision in this matter on December 26, 2008. 
This Court granted certiorari on April 1, 2009. Utah Supreme Court jurisdiction after 
grant of certiorari is present pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(a), and Rule 
45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"On certiorari, we review for correctness the decision of the court of appeals, not 
the decision of the district court." Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12, ^  9, 179 P.3d 775; 
See also, Florida Asset Financing Corp. v. Utah Labor Corn'n, 2006 UT 58, Tj 8, 147 
P.3d 1189; Clark v. Clark, 2001 UT 44, U 8, 27 P.3d 538. "The correctness of the court 
of appeals' decision turns on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's 
decision under the appropriate standard of review." Butler, 2008 UT 12, ^ j 9; Clark, 2001 
UT 44, f^ 8. Review in certiorari is further circumscribed by the issues raised in the 
questions presented for review. Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 856 
(Utah 1998). However, there is a presumption created by Rule 49(a)(4) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure "that each issue will also include subsidiary questions that may 
fairly be included in the issue presented." Sevy v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah, 
902 P.2d 629, 637 (Utah 1995); Willardson v. Industrial Corn'n of Utah, 904 P.2d 671 
(Utah 1995). This presumption "should be construed broadly to avoid the rigid exclusion 
of reviewable issues, however peripheral." Sevy, 902 P.2d at 637. Occasionally this 
Court will address all the merits of the underlying appeal when it makes procedural sense 
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to do so. Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, \ 15, 982 P.2d 572; Iron Head Const, Inc. v. 
Gurney, 2009 UT 25, — P.3d —-, 2009 WL 1098110. 
In the present case Third-Party Plaintiffs, Petitioners and Appellants presented the 
following questions for review: 
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court's imposition of an 
equitable constructive trust without also finding that the trial court had abused its 
discretion? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to remand the case for further findings 
of fact concerning the existence of an express trust when the trial court based its decision 
on a finding of an equitable constructive trust and the Court of Appeals held that the 
different legal standard of an express trust was the applicable legal theory? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that there are only two types of 
constructive trusts, express and equitable, when previous decisions of the Utah Supreme 
Court indicate that there are unlimited types of constructive trusts, and that the nature of 
the remedy defies limiting definitions? 
4. Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to construe the findings of fact of the 
trial court, including all reasonable inferences therefrom, in favor of the ruling of the trial 
court? 
5. Did the Court of Appeals err in fashioning a remedy which has the practical 
effect of a clearly erroneous finding, when Donald and Jeannette had failed to marshal 
the evidence? 
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In granting the Petition for Certiorari, this Court stated it would review "[wjhether 
the court of appeals erred in reversing the district court's imposition of a constructive 
trust." (See Order of Supreme Court dated April 1, 2009). Thus this Court has granted 
certiorari review of all issues surrounding the reversal of the imposition of a constructive 
trust, including all subsidiary questions to that issue. In addition to the questions raised 
above, the Petition also raised the issue of whether the district court correctly applied the 
discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations until the constructive trust had been 
repudiated. Petitioners specifically stated "If this Court grants the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, the applicability of the statute of limitations and the discovery rule are 
substantive issues that will be raised in the briefing." (See Petitioners Reply Brief, page 
5). Although the Court of Appeals failed to reach the question of the applicability of the 
discovery rule because it found that no constructive trust could be imposed, this decision 
was error. Moreover, the question of whether the discovery rule acts to toll the statute of 
limitations in constructive trust cases until the time that the trust is repudiated is a 
subsidiary question which is fairly included in the question of the imposition of a 
constructive trust, and which, under the broad interpretive guidelines of Rule 49(a)(4) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, should be included in the briefing. As such, 
Petitioners have briefed this issue.1 
1
 The Court has not granted certiorari on the second issue addressed by the Court of 
Appeals, i.e. the reversal of the imposition of sanctions on Donald and Jeanette for their 
failure to mediate in good faith after the district court ordered mediation. The Court of 
Appeals found that Donald and Jeanette's refusal to entertain or make any offers, or in 
any other way communicate during mediation, could not be sanctioned. Because 
- 3 -
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, 200 P.3d 662. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
There are no constitutional provisions or statutes directly applicable to the legal 
issues present in this matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The present case involves a dispute between siblings over the family farm, 
comprised of fruit orchards and livestock. In 1944, the father, Arnold Rawlings acquired 
the property in question, the farm, from his mother. (See Trial Exhibit 3). Until 1967, 
Arnold had title to the farm in his name. Id. The property has never been in the name of 
Arnold's wife, Cleo Rawlings. (See Trial Exhibit 3, Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 
52:15-16, 280:14-16). By October of 1966 Arnold had been diagnosed with cancer and 
required a substantial amount of medical care, including expensive cobalt treatments. 
(Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 45:20-25, 46:1-9, 47:5-13, 63:24-25, 64:1-23, 133:16-22). 
certiorari was not granted on this issue, it will not be briefed. Appellants, however, wish 
to note that the mediation and legal communities in Utah have been greatly concerned by 
the implications of this holding. It has the effect of making court-ordered mediation 
unenforceable because parties can show up and state that they refuse to mediate, without 
fear of being sanctioned for acting in bad faith, and even though "imposition of sanctions 
for failure . . . to participate in good faith in the ADR procedure assigned" is expressly 
permitted under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-205(3)(p). The holding eviscerates the power 
of the courts to enforce court-ordered mediation. In the event that this Court finds in 
favor of Appellants, and in the event that the Supreme Court is concerned with the 
implications of, or disagrees with, the result reached by the Court of Appeals on this 
issue, the Supreme Court has the power to vacate the Court of Appeals' decision as to the 
mediation sanctions, thereby negating its precedential value, without expressing an 
opinion thereon. 
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These expenses threatened to consume Arnold's estate, i.e. the farm. (Record p. 1451, 
Trans. Vol. I, 134:2-10). In order to avoid losing the farm, Arnold was specifically 
advised by the welfare department that he should transfer the farm out of his name. (See 
Trial Exhibit 68). At first, Arnold wanted to transfer the farm to his son LaRell 
Rawlings, LaRell, however, declined and suggested that Dwayne Rawlings, his brother, 
would be a better choice because he would be fair to all the members of the family. In 
March of 1967 Arnold finally decided that his eldest son, Donald Rawlings, would hold 
the farm for the benefit of Arnold and the family. (Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 48:20-
25, 49:1-25, 50:1-25, 51:1-24, 134:2-16, Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 224:2-5, 333:9-
25, 334:1-10, 335:23-25, 336:1-2, 381:4-15, 388:20-25, 389:1-5). In reaching this 
decision and communicating it to the family, Arnold had multiple conversations with the 
family. Donald was present at these discussions and did not object to the plan that he 
would hold the farm for the benefit of the family. Id. 
Consistent with the plan and with the understanding of the family, title to the farm 
was transferred into Donald and his wife Jeanette's name on March 24, 1967. (See Trial 
Exhibit 14). Although before the transfer, the farm was solely in Arnold's name, Arnold 
asked all of his children and their spouses to sign a quit claim deed. (Record p. 1451, 
Trans. Vol. I, 63:6-23, Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 247:2-10, 336:1-19). After the 
1967 transfer, Arnold continued to work the farm and refer to it as "his" farm. (See Trial 
Exhibits 19-29, Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 63:19-23, 191:3-18, Record p. 1459, 
Trans. Vol. II, 229:23-25, 233:21-25, 234:1, 238:9-12, 252:10-23, 338:16-25, 339:1-22). 
Specifically, Arnold ran livestock on the farm, just as he did before; he cultivated the 
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orchards, just had he had done before; and considered the farm to be his. Id. In several 
letters written to the military, all written after the 1967 transfer, Arnold specifically refers 
to the farm as "my farm." (See Trial Exhibits 19-29). At Arnold's request, other 
prominent persons in the community, including judges, also wrote letters to the military 
and referred to the farm as Arnold's farm. Id. The children also continued to treat the 
farm as solely owned by their father. LaRell continued to help his father market the fruit 
in Wyoming. (Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 99:2-25, 100:1-6). While Arnold was still 
alive, and with Arnold's direct permission, Bryce Rawlings (the fourth son) moved into a 
trailer Bryce placed on the farm. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 248:6-20). In short, 
Arnold continued to operate in a manner that indicated his sole control, authority, and 
ownership over the farm, thereby demonstrating that although legal title had shifted, 
Arnold intended to retain, and in fact did retain, equitable title to the farm. 
Arnold died on March 30, 1971. After his death, Arnold's widow, paid the taxes 
on the farm. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 280:14-16). Bryce continued to live there 
for four to five years after Arnold's death. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 248:6-20). 
All of the siblings (except Donald ironically) continued to labor on the farm. (Record p. 
1451, Trans. Vol. I, 63:19-23, 66:3-8, 129:9-19, 130:2-11, Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. Q, 
238:9-12, 254:1-10, 338:16-25, 339:1-22). In 1974, a boundary dispute with the Vinyard 
Meadows development arose on the southern border of the farm. (Record p. 1451, Trans. 
Vol. I, 104:9-24, Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 255:20-25, 256:1-16, 298:19-25, 299:1, 
344:1-25, 345:1-25, 346:1-25, 347:1-21). Donald required his siblings and mother to 
sign an additional quit claim deed to clear up some purported fault in the title so that he 
- 6 -
could properly prosecute litigation against Vinyard Meadows on behalf of the family. Id. 
After successful litigation against Vinyard Meadows, Donald distributed a small part of 
the proceeds from the judgment award to his siblings and his mother, thereby 
acknowledging his role of holding the farm for the benefit of the family. (Record p. 
1451, Trans. Vol. I, 162:2-7, Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 239:22-25, 240:1-17, 
255:20-24, 290:21-25, 291:1-3, 351:1-25, 352:1-19). None of Donald's siblings were 
informed of the exact amount of the settlement and were under the impression that the 
bulk of it had been distributed to their mother for the purchase of a car. It was not until 
the inception of this litigation that Donald's siblings learned exactly how large the 
settlement was ($52,000) and how little of it Donald had distributed to the family. 
Regardless of the amount distributed, Donald's distribution demonstrated an 
acknowledgment of his responsibility to hold the farm for the benefit of the family. In 
1978, Donald and Jeanette, and Dwayne and Paulette, traded a small part of the farm 
("the Pinegar lot") for another piece of land referred to as the 'industrial property.' 
(Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 349:9-25, 350:12-22). Immediately before this trade, 
Donald and Jeanette also deeded, without consideration, a half interest in the Pinegar lot 
to Dwayne and Paulette Rawlings. Id. Donald and Dwayne operated a top soil business 
on the farm property, and reserved surplus profits for the benefit of the family. (Record 
p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 354:24-25, 355:1-6). Throughout the following years, the 
siblings continued to work the farm and give the proceeds of fruit sales to their mother, 
Cleo. (Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 63:19-23, 66:3-8, 129:9-19, 130:2-11, Record p. 
1459, Trans. Vol. II, 238:9-12, 254:1-10, 338:16-25, 339:1-22). 
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Finally, in March of 1993, Donald sold two lots off of the farm and purchased 
property located near St. George, Utah ("the Hellwell trade"). (See Trial Exhibit 48). 
The siblings had no notice of this trade until the late summer of 1993, but when Dwayne 
learned of it, they understood that Donald was still acting for the benefit of the family. 
(Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 355:7-25, 356:1-25, 357:1-11, Record p. 1461, Trans. 
Vol. Ill, 453:7-25, 454:1-7). In late October or early November of 1993, Dwayne and 
Donald had a conversation in which Donald indicated for the first time that he had 
conducted the Hellwell trade for his own benefit and not for that of the family. This was 
the first time that Donald indicated to any of his family that he was holding the farm for 
himself thereby repudiating the trust. Id. The resulting disagreements over Donald's 
repudiation of the trust and disputes over the top soil business led to the disintegration of 
Donald and Dwayne's business and litigation ensued. Id. Three and a half years after the 
repudiation , within the statute of limitations, Dwayne and his siblings filed a 
counterclaim against Donald, asserting the existence of a constructive trust. (Record p. 
23-38). After several pretrial motions and a lengthy discovery period, the trial court 
bifurcated the case. The initial part of the trial would address the issue of the imposition 
of a constructive trust. The remaining causes of action between the parties, including a 
determination of damages, or partition of the constructive trust property, was reserved for 
2The parties agree that a four year statute of limitations applies to constructive trust 
actions. The dispute between the parties lies in the application of the discovery rule to 
toll the statute of limitations until such time as the trust is repudiated. The trial court 
determined, as a finding of fact, that the trust was not repudiated until the fall of 1993 and 
that, consistent with existing law, the discovery rule operated to toll the statute of 
limitations until the trust was repudiated. 
- 8 -
the second part of the trial. The first half of the trial addressing the imposition of a 
constructive trust went forward on March 12 through March 15, 2007. (Record p. 1449-
67). Witnesses were called by all parties and, after post trial briefing, the District Court 
ruled on May 24, 2007, imposing an equitable constructive trust, and entered a Rule 
54(b) certification on that issue. (Record p. 1540, 1583). Donald and Jeanette sought 
review of the imposition of the constructive trust, and review of the prior imposition of 
sanctions for failure to mediate in good faith. On December 26, 2008, the Court of 
Appeals handed down its decision, reversing the trial court on both issues. See Rawlings 
v. Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, 1j 10, 200 P.3d 662. Donald's siblings, Dwayne 
Rawlings, LaRell Rawlings, Bryce Rawlings, and Carol Lynn Masterson petitioned for 
certiorari review on the Court of Appeals' reversal of the imposition of a constructive 
trust. On April 1, 2009, this Court granted the siblings' petition. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the present case, the Court of Appeals has issued a decision which conflicts 
with precedent on several important aspects. In reaching its decision the Court of 
Appeals also misunderstands the meaning of the trial court's findings of fact and 
consequently reaches an illogical result. Specifically, the Court of Appeals failed to 
construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the ruling, as required, and fashioned 
a ruling which, in effect, found clear error, without examining the facts below. 
Moreover, a plain reading of the findings of fact, read in their entirety rather than 
selectively, demonstrates that the trial court made sufficient findings of fact to impose a 
constructive trust, either on express or equitable grounds. The statement by the trial court 
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that the evidence was conclusive as to a constructive trust because Arnold did not intend 
the signing of the 1967 deed to affect a transfer of his ownership rights in the farm was an 
express finding that Arnold intended to transfer legal title while retaining equitable title, 
thereby creating an express trust. 
The Court of Appeals" decision violates precedential requirements in several other 
areas: the decision limits and narrowly defines the doctrine of constructive trusts, which 
contradicts case law that indicates that there are unlimited types of constructive trusts and 
that the doctrine of constructive trusts should not be limited or narrowly defined; the 
decision fails to find that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a constructive 
trust, which is an express requirement before an appellate court can overturn a trial 
court's imposition of a constructive trust; the decision examines the evidence below 
despite Donald and Jeanette's failure to marshal the evidence in their favor; the decision 
misinterprets or misunderstands that evidence; and, the decision, in direct conflict with 
case law and general appellate practice, changes the legal standard by which this case 
should be decided, but does not remand the case to the trial court to make findings of fact 
in light of the new legal standard. 
A simple survey of the evidence presented at trial, and the evidence upon which 
the trial court expressly relied, demonstrates that the imposition of a constructive trust is 
clearly justified under either an express constructive trust theory or an equitable 
constructive trust theory. Finally, the trial court was correct in finding that the discovery 
rule operates to toll the statute of limitations until such time as the trust was repudiated in 
the fall of 1993. 
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The failure of the Court of Appeals to follow several areas of binding precedent 
and to understand the import of the trial court's findings requires that the decision of the 
Court of Appeals be reversed, and that the ruling of the trial court be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSTRUE THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT IN FAVOR OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING. 
In reviewing a trial court's decision, "Utah appellate courts do not take trial 
courts' factual findings lightly." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, 
Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052 (Utah 1994). Rather, an appellate court reviewing or applying 
a trial court's findings of fact is required to "view the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the trial court's findings . . . . [and] recite the facts in accordance with that standard." 
State v. A House and 1.37 Acres of Real Property located at 392 South, 886 P.2d 534, 
535 (Utah 1994); Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, lj 34, 189 P.3d 51 ("In determining the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the district court's findings, we review the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings."); State v. Widdison, 2001 
UT 60, If 60, 28 P.3d 1278 (The appellant must show that the evidence when viewed "in a 
light most favorable to the trial court's ruling is insufficient to support the trial court's 
findings.") Not only should trial court's findings be construed in favor of the ruling, if 
the findings of fact are lacking or even absent, the appellate court is required to assume 
that findings of fact exist to support the ruling if it is reasonable to do so. "[A] court 
upholds the trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would 
be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings." State v. Ramirez, 
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817 P.2d 774, 788 (Utah 1991). Even when "no findings of fact appear in the record, we 
assume that the trier of facts found them in accord with its decision, and we affirm the 
decision if from the evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to support it." Id. at 
787. This rule has been repeatedly affirmed. ww[W]hen a trial court has failed to make 
findings of fact on the record, we will assume that the trial court found facts in accord 
with its decision when it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such 
findings." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1994). This requirement is 
founded in good public policy. Unlike appellate courts, trial courts generally do not have 
a transcript of the trial to which they may cite. The trial court judge generally takes 
notes, admits exhibits and testimony, and then makes a ruling. In doing so, the trial court 
will weigh the sufficiency and the credibility of the evidence. An appellate court is less 
well equipped to conduct this analysis because a record or transcript will not reflect the 
nuances and the visual/auditory cues of the evidence as it came in at trial. When a trial 
court renders its ruling, it considers all of these nuances, even though the findings of fact 
may not and cannot reflect them. Ockey, Widdison, Ramirez, and others recognize these 
considerations and, thus, the importance of construing the findings in favor of the ruling 
of the trial court. 
Even more specifically, when addressing the imposition of a constructive trust, an 
appellate court is required "to view the evidence, including the fair inferences to be 
drawn therefrom, and all the circumstances shown thereby, in the light most favorable to 
the successful party below." Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1977). 
Appellate courts are to "affirm [a trial court's decision] if there is a reasonable basis for 
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doing so." Ockey, 2008 UT 37, f^ 34. Because appellate courts are to view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the successful party below and affirm a trial court's 
decision if there is a reasonable basis for doing so, appellate courts "must give great 
weight to findings made and to the inferences drawn by the trial judge." State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Findings of facts made by the trial court judge are 
rejected only "if [the appellate court] considers them to be clearly erroneous." Id. 
(emphasis added); State v. A House and 1.37 Acres of Real Property located at 392 
South, 886 P.2d, 534,535 (Utah 1994) (Appellate courts "reverse a trial court's findings 
of fact only if they are against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous.'"); Ockey, 2008 UT 37, ^ 34, ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous."). 
In the instant case, instead of following the practice prescribed by legal 
precedent—that is, determining if there was a reasonable basis for affirming the trial 
court's decision, construing the findings below in favor of the trial court's ruling, and 
reversing only if the findings are clearly erroneous—the Court of Appeals took 
extraordinary measures to reverse the trial court's decision by taking out of context one 
incomplete phrase in the Ruling of the trial court and misinterpreting its plain meaning 
when taken in context with the other findings made by the trial court. 
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied solely on one portion of 
one sentence in the trial court's Ruling, to the exclusion of the intent and meaning of all 
other findings of fact, and without examining the evidence to determine if the trial court 
was "clearly erroneous." The Court of Appeals determined, contrary to the conclusions 
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of the trial court, that Arnold did not have the appropriate intent to transfer the property 
into trust either "directly or by imposition of a legal constructive trust." Rawlings v. 
Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, f^ 22, 200 P.3d 662. Taken in context, the entire sentence 
by the trial court states: "The referenced evidence is persuasive on the subject of 
constructive trust and supports the conclusion that Arnold did not consider the 
conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership rights in the property." (Record p. 1535). 
The full sentence demonstrates that this finding was supposed to be viewed in the context 
of the other findings made by the court, or "[t]he referenced evidence" and was not meant 
to stand alone. A review of the "referenced evidence" preceding this sentence shows that 
the "intent" described is that Arnold intended to transfer legal title to the property without 
transferring equitable title to the property, which is the precise legal principle upon which 
trusts, both traditional and constructive, are founded. Examples of this "referenced 
evidence" cited by the Ruling of the trial court include: (1) "As Bryce Rawlings testified, 
his father signed the deed intending only to make it a temporary transfer, with the 
children to receive thereafter their expected shares of the farm. Other evidence 
corroborates that intent." (2) "Carol, Bryce, LaRell, and Dwayne were all told that the 
conveyance was because Arnold had to get the property out of his name as required by 
the welfare department. The Court is unpersuaded that Plaintiffs produced any 
persuasive testimony contradicting their testimony on that subject." (3) "Also, since the 
property conveyance in 1967, there has been an inadequate explanation as to why the 
siblings and their spouses, with the exception of Carol's husband, were asked to sign the 
quit-claim deed, Exhibit 68." (4) "LaRell Rawlings who testified that in late February or 
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early March, his father had a conversation with him in which Arnold suggested he needed 
to get the property out of his name because of the welfare department's requirement that 
it be transferred out of his name." (5) "Arnold indicated he was going to deed the 
property to Donald because of the welfare requirement for receiving assistance. That 
conversation was in the presence of Donald, was undisputed by Donald at trial and 
remains uncontradicted and unrebutted." (Record p. 1535-40). 
Thus, the "referenced evidence" supports the finding of a constructive trust. By 
latching onto this one incomplete phrase, the Court of Appeals erroneously failed to 
analyze and apply the other "referenced evidence" or findings made by the trial court. 
This rejection of the "referenced evidence" has the effect and purpose of a "clearly 
erroneous" finding, without reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence below. Such a 
holding does not satisfy the precedential requirement that the findings and inferences of 
the trial court be reviewed in a light most favorable to the trial court's decision below. 
Given that it is incumbent upon the Court of Appeals to "view the evidence . . . in the 
light most favorable to the successful party below," the Court of Appeals should not have 
reversed the trial court. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d at 710. By so reversing, the Court of 
Appeals has issued a decision which is in conflict with existing case law. 
A review of the trial court's Ruling shows how, when the Ruling is read in its 
entirety, the evidence and the findings of fact completely support the imposition of a 
constructive trust. Respondents Donald and Jeanette previously asserted, and the Court 
of Appeals erroneously agreed, that the trial court found that no transfer was intended by 
Arnold when he signed the 1967 deed. Upon a plain reading of the Ruling, these 
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statements clearly mistake the trial court's findings. At trial, the parties did not dispute 
that the 1967 deed transferred legal title to the family farm. The evidence showed that 
the whole family was gathered, each sibling signed a deed, and it was clear that a transfer 
of title was affected. Oddly, by latching on to one incomplete phrase of the trial court's 
Ruling, the Court of Appeals found that this signing was done without the intent to affect 
a transfer, which begs the question: If there was no intent to affect a transfer, then what 
was intended? Arnold and his children did not prepare and sign all these deeds just for 
fun. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals did not cross check its logic to ask whether its 
conclusion made sense. 
While it was clear and undisputed that Arnold transferred legal title to the farm, 
what was not initially clear, and what was at issue at the trial, was whether this transfer 
was intended to be a transfer of Arnold's ''ownership rights" in his farm, or in other 
words the equitable title or beneficial interest in the farm. If the legal title and the 
equitable title had been divided, then the imposition of constructive trust was appropriate. 
Why would the trial court state that a transfer of ownership rights was not intended and 
yet still impose a constructive trust? Because by affecting this transfer, Arnold bifurcated 
legal and equitable titles, thereby warranting the imposition of a constructive trust. 
The division of legal and equitable titles is the fundamental principal upon which 
trusts, both traditional and constructive, are based. Ockey, 2008 UT 37, f 11; In re 
Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, 144 P.3d 1129. The fundamental principal of law 
underlying trusts is that the legal title is held by the trustee, while the equitable title is 
held by the beneficiaries to the trust. Id. The trial court found that, although a transfer of 
-16-
the legal title occurred, it did not affect a transfer of Arnold's u ownership rights" in the 
farm. Arnold continued to refer to the farm as his own and treat it as if no change in 
ownership had occurred. In other words, when legal title was transferred, there was no 
intent to transfer equitable title. In the proper context, therefore the Ruling of the trial 
court clearly articulates a finding of an express trust. The trial court stated, wThe 
referenced evidence is persuasive on the subject of constructive trust and supports the 
conclusion that Arnold did not consider the conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership 
rights in the property." (Record p. 1535). When the trial court found that Arnold did not 
intend to transfer his "ownership rights in the property," that was an express finding that 
Arnold had not transferred the farm in fee simple to Donald and Jeanette, and that he 
intended to retain equitable title. In other words, it was an explicit finding of the intent to 
create an express trust.3 Thus, the trial court made findings concerning the creation of an 
express constructive trust. Ironically, the exact part of the Ruling which provides the 
legal basis for the imposition of a constructive trust is the part of the Ruling which the 
Court of Appeals misunderstood and misconstrued to hold as barring the imposition of a 
constructive trust. Thus the Court of Appeals failed to pick up on the nuances of the trial 
court's Ruling and erroneously reversed. As noted before, this error by the Court of 
Appeals violates important case law, including the requirement to construe the trial 
3
 Although this topic will be addressed more extensively below, it is worth pointing out 
now that if the Court of Appeals had simply recognized the import and meaning of the 
trial court's Ruling on this one issue, then it should have upheld the trial court's decision 
imposing a constructive trust, either on express constructive trust or equitable 
constructive trust grounds. 
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court's findings in favor of the ruling and to only disturb findings of fact when clear error 
is shown. By failing to construe the trial court's findings in favor of the Ruling, and by 
failing to perceive the meaning of the trial court's Ruling that equitable and legal titles to 
the farm had been divided, thereby requiring the imposition of a constructive trust, the 
Court of Appeals has issued a decision which departs from precedent and which conflicts 
with basic trust law. As such, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IS IN CONTRADICTION 
WITH EXISTING CASE LAW THAT INDICATES THAT THERE ARE 
UNLIMITED TYPES OF CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS. 
In its decision, the Court of Appeals attempts to clarify the law of constructive 
trusts by limiting the term into two distinct areas: express constructive trusts and 
equitable constructive trusts. This attempt to refine constructive trust law is in 
contradiction with existing case law, and violates the public policy objectives upon which 
constructive trust law is based. 
Several important Utah cases state that the doctrine of constructive trusts is not a 
legal theory which should be limited or narrowly defined. "An attempt to define or 
describe a constructive trust would be inadequate because such definition or description 
would be too narrow in its scope and fail to include important types of constructive 
trusts." Parks v. Zions First Nat Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 597 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted). 
u[T]he forms and varieties of these trusts . . . are practically without limits." Id. 
Furthermore, "[a] court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust, is bound by no 
unyielding formula, but is free to effect justice according to the equities peculiar to each 
transaction." Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1949). 
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These holdings are founded in good public policy. Inevitably, when a legal 
doctrine is narrowly defined, its applicability is decreased and certain aggrieved parties 
will no longer be able to avail themselves of this legal theory. Such a circumstance can 
lead to the unavailability of a remedy for wrongs committed and result in unfairness. 
Therefore, the doctrine of constructive trusts has been purposely left undefined so as to 
permit courts to fashion a remedy in equity to prevent injustice. The facts of this case are 
an example of how a narrow definition of constructive trusts can result in injustice. The 
trial court found that Arnold Rawlings deeded his farm to Donald to hold for the benefit 
of the family. The trial court further found that, later, Donald repudiated this trust and 
declared his intent to keep the farm for himself. In finding that no constructive trust can 
apply, the Court of Appeals recognized that its decision "produces results that, under a 
pure fairness standard, might arguably be deemed inequitable." Rawlings, 2008 UT App 
478, ]J 18. Thus, the Court of Appeals itself recognizes the conflict between its decision 
and the policy of fairness and equity underpinning an undefined constructive trust 
doctrine. 
Several cases present instances where the Utah Supreme Court indicated that a 
constructive trust should be imposed that did not fit within the new definitions articulated 
in the Court of Appeals' decision. In Acott v. Tomlinson, the Utah Supreme Court found 
that a transaction that is "unfair and lacking in disclosure of material facts" can qualify 
for imposition of a constructive trust. 337 P.2d 720, 724 (Utah 1959). Recently, in 
Parduhn v. Bennett, the Utah Supreme Court held that a constructive trust was an 
appropriate remedy for the provision of insurance proceeds to those equitably entitled to 
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them, rather than to those named on the policy as beneficiaries. 2002 UT 93, j^ 17, 61 
P.3d 982. Neither of these cases fits within the narrow definition of constructive trusts 
which the Court of Appeals has now articulated. 
Because Parks and Haws expressly state that the constructive trust doctrine cannot 
and should not be strictly defined, because Acott and Parduhn demonstrate the wisdom of 
this principle in action, and because the Court of Appeals has, in violation of Parks and 
Haws, limited and narrowly defined the constructive trust doctrine, the Court of Appeals 
has issued a decision which departs from precedent handed down by the Utah Supreme 
Court and which conflicts with the policy reasons of a broadly defined constructive trust 
doctrine. In contrast, the trial court issued an opinion which conformed to established 
precedent and which exercised a court's discretionary powers to impose a constructive 
trust when the evidence demonstrated that such an equitable remedy was justified. As 
such, the Court of Appeals decision should be reversed and the trial court's decision 
should be affirmed. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED THE TRIAL COURT'S 
IMPOSITION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST WITHOUT MAKING A 
FINDING OF AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc. establishes the standard by which 
constructive trust cases must be reviewed. "We can reverse the trial court's imposition of 
a constructive trust only for an abuse of discretion." Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water 
Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457, 462 (Utah App. 1996). This ruling has since been reiterated in 
Nielsen v. Nielsen, 2000 UT App 37, 2000 WL 33249399 (unpublished opinion, see 
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Appendix). Moreover, an appellate court "will only conclude the trial court abused its 
discretion if the ruling was beyond the limits of reasonability." Tolman, 912 P.2d at 462. 
A reading of the Court of Appeals' decision in this case, as contrasted with that in 
Tolman and Neilsen, leads to confusion about whether the Court of Appeals will address 
a constructive trust case as a question of law or as a question of equity. In its decision, 
the Court of Appeals indicates that it reviews "the legal requirements for the imposition 
of constructive trusts, for correctness." Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, j^ 10. The Court of 
Appeals then cites Flake v. Flake, a case involving the validity of a traditional trust 
instrument, rather than the imposition of a constructive trust, as the controlling authority. 
2003 UT 17, If 8, 71 P.3d 589. This holding suggests that the standard of review for the 
imposition of a constructive trust is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. The trial 
court made no findings as to what the "legal requirements for the imposition of a 
constructive trust[ ]" are. Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, If 10. Rather, the trial court 
imposed a constructive trust consistent with the case law as it found it. 
In its decision, the Court of Appeals suggests that existing case law on 
constructive trusts is "confusing." Id. at f 13. The Court of Appeals then proceeds to 
clarify the issue, bifurcating the doctrine between "express" and "equitable" constructive 
trusts. Id. at Tf 14-19. Once the Court of Appeals articulates the doctrine, however, no 
analysis is conducted as to whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a 
constructive trust in this case. The term 'abuse of discretion' is not used and there is no 
discussion as to whether the trial court went 'beyond the limits of reasonability'. No 
mention is made of either Tolman or Neils en. This failure to address whether the trial 
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court abused its discretion or acknowledge and deal with case law imposing that 
requirement undermines the statement by the Court of Appeals that constructive trusts are 
reviewed for correctness. 
As a result, a reader of Tolman, Neils en, and now Rawlings, is left with the 
irreconcilable standards articulated and followed in each, further confusing rather than 
clarifying the law of constructive trusts. Precedent establishes that equitable decisions 
are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, as Tolman and Neilsen indicate. See 
also, Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1041 (Utah 1995). The decision by 
the Court of Appeals now disregards and directly conflicts with these previous legal 
precedents. If the Court of Appeals wished to distinguish or overturn Tolman and 
Neilsen, it should have expressly so stated. Because the Court of Appeals has not done 
so, the Court of Appeals has issued a decision which contradicts precedent without 
explaining the discrepancy. 
In prior briefing Donald and Jeanette have argued that a finding of an erroneous 
conclusion of law implicitly includes a finding of abuse of discretion. To support this, 
Donald and Jeanette cited to Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., the latest in a long 
string of cases which hold that, in the context of discovery sanctions, an abuse of 
discretion can be found when there is an erroneous conclusion of law.4 This rule is 
expressly limited to discovery sanctions and does not have applicability elsewhere. Thus, 
the requirement laid down in Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co. Inc. and Nielsen v. 
4
 See also, Morton v. Continental Banking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997); Askew v. 
Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1996). 
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Neilsen, that an abuse of discretion must be found in order to overturn a trial court's 
imposition of a constructive trust, is good existing law. 
A simple review of the record demonstrates that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in imposing a constructive trust.5 The evidence presented showed that Arnold 
meant to convey his farm to Donald and Jeanette "to hold for the family." He continued 
to treat the farm as his and to refer to it as "my farm." The status quo continued after 
Arnold's death, in which all of the siblings continued to manage the farm, harvest fruit, 
and either divide the profits of give them to their mother. Moreover, the trial court found 
that Donald first repudiated the trust three and a half years before suit was filed. These 
findings of fact can only be overturned if they are clearly erroneous. Based on these 
findings of fact, it cannot be said that the imposition of a constructive trust is "beyond the 
limits of reasonability. Therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion and the 
imposition of a constructive trust must be upheld. 
Because it is well established case law that equitable decisions are reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion, and because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 
constructive trust, the Court of Appeals decision should be reversed and the trial court's 
decision should be upheld. 
5
 A more exhaustive examination of the evidence is included in a separate section below. 
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IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS REACHED A DECISION THAT FOUND 
CLEAR ERROR EVEN THOUGH DONALD AND JEANETTE FAILED 
TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
It is well established that when a "clearly erroneous" standard is applied or when a 
trial court's findings of fact are reversed, as has been done by the Court of Appeals in the 
instant case, "an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the findings 
and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings." Grayson Roper Ltd. P'ship v. 
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). Specifically, the appealing 
party 
must play the devil's advocate. Attorneys must extricate 
themselves from the client's shoes and fully assume the 
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the 
marshaling duty, the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings 
the appellant resists. Once the appellants have established 
every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they must 
ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence and show why those 
pillars fail to support the trial court's findings. They must 
show the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to 
be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them 
clearly erroneous. 
Oneida/SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1052-53 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis 
added); see also, West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 
1991); accord, In Re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 
(Utah App. 1993); Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993). 
- 2 4 -
"When the duty to marshal is not properly discharged, [appellate courts] refuse to 
consider the merits of the challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid." 
Oneida/SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1053 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also, 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 1989). An 
appellant's failure to meet this burden "allows [the appellate court] to affirm the [trial] 
court's findings on that basis alone." State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, \ 60, 28 P.3d 1278. 
It is not the duty of the appellate court to "review the trial court's findings where the 
party challenging those facts fails to marshal the evidence." Eggett v. Wasatch Energy 
Corporation, 2004 UT 28, f 10, 93 P.3d 193 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Moon v. 
Moon, 1999 UT App 12, \ 12, 973 P.2d 431). Rather, upon an appellant's failure to 
marshal, the appellate court "must assume that the record supports the findings of the trial 
court." Eggett, 2004 UT 28, jf 10 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Because 
Donald and Jeanette failed to marshal any evidence in support of the trial court's 
decision, precedent requires that all of the findings, including those supporting a finding 
of an equitable or express constructive trust in the instant case, should have been 
accepted as valid by the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the Court of Appeals' failure to 
reject Donald and Jeanette's substantive evidentiary arguments because of their failure to 
marshal the evidence directly contradicts existing case law. 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated that "we examine the particular 
elements urged by the [Appellants] and the sufficiency of the evidence to support those 
elements." Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, \ 20 (emphasis added). The proper procedure 
established by precedent when an appellate court examines the "sufficiency of the 
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evidence" requires the Court of Appeals to determine whether the appealing party has 
fully marshaled the evidence as set forth above. In the instant case, however, the Court 
of Appeals specifically rejected this established requirement and failed to take the 
required step of determining whether the appellants had appropriately marshaled the 
evidence. Surprisingly, Court of Appeals recognized that it was skipping an important 
analytical step. "[T]he Grantees ask us simply to reverse the district court without 
remand, arguing that the evidence presented can only lead to a finding of no enforceable 
trust." Id. (emphasis added). And, "[i]t is somewhat unusual for an appellate court to be 
asked to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support findings that were 
not actually made by the trial court." Id. (emphasis added). More than unusual, it was 
error—and a clear departure from binding precedent. All the "evidence presented" was 
in favor of the Siblings, because Donald and Jeanette had failed to marshal the evidence. 
Because the Court of Appeals recognized that it was reviewing the "sufficiency of the 
evidence" and because the Court of Appeals was required to review the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's decision, the Court of Appeals was required to 
apply the clearly erroneous standard and require Donald and Jeanette to marshal Ihe 
evidence.6 The Court of Appeals' failure to enforce this procedural requirement, 
grounded in prior precedent, is error and the Court of Appeals' decision should be 
reversed. 
6
 A separate section (below) has been devoted to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the imposition of a constructive trust, either on express or equitable grounds. 
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V. IN CONTRADICTION WITH EXISTING CASE LAW, THE COURT 
OF APPEALS CHANGED THE LEGAL STANDARD BY WHICH THIS 
CASE SHOULD BE DECIDED, BUT DID NOT REMAND THE CASE 
TO THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT IN LIGHT 
OF THE NEW LEGAL STANDARD. 
In handing down its decision, the Court of Appeals determined that the trial 
court's imposition of a constructive trust on equitable grounds was improper, and held 
that the proper analysis was under the theory of express constructive trusts. Rawlings, 
2008 UT App 478, *|ffi 16-19. However, after changing the legal standard for the analysis 
of the case, the Court of Appeals failed to remand the case for findings of fact consistent 
with the new legal standard. Id. at f^ 20. Because the Court of Appeals changed the legal 
standard by which this case should be judged, but failed to remand the case to the trial 
court to make findings under the new legal standard, the Court of Appeals has issued a 
decision which conflicts with existing case law. In general, when an appellate court 
issues a decision which holds that the trial court has applied the wrong legal standard, the 
case is remanded back to the trial court for findings consistent with the new legal 
standard. Moler v. CWManagement Corp., 2008 UT 46, t 14, 190 P3d 1250. "Because 
the district court applied the wrong standard, it did not make the findings necessary for us 
to conduct a review using the correct standard. Therefore, we remand for the district 
court to make factual determinations and apply the correct standard." Id. The reason for 
this procedural practice is self-evident: when a trial court makes findings of fact with a 
specific legal theory in mind, those findings will not reflect the legal elements of other, 
separate legal theories. As such, the legal elements of a different legal standard not 
considered by the trial court, will be lacking from the trial court's findings of fact. Thus, 
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the proper procedure is to remand in order for findings of fact to be made, consistent with 
the evidence presented, on the legal elements of the new legal theory. 
The Court of Appeals itself recognized this important procedural step, but, without 
explanation, refused to follow it. 
It is somewhat unusual for an appellate court to be asked to 
determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support 
findings that were not actually made by a trial court. 
Ordinarily, when the district court applies the wrong legal 
standard the matter is reversed and remanded so that the 
district court may consider the evidence under the proper 
standard. 
Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, f 20. However, after making this statement, the Court of 
Appeals inexplicably goes on to determine that the findings of fact made by the trial 
court, entered under an equitable constructive trust theory, were insufficient to support an 
express trust theory. By reversing the trial court's application of the equitable 
constructive trust theory, but not remanding the case for findings on the new legal 
standard imposed, the Court of Appeals directly violated the rule laid down in Moler that 
the case should have been remanded for findings of fact on the elements of an express 
constructive trust, the new legal standard. In the event that this Court reverses the Court 
of Appeals on the grounds articulated above this Court need not reach the issue of 
whether this case should be remanded. If in fact the Court does reach the question of 
remand, precedent makes it clear that the Court of Appeals erred in not remanding the 
case back to the trial court for findings consistent with the new legal standard and 
therefore the Court of Appeals should be reversed. 
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VL THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE IMPOSITION OF A 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, EITHER ON AN EXPRESS OR 
EQUITABLE THEORY. 
Assuming for the moment that the Court of Appeals was correct in narrowly 
defining the doctrine of constructive trusts into either express or equitable grounds, the 
evidence presented to the trial court and the trial court's subsequent findings of fact 
support the imposition of a constructive trust, either on an express or equitable theory. 
According to the Court of Appeals, an express trust can be created when the evidence 
demonstrates a "manifestation of intent to create it." Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, ^ 22 
{citing Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 151 (Utah 1987)). As has been articulated above, 
the trial court made the factual finding that, "The referenced evidence is persuasive on 
the subject of constructive trust and supports the conclusion that Arnold did not consider 
the conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership rights in the property." (Record p. 
1535). This finding indicates that, although Arnold transferred legal title to the property, 
he retained the "ownership rights" or equitable title for himself. When Arnold transferred 
the farm, he intended to, and in fact did, retain the equitable title to the farm, thereby 
demonstrating that he intended to create a trust. In other words, the evidence 
demonstrated a clear manifestation of intent to create a trust. The elements of an express 
constructive trust as articulated by the Court of Appeals are thereby satisfied. Thus, 
when the findings of fact are not taken out of context or misinterpreted, and when they 
are construed in favor of the Ruling of the trial court, the findings satisfy the 
requirements for the imposition of an express constructive trust. 
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The findings of the trial court and the evidence also support the imposition of a 
constructive trust on an equitable theory as well. Assuming again that the Court of 
Appeals was correct in narrowly defining constructive trusts, the findings and evidence 
both support the elements articulated by the Court of Appeals that there has been a 
wrongful act, unjust enrichment, and specific property that can be traced to the wrongful 
behavior. States the Court of Appeals, "in order for the Grantees' conduct to have been 
wrongful, Arnold would have needed to express his intent to transfer the property into 
trust—i.e., Arnold would have had to have attempted to create an express trust." This is 
precisely what the trial court determined that Arnold did. He transferred the family farm 
to Donald and Jeanette with the express intent that he retain his ownership rights in the 
farm. Arnold expressed the intent to create a trust. By the Court of Appeals own 
language, the wrongfulness prong is satisfied by Donald and Jeannette's failure to honor 
the trust under which they received the property. Donald and Jeannette would be unjustly 
enriched if they retained the property in violation of the trust under which the property 
was received, and specific property, i.e. the family farm and subsequent real estate trades, 
can be traced to this wrongful behavior. 
Alternately, the evidence supports the finding of other wrongful acts by Donald 
and Jeanette. Specifically, Donald and Jeanette took the subject property based upon a 
confidential relationship, and thereafter violated that confidence. When it is shown that, 
1) a party transferred certain property to another with the verbal understanding that the 
latter hold the property in trust for the benefit of the whole family, 2) that the transferor 
reposed confidence in the transferee, and 3) that the transferor and the transferee were 
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close relations, such as parent and child, then such evidence is sufficient to establish a 
confidential relationship. Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1949); Walker v. 
Walker, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1965); Hawkins v. Perry, 253 P.2d 372, 376 (Utah 
1953). "While kinship may be a factor in determining the existence of a legally 
significant confidential relationship, there must be a showing, in addition to the kinship, a 
reposal of confidence by one party and the resulting superiority and influence on the 
other party." Estate of Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d 345, 347-48 (Utah App. 1988) (citation 
omitted) rev'd on other grounds by Matter of Estate of Jones, 858 P.2d 983 (Utah 1993); 
See also Estate of loupe, 878 P.2d 1168, 1174 (Utah App. 1994). 
The evidence supports both the existence of an express trust, and the violation of 
that expression, and the existence of a confidential relationship and the violation of that 
confidence. Arnold Rawlings was suffering from cancer (eventually terminal) and was 
under heavy cobalt treatments. Consequently, he was under great stress to get the farm 
out of his name. (Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 45:20-25, 46:1-9, 47:5-13, 63:24-25, 
64:1-23, 133:16-22, 134:2-10). LaRell Rawlings, Donald's brother, testified that his 
father Arnold told LaRell that he wanted to get the farm out of his name so that he could 
qualify for government assistance due to his medical needs.7 Id. Arnold initially wanted 
to put the farm in LaRell's name, since he was doing most of the work on the farm. 
(Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 48:11-25, 49:1-25, 50:1-25, 51:1-3). LaRell suggested, 
7
 Arnold was specifically instructed by the welfare department to transfer the farm out of 
his name so that he could qualify for benefits that would cover the costs of his medical 
treatment. (See Letter from Welfare Department, Trial Exhibit 68). 
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instead, that Arnold put the farm in Dwayne's name, feeling that Dwayne would be 
fairest to the family. Id. Arnold finally settled on Donald as the person who would hold 
the farm for the benefit of the family, he being the oldest son. (Record p. 1449, Trans. 
Vol. I, page 48, lines 20-25; page 49, lines 1-25; page 50, lines 1-25; page 51, lines 1-24; 
page 177, lines 18-25; page 178, line 1). LaRell testified, "[W]hen I and my ex-wife 
Arlene went down to sign [the deed], Dad told me, he says 'This is not Donald's 
property. This is the family's/ He told me that before I signed it. I didn't ask him that; 
he told me that." (Record p. 1449, Trans. Vol. I, 60:8-12). LaRell further testified that 
his father and the rest of the family, including Donald, continued to treat the farm as 
family property, and to run the farm as a family farm, not as Donald's farm. (Record p. 
1449, Trans. Vol. I, 63:19-23, 66:3-8, 129:9-19, 130:2-11). The understanding was that 
the proceeds from the farm would continue to benefit Arnold, Cleo (the mother) and the 
rest of the family. (Record p. 1449, Trans. Vol. I, 182:23-25, 184:16-23, 191:3-18). 
LaRell testified: 
Q. At the time did you believe that Donald would do what your 
father told you was to be done with the farm? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. At that time you trusted that he would do that? 
A. Yes, I did. 
(Record p. 1449, Trans. Vol. I, 127:19-25, 128:1-3). 
Bryce Rawlings offered similar testimony to that of LaRell. He testified that 
Donald and Arnold approached Bryce, informed him that the farm needed to be taken out 
of Arnold's name, and that Donald would hold the farm for the benefit of the family. 
(Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. II, 224:2-5, 238:4-8). In addition, the children continued to 
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work the farm, and the farm continued to be treated as a family asset. (Record p. 1451, 
Trans. Vol. II, 229:23-25, 233:21-25, 234:1, 238:9-12, 248:6-20, 252:10-23, 254:1-10). 
Proceeds from the farm went to Arnold and Cleo. Id. Bryce further indicated that 
Donald exercised influence over the family in that he managed the legal affairs of the 
farm and dealt with legal disputes. (Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. II, 255:20-25, 256:1-16, 
298:19-25, 299:1). The proceeds of these legal disputes were distributed to both siblings 
and parent, with the understanding that all of the family was entitled to the proceeds, 
because Donald was holding the farm in trust for the family. Id. Such distribution would 
not have been necessary if Donald had not been holding the farm for the benefit of the 
family. It was not until this case was commenced that the siblings discovered that 
Donald had not properly distributed the proceeds from these legal disputes, and had kept 
the majority of the funds for himself. Regardless of the amount of funds dispersed, by 
distributing funds Donald acknowledged that he was holding the farm in trust. 
Dwayne Rawlings testified that Arnold and Donald approached him on the 
driveway of Arnold's house, and explained the medical situation and the need to get the 
farm out of Arnold's name. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 333:9-25, 334:1-10, 381:4-
15, 388:20-25, 389:1-5. Arnold specifically told Dwayne, in the presence of Donald, 
"that they had to get it out of Dad's name, and they were going to put it in Donald's name 
to hold it for the rest of the family." (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 333:21-23). Arnold 
told Dwayne that the farm would be divided up between the family members at a later 
time. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 335:23-25, 336:1-2). Further, Donald exercised 
influence and deceit over the family in that, when managing a boundary dispute, he 
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falsely represented to the family that additional deeds were required before he could 
proceed with litigation on behalf of the family. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 346:10-
22, 352:9-19, 398:3-7, Record p. 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill, 430:11-21). Throughout the years 
the family trusted Donald and followed his lead both in terms of legal issues and in 
finances. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 396:11-25, Record p. 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill, 
420:10-20, 421:1-20, 430:11-21, 462:3-13). 
Donald and Jeanette have previously asserted that neither a confidential 
relationship nor a constructive trust can be established by only 'self-serving' testimony. 
While such argument might have some merit if the only evidence supporting the trial 
court's imposition of a constructive trust were the self-serving testimony of the siblings, 
the trial court had much more than sibling testimony on which to base its conclusions. 
There is ample evidence outside the testimony of interested parties which both 
substantiates and independently establishes propriety of imposing a constructive trust. 
Several letters and affidavits written three years after the transfer, both by Arnold, and by 
associates of his who were prominent in the community, substantiate the testimony. 
These letters were written after the transfer of the title of the farm to Donald, and yet, 
Arnold refers to the farm as "my farm" and repeatedly asserts and implies ownership and 
control. (See Trial Exhibits 19, 20). Arnold's associates do the same. (See Trial 
Exhibits 21-29). After Arnold's death, Cleo continued to pay the taxes on the farm, not 
Donald. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 280:14-16). 
Next, Donald sold a portion of the farm and purchased some commercial property 
from the proceeds of the sale upon which he and Dwayne operated a business. (Record p. 
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1459, Trans. Vol. II, 349:9-25, 350:12-22, 354:24-25, 355:1-6). The brothers recognized 
that surplus proceeds of this business were to be held for the benefit of the family. Id. 
The record shows that Donald deeded Dwayne a one half interest in a small portion of the 
farm (known as the Pinegar lot) which was subsequently traded for some commercial 
property to start a business. Donald deeded this half interest to Dwayne without 
receiving or requiring any remuneration in return. Id. Such actions further substantiate 
that the farm and its derivatives were family assets, not Donald's assets. 
Furthermore, both Donald and Jeanette, against their own interest, failed to rebut 
any of the testimony given in support of a confidential relationship. Before trial Donald 
and Jeanette had asserted that they had paid off a small amount of back taxes and in 
return, Arnold had deeded them the entire farm. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 333:1-
25, 334:1-4). At trial, however, it was shown that Dwayne had paid the majority of these 
back taxes, and that he had done so on behalf of the family. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. 
11, 392:7-25). In addition, Donald did not rebut or dispute the testimony concerning his 
presence during both the conversation with Dwayne, Arnold and himself, and the 
conversation with LaRell, Arnold and himself. The uncontroverted testimony in regard 
to those conversations was that Donald indicated that he would hold the farm for the 
benefit of the family. (Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 48:20-25, 49:1-25, 50:1-25, 51:1-
24, 52:21-25, 53:1-4, 60:8-12, 134:2-16, Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 224:2-5, 238:9-
12, 333:9-25, 334:1-10, 335:23-25, 336:1-2, 381:4-15, 388:20-25, 389:1-5). Donald had 
ample opportunity to rebut this testimony, since he also was at the meetings, but he did 
not, thereby indicating that the testimony was truthful. Moreover, the uncontroverted 
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evidence is that after settlement of the border dispute, Donald distributed some of the 
proceeds to the family, thereby indicating that he was holding for the benefit of the 
family. (Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 162:2-7, Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 239:22-
25, 240:1-17, 255:20-24, 290:21-25, 291:1-3, 351:1-25, 352:1-19). In sum, there is 
abundant evidence on which the trial court relied to find that Arnold expressed an intent 
to transfer the property in trust to Donald, and to support a finding that Donald was in a 
confidential relationship with his father. Donald's violation of the express trust and his 
violation of the confidential relationship clearly establish the wrongful act necessary for 
the imposition of an equitable constructive trust. Furthermore, the abundance of evidence 
on this issue is definitive; the trial court's ruling was not an abuse of discretion and was 
not clearly erroneous. Consequently, the Court of Appeals' decision should be reversed 
and the trial court's Ruling should be affirmed. 
VII. THE DISCOVERY RULE OPERATED TO TOLL THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS UNTIL THE TRUST WAS REPUDIATED, AND THE 
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE TRUST 
WAS NOT REPUDIATED UNTIL THE FALL OF 1993. 
As was outlined above, the question of whether the statute of limitations was 
tolled by the discovery rule until the trust was repudiated is a question which Appellants 
indicated would be briefed. (See Reply to Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
page 5). Moreover, the issue of whether the discovery rule acts to toll the statute of 
limitations is a subsidiary question fairly encompassed within the question of "[wjhether 
the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court's imposition of a constructive 
trust." See Order of Utah Supreme Court, dated April 1, 2009. 
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Statute of limitations issues in constructive trust actions are complicated. Being a 
creature of equity, the constructive trust requires the trial court to consider all the 
evidence before it can rule on the issue. This is true because in constructive trust cases, 
and especially those involving family members, there is a presumption that the 'discovery 
rule' tolls the statute of limitations until discovery of repudiation of the trust. Answering 
this question requires factual findings, which generally have to be resolved at trial. The 
district court directly acknowledged this issue at the outset of the case. (Record p. 259-
260). The uncontradicted evidence is that Donald and Jeanette first repudiated the trust 
(to Dwayne only) in early November of 1993. (Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 355:7-25, 
356:1-25, 357:1-11; Record p. 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill, 453:7-25, 454:1-7). Three and a half 
years later, Appellees filed their claim for constructive trust. (Record p. 24). 
The discovery rule is an equitable doctrine which tolls the statute of limitations 
when a person lacks knowledge of the facts giving rise to a cause of action. 
While a statute of limitations generally begins running when a 
plaintiff has a completed cause of action, the discovery rule 
may nonetheless operate to toll a statute of limitations until 
the time at which a party discovered or reasonably should 
have discovered facts forming the basis for the cause of 
action. 
In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, f35, 144 P.3d 1129 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted); Christiansen v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2006 UT App 180, ^ fl2, 136 P.3d 
1266. 
[Tjhere are two situations in which an equitable discovery 
rule will operate to toll a statute of limitations: (1) where a 
plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action 
because of the defendant's concealment or misleading 
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conduct, and (2) where the case presents exceptional 
circumstances and the application of the general rule would 
be irrational or unjust. 
Hoopiiaina, 2006 UT 53, Tf35 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under the 
concealment prong of the discovery rule the claimant must demonstrate that "he neither 
discovered nor reasonably should have discovered the facts underlying the cause of 
action before the limitations period expired due to the defendant's concealment." Id. at 
^|36. When such a factual circumstance is established, the "statute of limitations will not 
commence running until the date the plaintiff possessed actual or constructive knowledge 
of the facts forming the basis of his or her cause of action." Id. (internal citations 
omitted). 
Furthermore, in cases involving families and constructive trusts, the discovery rale 
presumptively applies. 
[W]hen a case involves a trust, a trustee cannot take 
advantage of a statute of limitations defense until something 
has occurred to give the beneficiary a "clear indication" that a 
breach or repudiation has occurred, or, alternatively, the 
circumstances must be such that the beneficiary must be 
charged with knowledge of such a repudiation or breach. 
Snow v. Rudd, 2000 UT 20, ^fll, 998 P.2d 262 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). A statute of limitations defense "is not available to a trustee as against his 
beneficiaries until something has occurred to give a clear indication to them that he has 
repudiated his trust; or the circumstances are such that they must be charged with 
knowledge of such repudiation." Walker v. Walker, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 1965); See 
also Snow, 2000 UT 20, f^l 1. Although a court would normally conduct a balancing test 
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to determine whether the discovery rule should apply, ww[i]n the category of cases 
involving beneficiaries' claims of trustee misconduct, [a court has], in effect, already 
conducted this balancing test." Snow, 2000 UT 20, If 11. 
Good public policy undergirds the presumptive application of the discovery rule to 
cases involving familial relations and constructive trusts. The case of Walker v. Walker is 
particularly on point. 404 P.2d 253 (Utah 1965). In Walker, the father of the family died 
much earlier than did the mother, leaving a substantial estate. Id. at 255. The estate was 
not probated and the mother continued to manage the affairs of the family assets, 
including a mercantile store and farm land. Id. When the family fell on hard times and 
family assets were jeopardized, the oldest son agreed to take title to the store and farm in 
order to avoid the loss of the property. Id. at 255-56. Mother and siblings continued to 
live in the house, work on the family farm, and run the family business for another thirty 
six years. Id. at 256. Finally, when the mother died, the eldest son repudiated his trust 
and declared that he considered the property to be exclusively his. Id. In addressing the 
issue of statute of limitations and laches, the court found that in such cases, the statute 
does not begin to run until the beneficiaries have actual or constructive notice of 
repudiation of the trust. Id. at 257. This was especially true because of the close familial 
relations involved. 
Where a near relative is involved courts are less inclined to 
find a repudiation. This is so because of the greater 
likelihood that the beneficiaries have reposed confidence in 
him; and also, they would have a natural reluctance to sue 
him unless circumstances forced them to do so. . . . Under the 
facts shown there wouldn't be anything strange or 
unreasonable about the plaintiffs assuming, as they say they 
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did, that the defendant was holding the property for the family 
until after the death of their mother, so that she would be 
provided with a home; and that after her death, their father's 
estate would be settled and each would receive his share. 
These considerations together with the fact that some 
members of the family remained in the property, make the 
refusal of the trial court to apply laches against the plaintiffs 
harmonize with reason. 
Id. (emphasis added); See also Acott v. Tomlinson, 337 P.2d 720, 724 (Utah 1959). More 
recently, the Utah Supreme Court clarified this doctrine in Snow v. Rudd. 2000 UT 20. 
[W]here a trustee is sued by a beneficiary or claims a 
violation of the trust, it constitutes an "exceptional 
circumstance" calling for application of the discovery rule. 
We have held that under certain "exceptional circumstances" 
we will find that a rigid application of the statute of 
limitations may be "irrational and unjust" and thus make the 
discovery rule available. To determine when this is the case, 
we apply a balancing test to weigh "the hardship imposed on 
the claimant by the application of the statute of limitations 
against any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the 
passage of time." In the category of cases involving 
beneficiaries' claims of trustee misconduct, we have, in 
effect, already conducted this balancing test. In Acott and 
Walker we found, in substance, that to not apply the 
discovery rule would lead to unjust results because of the 
close familial relationship involved. In such a situation, the 
beneficiary will be less likely to question the motives of the 
trustee and less likely to sue. Therefore, it is appropriate to 
protect the interests of a beneficiary by applying the 
discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations until the 
beneficiary knows or should know of the alleged breach or 
repudiation." 
Snow, 2000 UT 20, ^11 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Early on in the instant case, while ruling on a motion for summary judgment based 
on a statute of limitations theory, the trial court correctly noted that this case presents an 
issue where the discovery rule might appropriately apply. (Record p. 259-260). Later, at 
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trial, the district court appropriately found that the case at bar does in fact present all the 
factual circumstances required to presumptively apply the discovery rule to toll the 
statute of limitations: the parties are siblings, and the evidence strongly demonstrates that 
both Arnold and each sibling reposed trust in Donald that he would hold the farm for the 
benefit of the family. (See Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 48:20-25, 49:1-25, 50:1-25, 
51:1-24, 52:21-25, 53:1-4, 60:8-12, 127:19-25, 128:1-3, 184:16-23, 191:2-18; Record p. 
1459, Trans. Vol. II, 224:2-5, 238:4-8, 333:1-25, 334:1-10, 335:23-25, 336:1-2, 381:4-15, 
388:20-25, 389:1-5, 396:11-25; Record p. 1461, Trans. Vol. Ill, 420:10-20, 421:1-20, 
430:11-21, 453:7-25, 454:1-7, 462:3-13; Trial Exhibits 19-29). Donald and Jeanette 
produced no evidence at trial that the parties were not siblings, and almost no evidence 
that the siblings did not repose trust in Donald and Jeanette. The trial court correctly 
sided with the great weight of the evidence. Thus, the findings of fact are not clearly 
erroneous, and the district court did not abuse its discretion. 
Because the discovery rule applies to the facts of this case, the only remaining 
question is whether and when repudiation occurred. In other words, when did the 
siblings know, or when should they have known that Donald and Jeanette were no longer 
going to honor their duties as trustees? When did Donald and Jeanette demonstrate that 
they would treat the family farm as solely their own property? In addressing this 
question, the trial court made the following factual finding: 
In 1993 Donald traded a property known as the Hellwell 
property, shown as Exhibit [4]1, for 6.5 acres in Washington 
County, Utah. It was only after Dwayne became aware of the 
Hellwell trade that Donald or his spouse, for the first time, 
told any siblings they believed they owned the trust property, 
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and they were using the funds or income from the trust 
property in any way they chose. 
(Record p. 1561). In other words, repudiation of the trust did not occur until after 
Dwayne knew of the Hellwell trade, and of Donald's intent on how he was planning to 
use the traded property. Substantial evidence supports this factual finding. Dwayne 
Rawlings testified that he and the rest of the family learned of the Hellwell trade in the 
summer of 1993, a few months after it occurred. (Record p. 1461, Trans. Vol. II, 453:7-
25, 454:1-7). When the Hellwell trade was discovered by the siblings, it was generally 
understood that the trade was done for the benefit of the family. (Record p. 1461, Trans. 
Vol. Ill 453:7-25, 454:1-7; Record p. 1459, Trans. Vol. II, 355:7-25, 356:1-25, 357:1-11). 
It was not until late October or early November of 1993 that Dwayne finally learned of 
Donald's true intentions. Dwayne testified that in late October or early November of 
1993, he and Donald had a conversation about the Hellwell trade. 
A. . . . I asked him what he'd give Mother for compensation 
for these two lots; and he told me he didn't give her anything. 
It was his lot. I says, "What have you - - how did you 
compensate Mother for the topsoil you've been taking off the 
farm?" He says, "I didn't compensate her at all. It was my 
property. It was my soil. I sold it, and put the money in my 
account, and spent it any way I wanted to." 
Then I said, "What about your brothers, your three brothers?" 
I said, "Why don't you - -" after he told me it was his 
property, I said, "Why don't you transfer a lot to each one of 
your two brothers and sister?" I said, "That would really help 
with the family relations." He said, "I'm not going to give 
that blank, blank, blank Larell anything." I said, "What about 
Carol and Bryce?" "I'm not going to give them anything 
either." 
I finished up - - I told him at that time, I says, "I'll finish up 
the job I'm working on," and I was doing most of the work 
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for the business. "I'll finish up the jobs I'm doing, and I will 
not do any more with you." 
Q. Was that the reason? 
A. That was the reason. 
Q. That caused the break up of your business? 
A. Yes. 
The district court specifically found that this was "the first time" that Donald gave 
an indication to anyone that he would no longer hold for the benefit of the family, and 
repudiated the trust. Furthermore, LaRell Rawlings testified that he had no notice that 
Donald had begun to treat the family farm as his personal property until after this action 
was initially filed by Donald. (Record p. 1451, Trans. Vol. I, 177:18-25, 178:1). Three 
and a half years after Donald and Dwayne's conversation, on May 8, 1997, Dwayne and 
his siblings filed a counterclaim against Donald alleging constructive trust, well within 
the four year statute of limitations period. (Record p. 23-28). 
Interestingly, although both Donald and Jeanette took the stand at trial, neither 
testified as to the repudiation of the trust. The Hellwell property was not mentioned in 
their testimony; the 1993 conversation with Dwayne was not brought up. Donald and 
Jeanette made no efforts to rebut the evidence and testimony regarding repudiation of the 
trust. Naturally, the trial court followed the only evidence presented on repudiation, and 
correctly found that Donald initially repudiated the trust in the fall of 1993. Therefore, 
Appellants' 1997 counterclaim for constructive trust was well within the statute of 
limitations. The Court of Appeals' decision reversing trial court's imposition of a 
constructive trust, and failing to address the issue of whether the discovery rule operates 
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to toll the statute of limitations until the trust was repudiated was error, and should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated, the decision of the Court of Appeals violates precedent and 
reaches a decision which does not conform with the findings of fact, and which does not 
make sense. Because the Court of Appeals fails to construe the findings of fact in favor 
of the trial court's ruling, and instead takes one phrase of the ruling out of context and 
misinterprets it; because the findings of fact, when read correctly, establish that legal and 
equitable titles were intended to be divided and an express trust established; because the 
Court of Appeals limits and narrowly defines the doctrine of constructive trusts; because 
the Court of Appeals fails to find an abuse of discretion; because the Court of Appeals 
examines the evidence and finds clear error when the evidence had not been marshaled; 
because the Court of Appeals fails to remand the case to the trial court after changing the 
legal standard; because the evidence satisfies the requirements for the imposition of a 
constructive trust, either on express or equitable grounds; and because the discovery rule 
operates to toll the statute of limitations until the trust was repudiated, the decision of the 
Court of Appeals was in error. For these reasons the decision of the Court of Appeals 
must be reversed and the ruling of the trial court upheld. 
DATED and SIGNED this IV ""day of May, 2009. 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
M. Dayle Jeffs / 
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Background: Siblings of grantees of a family farm 
under a 1967 deed brought action asserting grantees 
held the farm in trust for the entire surviving family 
under a constructive trust theory. The District Court, 
Provo Department, Fred D. Howard, J., imposed an 
equitable constructive trust on the grantees. Grantees 
appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Thome, Associate 
P.J., held that: 
(1) law of express trusts rather than law of equitable 
constructive trusts applied to claim of siblings; 
(2) evidence was insufficient to establish trust based 
on purported unwritten express trust; and 
(3) grantees did not act in bad faith at mediation to 
justify sanctions. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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Before GREENWOOD, P.J., THORNE, Associate 
P.J., andORME, J. 
OPINION 
TMORNE, Associate Presiding Judge: 
1[ 1 Donald and Jeanette Rawlings (collectively, the 
Grantees) appeal from the district court's entry of 
judgment finding an equitable constructive trust in 
favor of Dwayne and Paulette Rawlings, LaRell 
Rawlings, Bryce C. Rawlings, and Carol Lynn R. 
Masterson (collectively, the Siblings).— We reverse 
the judgment of the district court, as well as an order 
imposing sanctions against the Grantees for failing to 
participate in mediation proceedings in good faith. 
FN 1. Dwayne Rawlings's full name is Arnold 
Dwayne Rawlings, and LaRell Rawlings's 
full name is Theron LaRell Rawlings. We 
refer to them as Dwayne and LaRell to be 
consistent with references in the record and 
to differentiate between Dwayne Rawlings 
and his father, Arnold Rawlings. We also 
note that when we employ the term the 
Siblings as a descriptor of the beneficiaries of 
the purported trust in this case, the term in-
cludes all purported beneficiaries, including 
Grantees and Arnold and Cleo Rawlings. 
If 2 This dispute centers on a family farm that Arnold 
Rawlings transferred to the Grantees by deed in 1967. 
The Grantees are Arnold and Cleo Rawlings's oldest 
son, Donald, and Donald's wife, Jeanette. The Siblings 
comprise the rest of Arnold and Cleo's children, along 
with Dwayne's wife, Paulette. As summarized in 
greater detail below, the Grantees' position in this 
litigation is that they own the farm in fee simple pur-
suant to the 1967 deed from Arnold. The Siblings 
argue that the Grantees hold the farm in trust for the 
entire surviving family under a constructive trust 
theory. After a four-day trial exploring the circums-
tances of the 1967 deed, the district court agreed with 
the Siblings and imposed an equitable constructive 
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trust on the Grantees in regard to the farm. 
BACKGROUND 
1^3 Arnold acquired the farm from his mother in 1944. 
In 1966, Arnold was diagnosed with cancer. Arnold 
believed that he would be unable to obtain 
state-provided cancer treatment if he retained the farm 
in his name. This belief motivated Arnold to explore 
the possibility of transferring the farm to one of his 
sons as a means of getting it out of his name while still 
keeping it in the family. On March 24, 1967, Arnold 
conveyed the farm to the Grantees by warranty deed. 
Arnold's wife, Cleo, also signed the warranty deed 
although her name was not on the title to the farm. 
That same day, each of the Siblings signed quit-claim 
deeds transferring any interest they may have had in 
the farm to the Grantees. The Siblings contend that the 
transfer to the Grantees was always meant to be for 
their collective benefit as a family farm. 
T[ 4 After the transfer, Arnold and Cleo continued to 
live and work on the farm as if no transfer had oc-
curred. When Arnold died in 1971, Cleo continued to 
live on the farm and family members worked the farm 
for her benefit. In 1974, the Grantees litigated a 
boundary dispute with the farm's southern neighbor. 
The Grantees' success in litigating the matter led to a 
settlement with several title companies, who paid the 
Grantees $52,000. The Grantees kept the bulk of that 
money but did distribute portions to Cleo and the 
Siblings. 
11 5 In 1978, the Grantees deeded one of the lots 
comprising the farm to themselves and Dwayne and 
Paulette in joint tenancy. About this same time, Do-
nald and Dwayne began a business selling topsoil. In 
1993, the Grantees asserted, allegedly for the first 
time, that they owned the farm free and clear and were 
not holding it in trust for the Siblings. This dispute 
over the nature of the Grantees' ownership interest in 
the farm led to the dissolution of Donald and 
Dwayne's *665 business, and the Grantees eventually 
sued Dwayne and Paulette. Dwayne and Paulette filed 
a counterclaim and self-described third-party com-
plaint against the Grantees in their individual capaci-
ties and as trustees of an alleged trust, asserting a 
constructive trust over the farm property. The re-
mainder of the Siblings joined in the counterclaim and 
third-party complaint. After extensive discovery, the 
district court bifurcated the parties' disputes and de-
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cided to first address the constructive trust issue. 
T| 6 Prior to trial, the district court ordered the parties to 
mediate their disputes. The Grantees informed the 
Siblings before mediation that they had no intent of 
considering any settlement of the matter. The Grantees 
appeared at the mediation session and told the me-
diator the same thing. The mediation session did not 
result in a settlement. Afterwards, the Siblings sought 
sanctions from the Grantees, alleging that they did not 
participate in mediation in good faith. The district 
court agreed, and ordered the Grantees to pay the 
Siblings $2937 in expenses that the Siblings had in-
curred during the mediation process. 
K 7 A four-day trial on the constructive trust issue 
commenced on March 12, 2007. The bulk of the trial 
was comprised of the Siblings' testimony describing 
the circumstances of the 1967 transfer and the family's 
treatment of the farm property after that date. Several 
of the Siblings testified to conversations that they had 
had with Arnold prior to the transfer, conversations 
that the Siblings interpreted as expressing an intent to 
place the farm in trust. The Grantees used the Siblings' 
testimony to explore issues regarding the Grantees' 
payment of debts owed by Arnold, which the Grantees 
argued supported their position that Arnold intended 
to transfer the farm to them in fee simple. 
H 8 At the close of the Siblings' evidence, the Grantees 
moved for dismissal of the Siblings' constructive 1rust 
claims. The Grantees' motion and the Siblings' oppo-
sition to that motion relied on very different legal 
theories as to how the district court should evaluate the 
evidence at trial. The Grantees argued that the only 
way a constructive trust could have arisen in this case 
is if Arnold had attempted to create an express trust at 
the time of the transfer, but that express trust failed 
due to the lack of a writing evidencing the trust. Under 
the Grantees' theory, no trust was created unless Ar-
nold intended to transfer the farm property into trust 
and Arnold and the Grantees were in a confidential 
relationship at the time of the transfer. The Siblings 
theory was much broader, asserting that the district 
court could simply employ its equitable powers to 
impose a constructive trust if it felt the circumstances 
warranted it. The district court requested written 
briefing from the parties on their respective positions 
and took the matter under advisement. The Grantees 
then presented their case, comprised solely of their 
own brief testimony, and the trial concluded. 
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Tl 9 Two months after trial, the district court ruled on 
the constructive trust issue. The district court ex-
pressly adopted the Siblings' argument that it could 
impose a trust relying solely on equitable principles 
and without regard to Arnold's intent or relationship to 
the Grantees at the time of transfer. The ruling recited 
an extensive factual summary of the testimony at trial, 
rejected the Grantees' alternative argument that the 
transfer was in consideration of them paying off a 
prior mortgage, and determined that Arnold had in-
tended the conveyance solely as a mechanism to pro-
tect the family's ownership of the farm and did not 
intend the deed to operate as an actual transfer at all. 
The ruling concluded with the statement that the dis-
trict court was uexercis[ing] its equitable powers to 
impose a constructive trust." In findings of fact pre-
pared from the district court's ruling and later signed 
by the court, the court found as a factual matter that 
"Arnold did not consider the [1967] conveyance to be 
a transfer of his ownership rights in the [farm]." 
ISM k> AM) ^ \ .i > \iu>-- < ' '•• "' -
[1"1[2] €, in On appeal from the district court's final 
order imposing an equitable constructive trust, the 
Grantees argue that the Siblings failed to present suf-
ficient evidence in the district court to support the 
imposition of a trust under the circumstances of this 
*666 case.— " 'When an appellant is essentially 
challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence, a 
clearly erroneous standard of appellate review ap-
plies/ " Hi-Countiy Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. 
Bazlev & Co., 2008 UT App 105,11 10, 182 P.3d 417 
(quoting Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 487, 
489 (Utah Ct.App.1993)). However, we review a 
district court's decisions on questions of law, such as 
the legal requirements for the imposition of construc-
tive trusts, for correctness. See, e.g., Flake v. Flake, 
2003 UT 17, H 8, 71 P.3d 589 ("The validity of [a] 
trust is an issue of law, which we review for correct-
ness."). 
FN2. The Grantees also raise a statute of li-
mitations argument that we decline to ad-
dress in light of our resolution of the case in 
the Grantees' favor on other grounds. 
[311| 11 The Grantees also argue that the district court 
erred when it imposed sanctions against the Grantees 
based on their alleged lack of good faith participation 
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in court-ordered mediation. The proper interpretation 
of court rules presents an issue of law that we review 
for correctness. See, e.g., N.A.R., Inc. v. Fair, 2000 
UT App 62, 1] 5, 997 P.2d 343 (" CA trial court's in-
terpretation of a rule in the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration presents a question of law reviewed 
for correctness.' " (quoting Loporto v. Hoegemann, 
1999 UT App 175,11 5, 982 P.2d 586)).. 
ANATYSIS 
I. I lie District Court's Finding of an Equitable Con-
structive Trust 
J_4] )\ 12 Ihe Grantees first challenge the evidentiary 
basis for the district court's imposition of an equitable 
constructive trust. Specifically, the Grantees argue 
that there is no evidence to support two elements that 
they assert must exist in order to impose a constructive 
trust in this case: (1) that a confidential relationship 
existed between Arnold and the Grantees at the time 
Arnold transferred the farm to the Grantees and (2) 
that Arnold intended to transfer ownership of the farm 
to the Grantees in trust for the Siblings. The Siblings 
counter that neither a confidential relationship nor any 
particular intent on the part of Arnold is a prerequisite 
to a court's imposition of a constructive trust on purely 
equitable principles. Thus, we first determine the 
proper legal analysis for the constructive trust issue 
and then turn to the question of whether the Grantees 
have identified an evidentiary barrier to the imposition 
of a trust in favor of the Siblings. 
A. Trust Requirements 
II 13 The Grantees and the Siblings present us, and 
presented the district court, with two conflicting 
theories for the proper analysis of this case. Confu-
singly, although the theories are conceptually quite 
different, they are both properly referred to as con-
structive trusts. The legal constructive trust theory 
urged by the Grantees allows for the enforcement, in 
certain circumstances, of an express trust that would 
otherwise be unenforceable. By contrast, the Siblings' 
equitable constructive trust approach does not enforce 
an otherwise unenforceable express trust, but rather 
creates and imposes a trust in equity to avoid the un-
just enrichment of one who has committed some 
wrongful act. The district court accepted the Siblings' 
theory of the case and ruled accordingly. We disagree, 
and hold that, because the Siblings' claim for relief 
© 2009 1 homson Rei iters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
200 P.3d 662 
200 P.3d 662, 620 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 2008 UT App 478 
(Cite as: 200 P.3d 662) 
tion session. According to the Siblings' motion in the 
district court, the Grantees informed the Siblings prior 
to mediation that the Grantees did not want to partic-
ipate in mediation and did not intend to make any 
proposals or consider any settlement offers in the 
mediation. The Siblings also asserted that "[a]t the 
June 27, 2006 mediation, [the Grantees] informed the 
mediator that they would neither make any offer nor 
consider any offer that he might present to them, and 
that they would refuse to attempt to resolve this case 
other than to let the matter go to trial." The district 
court found that the Grantees "came to the mediation 
with a fully formed intention not to participate in the 
mediation in good faith and had determined that they 
would not be prepared to discuss all relevant issues in 
this case" and awarded sanctions against the Grantees. 
K 26 Mediation proceedings are governed by rule 101 
of the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative 
Dispute Resolution. See Utah R. Ct. ADR 101. Rule 
101(c) mandates that "[a]ll parties shall be present, 
shall be prepared to discuss, and shall have the au-
thority to fully settle, all relevant issues in the case." 
Id. R. 101(c). However, "[t]he parties may terminate 
the proceedings at any time." Id. R. 101(g). The rule 
further contemplates the circumstances under which 
sanctions may be imposed against a party: "Upon 
written recommendation by the mediator or motion by 
any party, the court may order absent parties to show 
cause why they failed to attend the mediation confe-
rence and, if appropriate, why sanctions should not be 
imposed." Id. R. 101(h) (emphasis added). 
TI 27 Here, it is undisputed that the Grantees attended 
the mediation conference. However, the district court 
concluded that the Grantees' actions at and prior to the 
conference violated rule 101(c). Interpreting that rule, 
the district court stated that it "requires good faith 
discussion, and while parties may terminate that 
process, they may only do so after they have engaged 
in the settlement process in good faith." This inter-
pretation is flatly contradicted by language elsewhere 
in the rule, which clearly states that "parties may 
terminate the proceedings at any time." See Utah R. 
Ct. ADR 101(g) (emphasis added). The rule also 
contemplates sanctions only when a party fails to 
attend a mediation conference, not when a party's 
actions at the conference fail to lead to a settlement. 
See id. R. 101 (h); cf. Avrilv. Civilmar, 605 So.2d988, 
989-90 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1992) (quashing sanctions 
order where the "basis for sanctions [was] merely that 
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defendants were unwilling to make an offer of set-
tlement satisfactory to [plaintiff]"). Finally, we dis-
agree with the district court that the Grantees acted in 
bad faith or violated rule 101(c). It appears that they 
merely held a firm belief, vindicated by our decision 
today, in the validity of their claims such that they had 
no interest in a compromised settlement. Promptly 
informing the other parties and the mediator of this 
fact served to avoid unnecessary time and resources 
spent in unproductive mediation efforts and cannot be 
viewed as evidence of bad faith under the circums-
tances so long as the Grantees otherwise complied 
with the terms of the rule.— 
FN5. We also note that our decision today is 
consistent with the high degree of confiden-
tiality afforded to the mediation process. See, 
e.g., Reese v. Tingev Constr., 2008 UT 7.11 8. 
177 P.3d 605 (expressing the policy that 
mediation communications "be protected 
from postmediation disclosure"). 
K 28 For these reasons, we hold that the district court 
erred in sanctioning the Grantees for their actions at 
and leading up to the court-ordered mediation confe-
rence. Accordingly, we also reverse the order award-
ing sanctions and direct that all parties bear their own 
costs and fees arising from the failed mediation. 
CONCLUSION 
K 29 We determine that the district court erred in 
finding that a purely equitable constructive trust can 
arise under the circumstances presented in this case. 
Rather, the only potential relief available to the Sibl-
ings is the enforcement, by means of a construc-
tive*670 trust, of an alleged unwritten express trust. 
We have determined, however, that an express trust 
can only exist in this case if Arnold intended to 
transfer the farm into trust and that the district court's 
finding that Arnold did not intend to transfer the farm 
at all precludes an express trust from arising in this 
case as a matter of law.— Accordingly, we reverse the 
district court's judgment on the trust issue and remand 
this matter for entry of judgment in the Grantees' 
favor. 
FN6. To the extent that the district court's 
finding of Arnold's intent potentially affects 
the validity of the deed itself or requires 
further findings about the farm's ownership 
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or chain of title, such matters exceed the 
scope of today's decision, and we express no 
opinion thereon 
T| 30 We also reverse the district court's order awarding 
sanctions against the Grantees for failing to engage m 
good faith participation m court-ordered mediation 
Rule 101 of the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alter-
native Dispute Resolution implicitly contemplates 
sanctions against parties solely for failing to appear at 
a mediation conference, and explicitly guarantees the 
rights of parties to terminate the proceedings at any 
time For these reasons, we hold that the district court's 
imposition of sanctions against the Grantees was im-
proper under the circumstances 
Tl 31 Reversed and remanded 
K 32 WE CONCUR PAMELA T GREENWOOD, 
Presiding Judge and GREGORY K ORME, Judge 
Utah App ,2008 
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The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 12-15, 2007 for a bifurcated 
bench trial proceeding on the issue of imposing a constructive trust. Following the presentation of 
the evidence and by agreement, each of the parties submitted & Post-trial Memorandum marshaling 
their arguments regarding the evidence and the law on the issue. Having considered the parties' 
respective memoranda and the evidence presented in trial, the Court now makes the following 
Ruling. 
RULING 
In this matter, Plaintiffs Donald Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings characterize the issue in the 
case as being limited to an express oral trust and assert that because there is no declaration of a trust 
concerning the property in dispute, the alleged trust fails as a matter of law. Third-party Plaintiffs 
U u i u l U 
Theron LaRell Rawlings, Bryce C. Rawlings, and Carol Lynn R. Masterson and Defendants/ 
Counterclaimants Arnold Dwayne Rawlings and Paulette Rawlings, however, assert that the 
persuasive evidence in this matter supports the implementation and imposition of a constructive 
trust. The Court is persuaded by the authorities cited by Third-party Plaintiffs that a constructive 
trust being an equitable remedy arises by operation of law and is not within the statute of frauds. 
Examination of a constructive trust, therefore, encompasses a specific review of the factual 
circumstances relative to each case. 
The Court has given careful consideration to the evidence regarding the properties in this 
matter, the parties' respective contentions, and the factual circumstances taken as a whole. From the 
evidence, the Court is persuaded that in addition to the testimony of the beneficiaries of the trust, 
there are numerous facts which demonstrate the necessity of the Court to establish a constructive 
trust. The Court is persuaded with the arguments and authorities of Third-party Plaintiffs Theron 
LaRell Rawlings, Bryce C. Rawlings, and Carol Lynn R. Masterson as well as the arguments and 
authorities marshaled by Defendants/Counterclaimants Arnold Dwayne Rawlings and Paulette 
Rawlings on the subject, which marshaled arguments and authorities the Court adopts and 
incorporates in this Ruling. 
From the evidence presented at trial, it is clear that Arnold Rawlings acquired the property 
from his mother in 1944, and from that time until the time of his death, his wife Cleo's name was 
not on the title to the property at issue in this case. It is also undisputed that at least by October of 
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1966, Arnold had been diagnosed with cancer which ultimately required substantial medical 
treatment. Mr. Donald Rawlings maintained that at that time, because his father was delinquent on 
an indebtedness to Walker Bank and Trust Company, he inquired of each of his siblings whether they 
wanted to buy a piece of the farm to pay the debt. Each of the siblings Dwayne, LaRell, Bryce, and 
Carol deny that any such conversation took place, which testimonies the Court finds credible and 
persuasive. Of significance, prior to December 16, 1966, Donald Rawlings talked to the welfare 
department about his intention to have his father transfer the farm property to him. That intent was 
corroborated by Exhibit 68, a letter from the Welfare Department referring to a prior meeting, and 
provides proof of the intent to transfer before the alleged payment of the Walker Bank debt. On 
December 22, 2006, Arnold was operated on to remove a large cancerous tumor, following which 
he labored to recover from his illness. Despite close contact with their father during this period of 
time and prior to the end of December 1966, no mention was made to any of the siblings by Arnold, 
Cleo, or Donald that there was any delinquency owing to Walker Bank and Trust. Plaintiffs have 
asserted that checks were paid by them for Arnold's indebtedness. However, notations regarding 
the checks were affixed to them some 30 years later, and the check register provided shows other 
payments on loans owed by Donald and Jeanette to Walker Bank and Trust at the time. It is 
undisputed that in 1963 the farm property was pledged to Walker Bank and Trust Company on a trust 
deed, Exhibit 8. It is also undisputed that in 1964 that indebtedness was rewritten as a conditional 
sales contract with the pledge of a Ford truck and an Oldsmobile automobile. Donald and Jeanette 
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assert that they paid $579.06 to Walker Bank on December 29, 1966 upon which the bank 
surrendered its conditional sales contract. However, no evidence was presented that the check for 
$579.06 was the required loan payoff. Jeanette also testified that the bank gave her a reconveyance 
on the trust deed at the same time. That testimony, however, is unpersuasive. The persuasive 
evidence supports the conclusion that the transaction consisted of a rewriting of the loan with the 
replacement of security. The Court notes that the conditional sales contract was stamped "paid," and 
by the terms of that agreement, the bank's remedy was a recourse to the automobile company under 
a full recourse clause. Noting the circumstances, the Court is unpersuaded with Plaintiffs' assertions 
regarding the December 29,1966 check and concludes that Plaintiffs' statements are not supported 
by the records. Noting the totality of the evidence, the Court is unpersuaded that the farm was deeded 
by the parties' father to Donald because of his payment of the alleged indebtedness. The Court 
adopts the arguments of Third-party Plaintiffs and Defendants/Counterclaimants on the subject. In 
addition, the Court is persuaded by the testimony of the LaRell Rawlings who testified that in late 
February or early March, his father had a conversation with him in which Arnold suggested he 
needed to get the property out of his name because of the welfare department's requirement that it 
be transferred out of his name. He further testified that in a later meeting in Salt Lake City at a 
restaurant where both he, Donald, and Arnold were present; Arnold indicated he was going to deed 
the property to Donald because of the welfare requirement for receiving assistance. That 
conversation was in the presence of Donald, was undisputed by Donald at trial and remains 
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uncontradicted and unrebutted. No mention was made in that conversation of any payment of the 
Walker Bank debt or any reason for deeding the property because of the Walker Bank debt. The 
persuasive evidence in this matter supports the conclusion that the conveyance was made in an effort 
to meet the requirements of the welfare department. 
The Court is also persuaded by the testimony of Dwayne Rawlings who testified that one or 
two days before March 24,1967, the date the property was deeded, that Donald and Arnold met with 
him and informed him that they were deeding the property to Donald because Arnold needed to get 
the property out of his name, consistent with other concerns regarding Welfare assistance; but that 
no mention was made that such transfer had anything to do with the payment of the Walker Bank 
and Trust debt. The deeding of the farm property to Donald and Jeanette occurred on March 24, 
1967, some three months after the alleged payment of the Walker Bank debt by Plaintiffs. Carol, 
Bryce, LaRell, and Dwayne were all told that the conveyance was because Arnold had to get the 
property out of his name as required by the welfare department. The Court is unpersuaded that 
Plaintiffs produced any persuasive testimony contradicting their testimony on that subject. Also, 
since the property conveyance in 1967, there has been an inadequate explanation as to why the 
siblings and their spouses, with the exception of Carol's husband, were asked to sign the quit-claim 
deed, Exhibit 68. 
As argued by Defendants/Counterclaimants, following the signing of the deeds in March 
1967, the persuasive evidence in this case supports the conclusion that Arnold continued to treat the 
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farm as his own. As Bryce Rawlings testified, his father signed the deed intending only to make it 
a temporary transfer, with the children to receive thereafter their expected shares of the farm. Other 
evidence corroborates that intent. Significantly, the Court notes Exhibits 19-29 which contained the 
sworn statements of Arnold Rawlings dated February 13, 1970. The exhibits reflect his efforts to 
secure the weekend release of LaRell Rawlings from his military service at the Dugway Proving 
Grounds to assist his father in running the farm. The exhibits include language written in third 
person verbiage, requesting release of LaRell to assist Arnold in the operation of "his" (Arnold's) 
farm, and that he needed LaRell's assistance in planting, cultivating, irrigating and harvesting "his" 
crops and in caring for "his" livestock. The statements were notarized by Arnold's attorney Mr. 
Dean Terry. Some five days later, he also prepared another sworn statement, Exhibit 20, indicating 
it was impossible for him to do the hard work that was required on the farm. He said he had 
livestock to feed and care for, and also that the fruit orchard required hard work. He addresses 
matters at issue in this case and speaks in the first person. He also refers to the fact that because of 
his failing health, he lost several hundred bushels of pairs the previous fall that would have paid the 
back taxes. The referenced evidence is persuasive on the subject of constructive trust and supports 
the conclusion that Arnold did not consider the conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership rights 
in the property. At this same time period, Arnold also requested and procured help from a number 
of people supporting his request to have LaRell discharged from the military to help him work "his" 
farm, as referenced by Exhibits 22 and 24-29. 
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On March 1, 1971 Arnold Rawlings died. On March 30, 1971 Cleo Rawlings, his widow, 
paid the taxes on the 8.84 acres. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' claim that they paid the back taxes and 
brought them current in 1967, Cleo paid the taxes in 1971 for the year 1966. Such evidence also 
supports the conclusion that Cleo likewise believed the farm was the family farm. 
Prior to Arnold's death, Bryce Rawlings requested permission to put a trailer on the farm 
property for a temporary residence. Arnold showed Bryce where in the orchard to place the trailer 
and Bryce lived in the trailer on the farm for four or five years following his father's death. This 
evidence also supports the conclusion that the parties considered the farm a family farm. 
In 1974 Donald Rawlings requested the siblings and his mother to sign a quit-claim deed 
purportedly to clear up a boundary discrepancy on the south border of the farm. Dwayne Rawlings 
testified, which testimony the Court finds persuasive, that Donald told Dwayne that he needed to 
clear up the title to "Mother's property." However, the description on the 1974 deed covered more 
than just the south boundary. At the time there was a development on the south boundary that 
appeared to be encroaching the farm property. Donald Rawlings initiated litigation and successfully 
established the property line to be that of the old fence line. In the fence line lawsuit, Dwayne 
Rawlings testified as to the long-existing fence line and the case was won for the family farm. 
Following the lawsuit, Donald enlisted Dwayne's help to install a fence upon the determined fence 
line across the encroaching, developed properties of neighboring owners and then negotiated with 
the title companies of the subdivided lots settlements for approximately $52,000. From those 
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proceeds he gave $500 to Carol, $500 to Bryce, and $600 to Dwayne; with approximately $5,000 
for a car and prepayment of burial funds for Cleo. The Court is persuaded that the distribution of 
such funds is an acknowledgment and action by Donald acknowledging that the farm was in fact a 
family farm in which the parties each had a right. Further, Donald testified that the 1974 quit-claim 
deed was not to convey any interest in the property from his siblings, but was only to clear up the 
title problem on the south boundary. 
In 1978, Plaintiffs Donald and Jeanette deeded a half interest in the lot known as the Pinegar 
lot for partial purchase of property referred to as the industrial property. However, Donald conveyed 
half interest in that property to Dwayne, recognizing part of which property constituted Dwayne's 
inheritance. The property was later conveyed to Jack Hadley and Merrill Gappmeyer, Exhibit 35, 
in return for conveyance by them of the industrial property, Exhibit 37. 
In summary, the persuasive testimony of LaRell Rawlings and Duane Rawlings as to the 
conversation with their father Arnold when Donald was present is that the only reason given for the 
March 24, 1967 deed to Donald was because of the requirements of the welfare department, and no 
reference was ever made that the conveyance was for the payment of the Walker Bank debt. This 
evidence is strengthened by the admitted treatment of the farm by Arnold as a family farm after the 
conveyance; the evidence of the welfare letter on December 16, 1966; the continued statements by 
Arnold; his solicitation of various letters from persons with whom he was acquainted nearly three 
years later; the affidavits by Arnold asserting that the farm was "his" farm and he needed help to run 
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it, the payment of taxes by Dwayne after the conveyance to Donald; the payment of taxes in 1971 
by Cleo; the work on the farm by family members with irrigating, harvesting, and marketing fruit, 
as well as handling horses, with the proceeds of the harvest being given to their mother Cleo; the 
placement of a house trailer on the property by Bryce Rawlings prior to Arnold's death; the request 
that family members sign a quit-claim deed to clear up a southern boundary dispute with the 
Vineyard Meadows subdivision; the payment by Donald of part of those proceeds to his siblings; the 
conveyance of a half interest in the Pinegar lot to Dwayne to purchase the industrial property; and 
the setting aside of funds for Cleo's burial and the payment to her for the purchase of a car. Such 
evidence refutes the assertions of Plaintiffs that the conveyance was for payment of the Walker debt. 
Such evidence as reviewed in the totality of the circumstances supports the imposition of a 
constructive trust. The Court is persuaded by Defendants/Counterclaimants' and Third-party 
Plaintiffs' arguments that unless the Court imposes the constructive trust, Plaintiffs will be unjustly 
enriched in this matter, having received a windfall in variance of the intended trust. From the 
inception of the trust, Donald Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings received unjust enrichment of the 
property which they treated as their own, which included $1,000 of the roughly $1,200 taxes paid 
by Dwayne and his spouse, and a portion of the barn property. Further, they received approximately 
$52,000 from the negotiated payments regarding the south boundary fence dispute. The Court is 
unpersuaded that Arnold deeded approximately 8 .84 acres of his farm ground, which was his 
primary source of support, to Donald for payment as alleged by Donald for taxes and the trust deed. 
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The property was worth considerably more than any such tax obligation in 1967 and such testimony 
is contrary to other persuasive declarations made by Arnold and the actions of the parties taken as 
a whole. The evidence in this matter is persuasive and convincing to support the conclusion that the 
siblings waited a long period of time, given their trust in their older brother that he would do what 
was right for the family and as buttressed by their own actions during the period following the 
conveyance. The Court is persuaded, therefore, to the position of the Defendants/Counterclaimants 
and Third-party Plaintiffs to exercise its equitable powers to impose a constructive trust in this 
matter. 
The Court directs that counsel for Defendant/Counterclaimants and Third-Party Plaintiffs 
prepare joint Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent with this Ruling, which may 
include findings and recitals marshaled and set forth by Defendants/Counterclaimants and Third-
Party Plaintiffs from the evidence and as submitted in their post-trial memoranda. 
Dated this ^// day of May 2007 
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John LEHMER; Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc., a Utah 
corporation; Iron Mountain Holding Group, L.C.; Iron 
Mountain Associates, L.L.C.; White Pine Associates, 
LTD; White Pine Associates, Inc.; George Condas; 
Nick J. Condas; Chris Condas; Ellen Bayas; Alexan-
dra Ockey; John Condas; Susi Kontgis; Marina Con-
das; Hermione Bayas; Ellen Ockey-Johnson; Keith 
Kelley; Walt Brett; and Tom Guald, Defendants, 
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No. 20060142. 
June 24, 2008. 
Background: Trust beneficiary brought action 
against cousin and developer entity which had de-
veloped ranch property that was part of trust, asserting 
claim to quiet title to ranch and a claim for declaratory 
relief as to his ownership in the ranch, and asserting 
claims of conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. The 
District Court, Third District, Silver Summit, Robert 
K. Hilder, J., dismissed the declaratory relief and quiet 
title claims and entered judgment for cousin and entity 
on the conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims. 
Beneficiary appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Parrish, J., held that: 
(1) conveyance of trust corpus to developer entity was 
voidable rather than void ab initio; 
(2) beneficiary ratified the conveyance; 
(3) equitable discovery rule did not apply to toll the 
statute of limitations on conversion claim; 
(4) beneficiary had an adequate remedy at law and 
thus was not entitled to an equitable remedy for al-
leged breach of fiduciary; and 
(5) beneficiary's requested "return" of stock was an 
inequitable remedy for alleged breach of fiduciary 
duty. 
Affirmed. 
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Equity 150 €=?3 
150 Equity 
1501 Jurisdiction, Principles, and Maxims 
1501(A) Nature, Grounds, Subjects, and Extent 
of Jurisdiction in General 
150k3 k. Grounds of Jurisdiction in General. 
Most Cited Cases 
A trial court is accorded considerable latitude and 
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discretion m applying and formulating an equitable 
remedy, and it will not be overturned unless it has 
abused its discretion 
J.261 Appeal and Error 30 €^>852 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVKA) Scope, Standards, and Extent, m 
General 
30k851 Theory and Grounds of Decision of 
Lower Court 
30k852 k Scope and Theory of Case 
Most Cited Cases 
Appeal and Error 30 €^>856(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVKA) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k851 Theory and Grounds of Decision of 
Lower Court 
30k856 Grounds for Sustaining Deci-
sion Not Considered 
30k856(l) k In General Most Cited 
Cases 
An appeal, the Supreme Court may affirm the district 
court on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record, even though such ground or theory differs 
from that stated by the district court 
1271 Trusts 390 €^>359(2) 
390 Trusts 
390VII Establishment and Enforcement of Trust 
390VIKC) Actions 
390k359 Nature and Form of Remedy 
390k359(2) k Equity Jurisdiction in 
General Most Cited Cases 
Trust beneficiary had an adequate remedy at law m the 
form of an action for conversion and thus was not 
entitled to an equitable remedy for alleged breach of 
fiduciary duty by cousin, who received stock tor 
payment for developer's default but failed to distribute 
the stock to family members and instead cancelled the 
stock and reissued shares in order to raise funds 
[281 Equity 150 ©=^3 
150 Equity 
1501 Jurisdiction, Principles, and Maxims 
1501(A) Nature, Grounds, Subjects, and Extent 
of Jurisdiction in General 
150k3 k Grounds of Jurisdiction m General 
Most Cited Cases 
Equity 150 €>^>46 
150 Equity 
1501 Jurisdiction, Principles, and Maxims 
1501(B) Remedy at Law and Multiplicity of 
Suits 
150k45 Adequacy of Legal Remedy 
150k46k In General Most Cited C ases 
The right to an equitable remedy is an exceptional one, 
and absent statutory mandate, equitable relief should 
be granted only when a court determines that damages 
are inadequate and that equitable relief will result in 
more perfect and complete justice 
[291 Equity 150 €=^43 
150 Equity 
1501 Jurisdiction, Principles, and Maxims 
1501(B) Remedy at Law and Multiplicity of 
Suits 
150k43 k Existence of Remedy at Law and 
Effect m General Most Cited Cases 
The general rule regarding equitable jurisdiction is 
that equitable jurisdiction is precluded if the plamtiff 
has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer 
substantial irreparable injury 
[301 Trusts 390 €=>359(2) 
390 Trusts 
390VII Establishment and Enforcement of Trust 
390VIKC) Actions 
390k359 Nature and Form of Remedy 
390k359(2) k Equity Jurisdiction in 
General Most Cited Cases 
Trust beneficiary's requested "return" of stock m 
company was an inequitable remedy for alleged 
breach of fiduciary duty by cousin, who took control 
of company stock after developers defaulted and who, 
rather than redistribute stock on a proportional basis, 
cancelled and reissued the stock m order to raise funds 
for development, funds allowed company to maintain 
state lease, which was company's sole asset, and that 
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investment caused company's value to greatly increase 
such that beneficiary's purported share, which was of 
negligible worth at the time of the alleged breach of 
fiduciary duty, was worth several millions of dollars. 
*53 Eric P Lee, Salt Lake City, for appellant 
*54 TiovL Booher, Matthew L Lalh, Salt Lake City, 
for appellee John Lehmer 
Dennis J Conroy, Spencer C Siebers, Salt Lake City, 
for appellee Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc 
PARRISfj Justice 
H 1 This case arises from an mtrafamihal struggle over 
the division of profits from the development of a 
2700-acre ranch situated between the Park City 
Mountain Resort and The Canyons Resort in Summit 
County Beginning in 1976, the ranch was held m 
various trusts established by members of the Condas 
family Scott Ockey ("Ockey"), one of the beneficia-
ries of the trusts, alleges that he was wrongly divested 
of his real property interest m the ranch He also al-
leges that he was wrongfully deprived of his interest in 
a company, Iron Mountain Alliance, Inc ("IMAI"), 
that was dedicated to developing portions of the ranch 
Ockey filed suit, asserting a claim to quiet title to the 
ranch and a claim for declaratory relief as to his 
ownership therein He also asserted claims of conver-
sion against his cousin John Lehmer ("Lehmer") and 
IMAI, as well as a claim for breach of fiduciary duty 
against Lehmer 
K 2 The district court dismissed the declaratory relief 
and quiet title claims and ruled against Ockey as to the 
conversion and breach of fiduciary duty 
claims-decisions that Ockey appeals We affirm 
BACKGROUND 
I FACTUAL HISTORY 
H 3 The parties do not dispute the factual findings of 
the district court We therefore recite the facts in ac-
cordance with the district court's findings — The 
ranch property in dispute was originally owned by 
John Condas, a Summit County rancher, who left an 
undivided one-sixth interest in the ranch to each of his 
six children upon his death in 1969 Seven years later, 
the children, seeking to avoid large estate taxes, con-
veyed their interests in the ranch to various irrevocable 
trusts The trusts named the third generation-John 
Condas' grandchildren-as beneficiaries 
FN1 Pack\ Case, 2001 UTApp 232 112 30 
P 3d 436 
K 4 Scott Ockey, one of those grandchildren, was the 
named beneficiary under two such trusts The first 
trust, settled by his mother, Alexandra Ockey, held an 
undivided one-twelfth interest in the ranch The 
second trust, settled by Ockey's uncle, Nick Condas 
("Uncle Nick"), held an undivided one-eighteenth 
interest in the ranch This left Ockey as the beneficiary 
of trusts collectively holding nearly fourteen percent 
of the ranch property 
K 5 Both trusts, the terms of which were nearly iden-
tical, indicated that they would terminate upon the 
beneficiary's twenty-first birthday Each trust could be 
extended, however, at the beneficiary's election, until 
he turned twenty-eight Upon termination, the corpus 
of the trusts would pass to the beneficiary 
U 6 Beginning as early as 1975, the Condas family 
sought to capitalize on the ranch's location by devel-
oping it To this end, land-owning family members 
leased their interests to IMAI, a development com-
pany, in May 1989 Lehmer, one of the grandchildren 
and Ockey's cousin, represented the family in its 
dealing with IMAI 
U 7 In 1993, after defaulting on its lease payments 
multiple times, IMAI delivered all of its stock to 
Lehmer m satisfaction of the defaulted payments At 
the time Lehmer received the IMAI stock, the sole 
asset of IMAI was a lease on adjacent state lands that 
were critical to the future development of the ranch 
(the "State Lease") When Lehmer received the IMAI 
stock, the annual payment on the State Lease was past 
due, requiring the family to immediately raise funds in 
order to retain the State Lease After discussing the 
issue with some-but not all-family members, Uncle 
Nick, the "family communicator," instructed Lehmer 
to cancel the received IMAI stock and reissue new 
shares that would be sold at $1 00 per share to repre-
sentatives of each of the six families (the "1993 stock 
transfers") This scheme allowed the family to raise 
$6,000 to make the State Lease payment In subse-
quent*55 years, similar stock sales provided a way to 
compensate family members who were willing to 
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U 8 In 1994, in an effort to facilitate development of 
the ranch, the family consolidated ownership of the 
ranch by transferring their interests to a family limited 
liability company, Iron Mountain Alliance, L td, 
which, in turn, conveyed those interests to Iron 
Mountain Holding Group ("IMHG"), the entity that 
would eventually develop the ranch — The transfer 
was accomplished through a document in which the 
trustees conveyed the trusts' interests in the ranch to 
IMHG (the "1994 conveyance") Sometime prior to 
the 1994 conveyance, Ockey executed a document 
directing the trustees to convey his interest in the 
ranch property in exchange for a partnership interest in 
IMHG 
FN2 For simplicity, we will refer to both of 
the companies as "IMHG " 
H 9 Since 1993, the ranch has become part of a suc-
cessful real estate development All family members, 
including Ockey, have enjoyed substantial profits due 
to their ownership interests in IMHG, and it is antic-
ipated that they will receive more m the future 
II PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
T| 10 In 1997, Ockey filed suit against fourteen family 
members and IMAI — Ockey alleged that the 1993 
stock transfers were improper because the IMAI stock 
should have been split and issued to the legal owners 
of the ranch, rather than sold to family members 
willing to buy stock Accordingly, he brought claims 
for conversion of his stock and breach of fiduciary 
duty, as well as other claims arising from the 1993 
stock transfers 
FN3 Ockey's cousin, Catherine Condas, in-
itially joined this suit but did not appeal 
Therefore, we refer only to Ockey's claims in 
this opinion 
K 11 Ockey also contests the 1994 conveyance, ar-
guing that it was void because his trusts terminated on 
his twenty-eighth birthday, eight years before the 1994 
conveyance, vesting in him individually both legal and 
equitable title to his percentage interest m the ranch 
and leaving the trustees nothing to convey This is the 
basis of Ockey's quiet title and declaratory relief 
Page 8 
claims 
H 12 Before trial, various settlements and dismissals 
narrowed the pool of defendants to Lehmer and IMAI 
and narrowed Ockey's claims to four causes of action 
(1) a declaratory relief claim that the 1994 conveyance 
was void because Ockey's trust had terminated, vest-
ing ownership in Ockey and divesting the trustees of 
the authority to act on his behalf, (2) a quiet title claim 
based on Ockey's interest in the ranch, (3) a conver-
sion claim against Lehmer and IMAI, and (4) a breach 
of fiduciary duty claim against Lehmer 
T| 13 In 2000, the district court granted summary 
judgment against Ockey on the declaratory judgment 
and quiet title claims, holding that Ockey ratified the 
1994 conveyance In 2002, the district court con-
ducted a trial to consider Ockey's two remaining 
claims (1) conversion against Lehmer and IMAI and 
(2) breach of fiduciary duty against Lehmer Follow-
ing trial, the district court dismissed both claims, 
concluding that the conversion claim was barred by 
the statute of limitations and that the breach of fidu-
ciary duty claim failed for lack of a l emedy 
ANALYSIS 
11 14 Although Ockey raises eight issues on appeal, 
three are dispositive (1) whether the district court 
properly concluded that the doctrine of ratification 
barred Ockey's quiet title and declaratory relief claims 
arising from the 1994 conveyance, (2) whether the 
district court properly found that Ockey's conversion 
claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and (3) 
whether the district court erred in refusing to fashion 
an equitable remedy for Ockey's breach of fiduciary 
duty claim We affirm the district court on all three 
issues 
I THE 1994 CONVEYANCE WAS VOIDABLE 
AND RATIFIED BY OCKEY 
H 15 The district court dismissed Ockey's declaratory 
relief and quiet title claims on *56 summary judgment, 
reasoning that Ockey ratified the 1994 conveyance of 
his interest in the ranch to IMHG, the family-owned 
holding company created to facilitate developing the 
ranch property On appeal, Ockey argues that the 1994 
conveyance was void ab initio because his trusts ter-
minated in 1986, on his twenty-eighth birthday, vest-
ing both legal and equitable title in his name and 
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leaving nothing for the trustees to convey in 1994. 
Because the 1994 conveyance was void ab initio, he 
argues, it could not be ratified. 
1! 16 The district court's summary dismissal of the 
quiet title claim presents an issue of law that we re-
view for correctness.— 
FN4. See Wasatch Crest Ins. Co. v. LWP 
Claims Adm'rs Corp., 2007 UT 32, 
P.3d 548. 
6, 158 
FN6. See, e.g., Consul. Realty Group v. Siz-
zling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 273 n. 7 
(Utah Ct.App.1996) (" 'The term "void," 
however, as applicable to conveyances or 
other agreements, has not at all times been 
used with technical precision, nor restricted 
to its peculiar and limited sense, as contra-
distinguished from "voidable" ....' " (quoting 
Black's Law Dictionary 141.1 (5th ed. 
1979))),,, 
A. The 1994 Conveyance Was Voidable Because It 
Harmed Only Ockey and Did Not Violate Public 
Policy 
\ 17 By their terms, both of Ockey's trusts terminated, 
at the latest, in 1986, when Ockey turned twenty-eight. 
Upon termination, the trustees retained only the au-
thority to wind up affairs of the trusts and to transfer 
the corpus of the trusts, the ranch property, to the 
beneficiary, Ockey.— Ockey is therefore correct in 
arguing that by the time the trustees purported to 
convey the trust corpus to IMHG in 1994, they lacked 
the authority to do so. The fact that the trustees lacked 
the authority to execute the 1994 conveyance, how-
ever, does not resolve the dispute over ownership of 
the ranch, however, because it does not address 
whether the conveyance was void ab initio or merely 
voidable and therefore capable of ratification. 
FN5. ffegRestatement (Second) of Trusts $$ 
344-45 (1959) (stating the general rule that 
when a trust unambiguously ends on the 
happening of a certain event, the trust ter-
minates and the trustee retains only the au-
thority to wind up the affairs of the trust or to 
distribute the property in accordance with the 
terms of the trust). 
mr2ir31f41 U 18 The distinction between void and 
voidable is important, although the terms are not al-
ways used precisely.— A contract or a deed that is 
void cannot be ratified or accepted,— and anyone can 
attack its validity in court.— In contrast, a contract or 
deed that is voidable may be ratified at the election of 
the injured party. Once ratified, the voidable contract 
or deed is deemed valid. A deed that is voidable is 
valid against the world, including the grantor,— be-
cause only the injured party has standing to ask the 
court to set it aside.^^ 
FN7. See, e.g., Mat. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. 
Winne, 20 Mont. 20. 49 P. 446. 449 (1897) 
("A thing is void which is done against law at 
the very time of doing it, and where no per-
son is bound by the act; but a thing is voida-
ble which is done by a person who ought not 
to have done it, but who nevertheless cannot 
avoid it himself after it is done."(internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
FN8. Wagner v. United States, 573 F.2d 447. 
452(7thCir,1978) ( " 'Another test of a void 
act or deed is that every stranger may take 
advantage of it, but not of a voidable one.' " 
(quoting Winne, 49 P. at 449)). 
F N9. 23 AmJur.2d Deeds j? 162 n. 3 (2002). 
FN10. See, e.g., Wagner, 573 F.2d at 452 (" 
'Whenever the act done takes effect as to 
some purposes, and is void as to persons who 
have an interest in impeaching it, the act is 
not a nullity, and therefore, in a legal sense, is 
not utterly void, but merely voidable.' " 
(quoting Winne, 49 P. at 449)); Baldwin v. 
Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1193 (Utah 1993) 
("[T]he general rule of construction fis] that 
when an act is void as to persons who have an 
interest in impeaching it, the act is not utterly 
void, but merely voidable."). 
[51 1,] 19 In general, the difference between void and 
voidable contracts is whether they offend public pol-
icy. Contracts that offend an individual, such as those 
arising from fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake, are 
voidable. Only contracts that offend public policy or 
harm the public are void ab initio.^J~ 
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FN11. Fletcher v. Stone, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 
250, 252 (1825) ("Acts which affect inju-
riously the public interest are generally void; 
and those which affect only private rights are 
voidable."(citation omitted)); Black's Law 
Dictionary 1604 (8th ed. 2004) ("A contract 
is void ab initio if it seriously offends law or 
public policy, in contrast to a contract that is 
merely voidable at the election of one party 
to the contract."). 
*57 [6] U 20 In this case, Ockey asks us to hold that the 
1994 conveyance was void because the trustees lacked 
authority to transfer the ranch property to IMHG after 
the trusts terminated. We decline, concluding that the 
1994 conveyance was merely voidable because the 
trustee's actions were not contrary to public policy and 
did not injure anyone other than Ockey himself. 
[7ir81[91 «|| 21 In determining whether the 1994 con-
veyance was void or voidable, we start with the pre-
sumption that contracts are voidable unless they 
clearly violate public policy. This presumption stems 
from the general rule that "the law favors the right of 
men of full age and competent understanding to con-
tract freely." ^ ^ For a contract to be void on the basis 
of public policy, "there must be a showing free from 
doubt that the contract is against public policy." Ehl1 
FN12. Frailev v. McGarrv, 116 Utah 504. 
211 P.2d 840, 847 (1949); see also Phone 
Directories Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, |^ 
15, 8 P.3d256 ("[P]eople are generally free 
to bind themselves pursuant to any contract, 
barring such things as illegality of subject 
matter or legal incapacity."). 
FN13. Frailev, 111 P.2d at 847. 
j^ 22 For example, in Millard County School District v. 
State Bank of Millard County, we considered whether 
a contract was void or voidable.2^ At issue was 
whether the bank acted in excess of its statutory power 
by issuing securities that were different from those 
that the bank was statutorily authorized to issue. Ac-
knowledging that the bank exceeded its authority by 
issuing the securities, we disagreed that this ultra vires 
act rendered the securities void.^12 "[B]y the great 
weight of judicial authority it is well recognized that 
there is a distinction between an illegal or void con-
tract and one merely ultra vires," which could become 
enforceable by ratification or estoppel.^^ We ex-
plained that only "contracts and corporate acts and 
transactions which are malum in se or malum prohi-
bitum, which contravene some rule of public policy, 
[or] violate some public duty ... are illegal and void." 
^ ^ Although the bank had acted in excess of its au-
thority, its action did not violate the general policy of 
the state so egregiously that the contract was void. 
FN14. 80 Utah 170, 14 P.2d 967, 971-72 
(1932). 
FN15.A/. 
FN16. Id. at 971-72 (citation omitted). 
FN17. Id. at 972; see also Hatch v. Lucky Bill 
Mining Co., 25 Utah 405, 71 P. 865, 866 
(1903) (stating that corporate actions which 
are "neither criminal, opposed to good mor-
als, nor against public policy ... are not void, 
but voidable only; and a stockholder ag-
grieved thereby may acquiesce in and ratify 
what has been done, or may disaffirm and 
repudiate the voidable proceeding"). 
T| 23 In contrast, in Zion's Sendee Corp. v. Daniel son, 
we found a contract void where the purpose of the 
contract was to control prices and limit competition 
between the bids given by masonry contractors.^-^ 
Finding that the contract created an unreasonable 
restraint on trade, we held it void as against public 
policy.^^ Two elements were present in Zion's Ser-
vice Corp. that are important to our analysis. First, the 
legislature had specifically declared that contracts 
formed to control prices were " 'prohibited and de-
clared unlawful' " and would be " 'absolutely void.' " 
^-^ Second, the contract harmed the public as a 
whole-not just an individual. 
FN18. 12 Utah 2d 369, 366 P.2d 982, 985-86 
(1961). 
FN19.M at 986. 
FN20. Id. at 985 (quoting Utah Code Ann §§ 
50-1-1,-6(1953)). 
[101 U 24 Comparing Ockey's case to these two cases 
demonstrates that the 1994 conveyance was merely 
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voidable. First, no statute declares ultra vires acts by 
trustees absolutely void as against public policy. 
Second, the trustees' actions only affected Ockey-they 
did not harm the general public. Finally, in light of the 
freedom to contract, we have a duty to employ "any 
reasonable construction" to declare contracts "lawful 
and not in contravention of public welfare."" ~L^-
I- N2 1.. Frailev, 211 P.2d at 847. 
B. Ockey Ratified the 1994 Conveyance 
[" 1 1. "1 f|j 25 Whether we characterize the facts found by 
the district court in the worst *58 light or the best light, 
Ockey ratified the 1994 conveyance. 
112111311141II 26 Placing the worst gloss on the facts 
found by the district court, it is possible that the trus-
tees engaged in self-dealing and violated their fidu-
ciary duty to Ockey by failing to transfer the ranch 
property when the trust terminated. Even if this were 
the case, the 1994 conveyance would be voidable and 
ratified by Ockey. According to well-established case 
law, a trustee's violation of his fiduciary duty is 
voidable and capable of ratification.^^ "[Ajfter a 
breach of trust has occurred, a beneficiary may ex-
pressly or impliedly express satisfaction with the 
trustee's action and thereby prevent himself from 
claiming thereafter that it was illegal." —^ As an 
Illinois court recognized, "a trust beneficiary who 
consents to or approves of an act, omission, or trans-
action by a trustee, may upon the ground of waiver or 
estoppel be precluded from subsequently objecting to 
the impropriety of such act, omission, or transaction; 
this rule may arise from acquiescence, request, par-
ticipation, or notification." -L^-
FN22. See, e.g., Hallin v. Hallin, 228 Wis.2d 
250, 596 N.W.2d 818 (Ct.App.1999) (hold-
ing that a contract made in violation of trus-
tee's fiduciary duty was voidable and ratified 
by the beneficiary). 
FN23. Id. at 824 (internal, quotation mai ks 
omitted). 
FN24. Mahle v. First Natl Bank of Peoria, 
241 Ill.App.3d 672, 182 Ill.Dec. 69L 610 
N.E.2d 115, 117(1993). 
Tl 27 Under this characterization of the facts, Ockey 
ratified the 1994 conveyance. First, in 1993, before the 
trust property was conveyed to IMHG, Ockey signed a 
document directing the trustees to convey his owner-
ship in the ranch property to IMHG in exchange for 
his partnership interest in IMHG. Second, following 
the 1994 conveyance, Ockey accepted the benefits 
stemming from the contract. Consolidating ownership 
of the ranch in IMFIG facilitated the successful de-
velopment of the ranch. As a result, Ockey has re-
ceived approximately two million dollars in profits, 
and he stands to receive more. In 1998, Ockey entered 
into a settlement agreement with IMFIG fs successor, 
promising that the outcome of this litigation would not 
affect ownership of the ranch. The settlement agree-
ment enabled the ranch development to proceed and 
allowed Ockey to continue to profit from the devel-
opment. These two facts demonstrate that Ockey ac-
quiesced in and ratified the 1994 conveyance.-1^ 
FN25. See Bullock v. State, 966 P.2d 1215, 
1219 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ("A principal's 
retention of the fruits of a contract can also 
serve as an implied ratification of the con-
tract."). 
[15111 28 Placing the best gloss on the facts found by 
the district court, it is possible that when the trust 
terminated, Uncle Nick's role shifted from acting as a 
trustee to acting as an agent on behalf of Ockey and 
the other family members. Of course, actions that 
exceed the scope of agency are merely voidable, not 
void, and therefore capable of ratification by the 
1 FN26 
principal. 
FN26. See, e.g., Zions First Nat'I Bank v. 
Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1098 
(Utah 1988) ("A principal may impliedly or 
expressly ratify an agreement made by an 
unauthorized agent. Ratification of an agent's 
acts relates back to the time the unauthorized 
act occurred and is sufficient to create the 
relationship of principal and agent.... Under 
some circumstances failure to disaffirm may 
constitute ratification of the agent's acts."). 
^29 Ockey ratified the contract under this characte-
rization of the facts as well. Ockey owned his portion 
of the ranch as a tenant in common with the rest of the 
family, all of whom were interested in developing it. 
In order to develop the land, specific actions were 
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necessary For example, the family needed to make 
annual payments on the State Lease, contract with 
developers, and make improvements on the state 
property 
Tl 30 In light of these responsibilities, it makes sense 
that an individual withm the family would take the 
lead The district court found that "in accordance with 
the family's usual business practice," Uncle Nick took 
that role by acting as the "family communicator" 
Between 1969 and 1995, business decisions con-
cerning the development of the ranch "generally fol-
lowed a common course of dealing " Uncle Nick 
contacted members of the family, solicited their input, 
generated a consensus, and acted as the family spo-
kesperson for decisions that were made During this 
time, Ockey was "obsessed"*59 with the ranch and 
"read everything he could" about it When Ockey 
asked Uncle Nick questions about the ranch, Uncle 
Nick directed him to the relevant records concerning 
the ranch, which were stored in an office that Ockey 
and Uncle Nick shared 
[161 H 31 As we stated in Btadshaw \ McBjide, a 
principal "may not be wilfully ignorant, nor may he 
purposely shut his eyes to means of information 
withm his possession and control and thereby escape 
ratification " ^ ^ Ockey was thirty-six when the 1994 
conveyance took place He had access to all relevant 
records concerning his ownership of the ranch and he 
signed a document directing Uncle Nick and the other 
trustees to transfer his real property interest to the 
holding company Ockey's failure to object to the 1994 
conveyance constitutes ratification-either consciously 
or through willful ignorance-of the actions taken on 
his behalf 
FN27 649 P 2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) 
£12} H 32 The purpose of doctrines like ratification and 
apparent authority is to avoid instances where a tech-
nicality can be used to evade a contract despite the 
expectations of both parties It is well established in 
our case law that an individual cannot go along with a 
contract for the purpose of enjoying benefits that "al-
though not directly conferred by the contract, are 
nevertheless made possible as a result of the contract, 
only to later claim a right to rescind when he discovers 
the benefits will not be great enough to compensate 
him for the loss he will sustain by reason of the fraud " 
Ockey's entire argument regarding the illegality of 
the 1994 conveyance rests on the premise that when 
the trust terminated m 1986, ownership vested m him, 
rendering the latter conveyance void But because the 
1994 conveyance was merely voidable, it was capable 
of ratification by Ockey Ockey ratified the con-
veyance by directing the trustees to convey his interest 
to IMHG in exchange foi a partnership interest in 
IMHG and by accepting the benefits of his family's 
efforts to develop the ranch For these reasons, we 
uphold the district court's determination that Ockey 
ratified the 1994 conveyance and affirm the court's 
summary dismissal of his quiet title and declaratory 
relief claims 
FN28 Frailer 211 P 2d at 845, see also 
Swan Peek Vill Homeowneis Ass'n \_ 
Wame. 2006 UT 22 11 34, 134 P 3d 1122 
(recognizing ratification as part of the 
equitable principle that "helps to ensure that 
justice is met and prevents parties lrom 
avoiding valid obligations due to technicali-
ties") 
II OCKEY'S CONVERSION CLAIM IS BARRED 
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
T181 ^(33 Ockey also alleged a conversion claim 
against Lehmer and IMAI based on the 1993 stock 
transfers in which Lehmer accepted the stock of IMAI 
from two developers who defaulted on payments 
owed to the family Rather than distributing the IMAI 
stock to the family according to their proportionate 
interest in the ranch property, Lehmer canceled the 
original stock and reissued stock that he sold to family 
members in order to raise the capital necessary for 
furthering development The district court dismissed 
Ockey's conversion claim against Lehmer and IMAI, 
holding that it was barred by the statute of limitations 
Because Ockey cannot invoke the equitable disco\ery 
rule, and because his conversion claim was filed after 
the three-year statute of limitations expired, we affirm 
the district court's holding 
jT9ir20ir211 K 34 The applicability of both the statute 
of limitations and the equitable discovery rule are 
questions of law, reviewed for correctness ^ ^ The 
subsidiary factual determination of whether Ockey 
knew or should have known about the alleged con-
version is a question of fact that Ockey argues was not 
supported by the evidence °^"Fmdings of fact 
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-
L
 In determining the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the district court's findings, "[w]e review 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's findings and affirm if there is a reasonable 
basis for doing so." ^^ 
FN29. Russell Packard Dew, Inc. v. Carson, 
2005 UT 14.1118. 108 P.3d 741. 
FN30. See id. 11 39 (stating that the point at 
which a person reasonably should know that 
he or she has suffered a legal injury is a 
question of fact). 
FN31. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
FN32. Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 
P.2d 487, 489 (Utah Ct.App.1993); see also 
Grayson Roper Ltd. P'ship v. Finlinson, 782 
P.2d 467. 470 (Utah 1989) ("To successfully 
attack a trial court's findings of fact, an ap-
pellant must first marshal all the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrate 
that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to 
support the findings.. "). 
11 35 The district court found that Ockey's conversion 
claim accrued on July 1, 1993. The statute of limita-
tions for conversion is three y e a r s . ^ ^ Ockey's com-
plaint was not filed until June 19, 1997, several 
months after the statute of limitations had run. But 
Ockey argues that his late filing was excused because 
the equitable discovery rule tolled the statute of limi-
tations. 
FN33. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-305(2) 
(2008). 
|"221[231 H 36 The equitable discovery rule operates to 
"toll a statute of limitations until the time at which a 
party discovered or reasonably should have discov-
ered 'facts forming the basis for the cause of action.' " 
^ ^ There are two versions of the rule: (1) the con-
cealment version, requiring the plaintiff to show that 
he did not know about the events giving rise to his 
claim due to "the defendant's concealment or mis-
leading conduct," and (2) the exceptional circums-
tances version, requiring the plaintiff to show the 
^ ?not) Tlii'rr.s-.ii Reuters/West. 
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existence of exceptional circumstances such that ap-
plication of the general statute of limitations would be 
"irrational or unjust." * ^ 
FN34. Nolan v. Hoopiiaina (In re iloppituma 
Trust), 2006 UT 53. 1j 35, 144 P.3d 1129 
(quoting Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14. r 21. 
108 P.3d 741). 
FN35. Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, 11 25, 
108 P.3d 741 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
T[ 37 Because Ockey has not asserted the existence of 
any exceptional circumstances, we evaluate Ockey's 
claim only under the concealment version of the 
equitable discovery rule. To prevail, Ockey must show 
that he did not know, and could not have reasonably 
known, about the events giving rise to his injury be-
fore the statute of limitations r a n . ^ ^ Ockey did not 
raise the alternative argument that he "acted reasona-
bly in failing to file suit before the limitations period 
expired." ^ ^ Therefore, we do not address this ar-
gument. 
I / -OP. See No/tin. 2<M^ L i .v . * ^\
 t-t4 
P.3d 1129. 
FN37. Russell Packard, 2005 UT 14, 1| 30. 
108 P.3d 741. 
TI 38 Ample evidence supports the district court's 
conclusion that Ockey either knew, or had reason to 
know, of the 1993 stock transfers within three years of 
their occurrence. For example, the district court found 
that as early as 1993 or 1994, Ockey knew that IMAI 
stock had been issued to other family members be-
cause he had ready access to all relevant records 
concerning the ranch and because Ockey asked Uncle 
Nick if he could buy some of Uncle Nick's IMAI 
k. Moreover. Ockey knew that family members 
WL;C being compensated with IMAI stock for their 
work on behalf of IMAI. And he was knowledgeable 
regarding IMAI business affairs, such as the fact that 
his mother was president of IMAI and his cousin was a 
member of the IMAI board. Ockey had also seen an 
,x T
 M stock ledger, shown to him by his mother, that 
cted who had shares in the corporation. Based on 
these facts, the district court found, as a matter of fact, 
that Ockey "either knew or had reason to know of the 
events giving rise to a conversion claim within three 
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years after any conversion of IMAI stock " Although 
the district court did not clearly state when in 1993 or 
1994 these events occurred, viewing the evidence m 
the light most favorable to the trial court's findings we 
must assume that the events occurred prior to June 19, 
1994 
lj 39 The evidence listed by the district court is suffi-
cient to show that Ockey knew, or had reason to know, 
of the events giving rise to his conversion claim before 
the three-year statute of limitations expired in 1996 
Thus, the equitable discovery rule is not applicable, 
and the district court correctly dismissed*61 Ockey's 
conversion claim as barred by the statute of limita-
tions 
III OCKEY'S BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
CLAIM FAILS FOR LACK OF A REMEDY 
H 40 In the district court, Ockey expressly waived the 
opportunity to prove damages and elected to proceed 
solely in equity, arguing that he had no adequate re-
medy at law for his breach of fiduciary duty and 
conversion claims As an equitable remedy, he re-
quested the "return" of the stock canceled in the 1993 
stock transfers 
K 41 Ockey asserts that when Lehmer received the 
IMAI stock as payment for the developer's default, 
Lehmer should have distributed the stock to the family 
members m proportion to their ownership interest in 
the ranch Lehmer's decision to cancel the stock and 
sell reissued stock m order to raise funds, according to 
Ockey, amounted to conversion and a breach of 
Lehmer's fiduciary duty As an equitable remedy, 
Ockey requested the court to order that Lehmer con-
vey to Ockey a portion of Lehmer's own stock in 
IMAI-m other words Ockey requested a "return" of 
the original IMAI stock Because Ockey's conversion 
claim is barred by the statute of limitations, we ad-
dress only his breach of fiduciary duty claim We 
affirm the district court's conclusion that Ockey's 
breach of fiduciary duty claim fails for lack of a re-
medy 
[24]I25JI261 K 42 The availability of a remedy is a 
legal conclusion that we review for correctness *-^ 
However, "a trial court is accorded considerable lati-
tude and discretion in applying and formulating an 
equitable remedy, and [it] will not be overturned un-
less it [has] abused its discretion " £^JL- Moreover, on 
appeal, we may affirm the district court "on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record, even though 
such ground or theory differs from that stated by the 
[district] court" ^ 
FN38 Thwston \ Box Eldei Coitntx, 892 
P2d 1034, 1040-41 (Utah 1995) (holding 
that the availability of an equitable remedy is 
reviewed for correctness but that the trial 
court's application and formulation of an 
equitable remedy is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion) 
FN39 US Fuel Co \ Hunting 
ton-Cle\elandbligation Co , 2003 UT 49 <j 
9, 79 P 3d 945 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) 
FN40 State \ Robison, 2006 UT 65 <1 19 
147 P 3d 448 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (alteration in original) 
^ 43 We affirm the district court's refusal to grant an 
equitable remedy for two reasons that differ from 
those relied on by the district court but that are, nev-
ertheless, apparent from the record First, an adequate 
remedy at law exists for the alleged breach of fidu-
ciary duty, rendering an equitable remedy unavailable 
as a matter of law Second, even if a legal remedy were 
unavailable, the remedy requested by Ockey would 
not be appropriate because it would overcompensate 
him-grantmg him a windfall at the expense of the 
defendants 
A Ockey's Request for an Equitable Remedy Fails 
Because an Adequate Remedy at Law Exists 
£27][28]r291 H 44 By waiving his legal claim for 
damages, Ockey chose to invoke only the equitable 
jurisdiction of the court However, "[t]he right to an 
equitable remedy is an exceptional one, and absent 
statutory mandate, equitable relief should be granted 
only when a court determines that damages are in-
adequate and that equitable relief will result in more 
perfect and complete justice " ^ ^ The general rule 
regarding equitable jurisdiction is that "equitable 
jurisdiction is precluded if the plaintiff has an ade-
quate remedy at law and will not suffer substantial 
irreparable injury " £M2-
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I:N41. Thurston, 892 P.2d at 1040. 
FN42. Buckncr v. Kennartl, 2004 UT 78, % 
56. 99 P.3d 842; see also Belnap v. Blain, 
575 P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1978) ("[A] resort to 
equity for collection of a judgment is not 
authorized in the absence of a showing of 
unavailability of collection by legal process 
...." (internal quotation marks omitted)); 27A 
Am.Jur.2d Equity § 21 (2008) (u[T]he plain-
tiff must affirmatively show a lack of an 
adequate remedy at law on the face of the 
pleading and from the evidence, and if a 
complaint on its face shows that adequate 
legal remedies exist, equitable remedies are 
not available."). 
:;62 1| 45 in Bitchier v. Kemuird, deputy sheriffs in the 
Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office sought to invoke 
this court's equitable jurisdiction by requesting back 
pay as compensation for past pay inequity they suf-
fered in violation of a state civil service statute.^^We 
declined to treat their claim as an equitable claim 
because the deputies had an adequate remedy at law. 
Furthermore, they did not argue that their injury was 
substantial, irreparable, unconscionable, or caused by 
duress.-"— 
FN43. 2004 U F 78, ^  55, 9v i\;,d M2. 
FN44. Id. ^\ 57; see also Thurston, 892P.2dat 
1042 (declining to order reinstatement as an 
equitable remedy for wrongful termination 
where injured party did not show that dam-
ages were inadequate or unascertainable). 
II 46 Similarly, there is an adequate remedy at law for 
Ockey's claimed injury. In Broadwater v. Old Repub-
lic Surety, we acknowledged the difficulty of fa-
shioning a remedy for conversion when the property 
converted, such as stock, fluctuates in valueP^1 In 
light of this difficulty, we adopted the "New York 
rule, which sets the measure of damages as the highest 
intermediate value of the stock between the time of 
conversion and a reasonable time after the owner 
receives notice of the conversion." - ^ This rule 
"providers] the fairest measure of damages to all in-
volved" by indemnifying the plaintiff, the rightful 
owner of the converted stock, for his loss "without 
affording a windfall at the expense of the defendant." 
-^-
L
 An alternative rule, allowing the measure of 
damages to be calculated at the time of trial or at the 
highest value of the property between the date of 
conversion and the date of trial, would allow the 
plaintiff to "ride the stock market at the defendant's 
risk and expense until trial." ^-^-
FN45. 854 P.2d 527. 531 (Utah 1993). 
FN46. Id. 
FN47. Id. at 532. 
FN48.M at 531. 
II 47 Although the New York rule was ioiinuu.i^. .;. 
the context of a conversion claim, we find it to be 
applicable to Ockey's claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty because Ockey's breach of fiduciary duty claim 
arises from Lehmer's alleged conversion of the stock. 
Because the two claims share the same operative facts, 
we apply the same standard to Ockey's breach of fi-
duciary duty claim that we would apply to Ockey's 
conversion claim. 
*| 48 In summary, Ockey had an adequate remedy at 
law, and he waived the opportunity to pursue it be-
cause his preferred remedy would be far more lucra-
tive. Because equitable relief is only available in those 
cases where legal relief is unavailable, we affirm the 
district court's refusal to fashion an equitable remedy 
for Ockey. 
j> / u ijit.: in^ a Return " oj the IMA I ^ • i *' 
Over compensate Ockey 
[30 j \ 49 I he district court's refusal to order iiu u ;uni 
of Ockey's IMAI stock is also supported on an inde-
pendent basis. Requiring that Lehmer deliver IMAI 
stock to Ockey would be inequitable because it would 
overcompensate Ockey by awarding him almost 
fourteen percent of IMAI's stock, which is worth mil-
lions today but was of negligible worth at the time of 
the alleged conversion and breach of fiduciary a :>\. 
II 50 When Lehmer took control of the IMAI stock 
after the developers defaulted, the stock had minimal 
value. IMAI's only asset was the State Lease, an asset 
requiring an immediate $6,000 payment in order to 
retain it. At that point, development of the ranch was 
not assured, and maintaining the State Lease was an 
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integral part of the envisioned development Even 
Ockey believed that the IMAI stock had only nominal 
value in 1993 The speculative investment m IMAI 
made by other family members enabled the family to 
keep the State Lease, which ultimately caused IMAI's 
value to skyrocket Granting Ockey's request would 
allow Ockey to enjoy the benefits of his family 
members' speculative investment, while avoiding the 
risks that they all undertook in 1993 
T] 51 This dynamic, where returning the allegedly 
converted stock would overcompensate the plaintiff, 
is the same dynamic that motivated our adoption of the 
New York rule Under the New York rule, Ockey's 
*63 damages would be the highest intermediate value 
between the time of Lehmer's alleged conversion and 
breach of fiduciary duty and a reasonable time after 
Ockey learned about the alleged conversion and 
breach Because the district court concluded that 
Ockey learned about the conversion as early as 1993, 
his remedy for Lehmer's breach under the New York 
rule would be minimal because the value of the stock 
in 1993 was minimal Had the district court granted 
Ockey's requested remedy, it would have allowed him 
to circumvent the New York rule, thereby reaping an 
unjustified windfall Such a result would be inequita-
ble because it would effectively allow Ockey to "ride 
the stock market at the defendants'] risk and ex-
pense " ^ ^ Accordingly, the district court appro-
priately refused to fashion an equitable remedy for 
Ockey that would allow him to receive a windfall at 
the expense of his family members 
FN49 Id , see also Lysenko \ Sa way a, 1999 
UTApp31,H8, 973 P 2d 445 ("If allowing 
the plaintiff to elect to recover the converted 
property itself will over-compensate him for 
his injury, then the election must be taken 
away from the plaintiff "(internal quotation 
marks omitted)) 
CONCLUSION 
H 52 In summary, we affirm the district court's grant of 
summary judgment, holding that the 1994 conveyance 
was voidable and capable of ratification by Ockey We 
also affirm the district court's dismissal of Ockey's 
conversion claim as barred by the statute of limita-
tions Finally, the district court appropriately refused 
to fashion an equitable remedy for Ockey's breach of 
fiduciary duty claim 
K 53 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice 
DURRANT, Justice WILKINS, and Justice NI HR-
ING concur in Justice PARRISH's opinion 
Utah,2008 
Ockey v Lehmer 
189 P 3d 51, 2008 UT 37 
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Supreme Court of Utah, 
frank CARNESECCA and Mary Carnesecca, his 
wife, and Joseph Carnesecca, Jr., and Janet Carne-
secca, his wife, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Bernice D. CARNESECCA and the Land Title 
Company, Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 15051. 
U-, -77. 
Appeal was taken from a judgment of the Fourth 
'" 'net Court, Utah County, J. Robert Bullock, J., 
JUcrmining ownership of 18 acres and well thereon. 
The Supreme Court, Ilall, J., held that: (1) evidence 
-stained trial court's determination that constructive 
rust existed in favor of brother who orally purchased 
one-third interest in acreage in 1950 and (2) widow of 
one brother was equitably estopped from asserting 
more than one-third interest in acreage where she 
agreed to sale documents reflecting one-third interest 
in property in each of two brothers and herself, all 
parties, in reliance upon her conduct, bound them-
selves to sale and widow did not oppose the one-third 
division of sale proceeds until three weeks after her 
agreement to sell. 
Afiirmcd. 
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3901(C) Constructive Trusts 
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duciary Relation in General 
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390 Trusts 
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3901(C) Constructive Trusts 
390kl03 Contracts and Transactions Be-
tween Persons in Confidential Relations 
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Cases 
Usual circumstances giving rise to a constructive trust 
involve one unjustly profiting through fraud or viola-
tion of duty imposed under fiduciary or confidential 
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390 Trusts 
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3901(B) Resulting Trusts 
390k63.5 k. Effect of Statute of Frauds and 
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78-24-2(3). 
[101 Witnesses 410 €^>126 
410 Witnesses 
41 OH Competency 
41011(C) "Dead Man'S" Statutes and Rules 
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terms. U.C.A.1953, 78-24-2(3). 
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witnesses who have direct interest adverse to interests 
of deceased and his estate and statute has no applica-
tion to those witnesses who have a mere interest in the 
estate when the controversy between them is only as to 
their respective rights as heirs,, U.C.A.1953, 
78-24-2(3). 
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390 Trusts 
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity 
3901(C) Constructive Trusts 
390kl06 Evidence to Establish Trust 
390kl 10 k. Weight and Sufficiency. 
Most Cited Cases 
Evidence introduced in proceeding to determine 
ownership of 18 acres which two brothers purchased 
from their father in 1942 sustained trial court's de-
termination that constructive trust existed in favor of 
• .i-ii brother who orally purchased one-third interest 
in acreage in 1950. 
Estoppel 156 €^>55 
.156 Estoppel 
156III Equitable Estoppel 
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
156k55 k. Reliance on Adverse Party. Most 
Cited Cases 
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156 Estoppel 
156III Equitable Estoppel 
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
156k58 k. Prejudice to Person Setting Up 
Estoppel. Most Cited Cases 
"Equitable estoppel" is conduct by one party which 
leads another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt 
course of action resulting in detriment or damage if 
first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct. 
156 Estoppel 
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156III Equitable Estoppel 
156111(B) Grounds of Estoppel 
156k78 Contracts 
156k78(3) k. Contracts Relating to Real 
Estate. Most Cited Cases 
Widow of one brother was equitably estopped from 
asserting more than one-third interest in acreage 
where she agreed to sale documents reflecting 
one-third interest in property in each of two brothers 
and herself, all parties, in reliance upon her conduct, 
bound themselves to sale and widow did not oppose 
the one-third division of sale proceeds until three 
weeks after her agreement to sell. 
*709 Jackson Howard, Robert C. Fillerup, Provo, for 
defendant and appellant. 
Thomas T. Billings, Keith E. J aylor, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiffs and respondents. 
This appeal concerns a dispute as to the ownership of 
family property consisting of approximately 18 acres 
of land and a well thereon, situate in Utah County. 
The plaintiffs, Frank and Joseph Carnesecca are the 
sons of Joseph Carnesecca, Sr., deceased, the re-
maining plaintiffs being their respective wives. He-
reafter, all of said plaintiffs shall be referred to col-
lectively as "Frank and Joe.'" 
The defendant, Bernice D. Carnesecca, hereinafter 
referred to as "Bernice," is the surviving wife of Egi-
dio Carnesecca, deceased, hereinafter referred to as 
"Jim," who also was a son of Joseph Carnesecca, Sr., 
hereinafter referred to as "father." 
The father acquired the initial acreage which he oper-
ated as a farm with the primary assistance of Jim and 
Joe. In 1942, while Joe was away in the Navy, Jim and 
Frank purchased for $900 the 18 acres in question and 
took title in their own names. 
At th^
 Pn, iy:)0 harvest there was a family 
0;t •••• •>-^ ;t , -edly, all parties here were present, 
although Bernice denies being there. Nevertheless, at 
that meeting, father required Jim and Frank to permit 
Joe to purchase a one-third interest in the 18 acres for 
the SUIT) of $1,200. However, title remained, in the 
name s o f Frank and J i m, 
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In 1955 Jim and Joe determined a well was necessary 
to irrigate some 53 acres of the farm acquired by deed 
and inheritance from their father and the well was 
sunk, out of proceeds from the farm, on the 18 *710 
acres since it was the most advantageous site. 
Jim died in 1966 and Bernice inherited all of his 
property including one half of the 18 acres and one 
half of the remainder of the farm which she continued 
to operate with Joe until 1973 when they had a dispute. 
Thereafter the farm, excepting the 18 acres, was sold 
and the proceeds divided one half to each, Frank 
making no claim thereto. 
In 1975 a meeting was held at Bernice's home at her 
instance and request since she had received an offer to 
purchase the 18 acres. All parties were present, in-
cluding the potential purchaser, Christensen, who 
presented documents of sale reflecting the record title 
of the well and land. It was ultimately agreed, how-
ever, that the sale must necessarily reflect a one-third 
ownership of land and water in Frank, Joe and Ber-
nice. The sale documents were modified accordingly 
and were subsequently executed, binding them irre-
vocably to the sale, but at the time for closing Bernice 
refused to sign, asserting a claim to one half of the net 
proceeds of sale. By stipulation, the sale proceeds are 
still being held in escrow pending the disposition of 
this appeal. 
The defendant Land Title Company was dismissed 
from the suit at pre-trial and the only issue tried below 
was the respective interests of the parties in the 18 
acres and the well. The trial court declared Joe was the 
purchaser of a one-third interest in the land in 1950 
and that thereafter Bernice and Frank held in trust for 
him. The court also declared Frank to be a one-third 
owner in the well and that Joe and Bernice held the 
same in trust for him. The court further found that 
Bernice was estopped by her own conduct from as-
serting more than a one-third interest in the land and 
well. 
Bernice makes three claims of error, 1) the 1950 
agreement was not admissible in evidence by virtue of 
the provisions of the Deadman Statute, Statute of 
Frauds and Statute of Limitations, 2) the evidence did 
not support a finding of constructive trust, and 3) the 
evidence did not support a finding of estoppel. 
Frank and Joe contend the appeal merely reflects a 
dissatisfaction with the facts as found by the trial 
court. 
[1] The long established rules of appellate review 
require this court to defer to the findings of the fact 
finder rather than substitute our judgment therefor, 
and such holds true unless it can be determined as a 
matter of law that no one could reasonably find as did 
the fact finder. FFN11 
FN1. Hanover Limited v. Fields, Utah, 568 
P.2d751 (1977). 
[21 The rules also require us to view the evidence, 
including the fair inferences to be drawn therefrom, 
and all of the circumstances shown thereby, in the 
light most favorable to the successful party be-
low.[FN21 
FN2.Id. 
F31f41[5] Equity will impress a constructive trust upon 
property in favor of a beneficiary of an oral trust under 
certain circumstances and no writing evidencing an 
intention to create a trust is required. Such is an 
equitable remedy arising by operation of law to pre-
vent unjust enrichment and is not within the statute of 
frauds. [FN31 The fact that parol evidence is admitted 
fFN41 to prove its existence necessarily requires a 
showing by clear and convincing evidence. FFN51 
FN3. Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212,209 P.2d 
299(1949). 
FN4. Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P.2d 
940(1933). 
FN5. Nielson v. Rasmussen, Utah, 558 P.2d 
511 (1976). 
£6] The usual circumstances which give rise to a con-
structive trust would involve one unjustly profiting 
through fraud or the violation of a duty imposed under 
a fiduciary or confidential relationship.[FN6] 
FN6. Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Utah 16, 253 
P.2d 372 (1953). 
The record is replete with evidence that the farm was a 
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famtiy oriented operation from its beginning. Its con-
siderable success*711 obviously resulted from the 
combined industry of the whole family which chose to 
operate in the nature of a partnership. Their relation-
ship was one of trust, each relying upon the good faith 
of the other, usually without the benefit of written 
understandings. Father kept an abbreviated account of 
the farm business which reflected annual profits and 
the division thereof. There is a $1,200 entry in 1950 
which is supportive of the oral contract for Joe's pur-
chase of a one-third interest in the 18 acres. The 
over-all conduct of Jim and Frank in the years fol-
lowing the purchase is indicative of their recognition 
of Joe's joint ownership. 
All of such evidence, coupled with the testimony of 
Frank, Joe and their wives, is of the clear and con-
vincing nature as has been previously recognized by 
this court.[FN7] 
FN7. Barrett v. Vickers, J00 Utah 534, ] J6 
L2d 772 (1941). 
[71 The effectiveness of Bernice's statute of frauds 
argument is dispelled by the fact Joe has been in 
possession of the land, redeemed it from tax sale, 
expended considerable sums to improve it, (planting, 
installing heating and irrigation systems and placing a 
well thereon) all of which is substantial evidence of a 
fully executed oral contract of purchase.[FN8] Also, 
trusts arising by implication or operation of law are 
expressly excluded from the effects of the sta-
tute. rFN91 
FN8. Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 
Utah 2d 18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956), citing 
various cases establishing the Utah doctrine 
of part performance. 
FN9.U.C.A.1953, 25-5-2. 
[81 Similarly, the statute of limitations argument es-
poused by Bernice has no application since there was 
no repudiation of contract nor hostile assertion by Jim 
(and thereafter by Bernice), and it was not until 1975 
that she took a position contrary to Joe's inter-
esUFNlOl 
FN 10. In re Madsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327, 
259 P.2d 595 (1953). 
£91 In regard to the contention that the dead man sta-
tute [FNJJJ bars testimony relating to the 1950 con-
tract of purchase, its application must be viewed in 
light of the legislative purpose for its enactment. Its 
purpose was not to suppress truth but to prevent the 
proof of claims against an estate of a deceased person 
by false testimony. [FN 121 
FN11.U.C.A.1953, 78-24-2(3). 
FN12. Maxfield v. Samsbury, 110 Utah 280, 
172P.2d 122(1946). 
riOiril] The statute, in limiting the introduction of 
testimony bearing upon ultimate truth, must be nar-
rowly construed [FN131 and applied strictly according 
to its terms. [FN 141 I t s intent was to disqualify only 
those witnesses who have a direct interest adverse to 
the interests of a deceased person and his estate and it 
has no application to those witnesses who have a mere 
interest in the estate when the controversy between 
them is only as to their respective rights as 
heirs.£FN!51 
FN13. Morrison v. Walker Bank & Trust 
Co., 11 Utah 2d 416, 360 P.2d 1015 (1961). 
FN14. Timpanogos Highlands, Inc. v. Har-
per, Utah, 544 P.2d 481 (1975). 
FN15. Staats v. Staats, 63 Utah 470, 226 P. 
677(1924). 
[121 In the instant case there were four witnesses to the 
transaction, and in addition, the trial court found Ber-
nice herself was present. That, together with the other 
evidence corroborates the trust agreement. Conse-
quently, even if some of the evidence may have been 
inadmissible there is substantial evidence to sustain 
the determination of the trial court that a constructive 
trust existed.rFN161 
FN16. In re Estate of Sharp, Utah, 537 P.2d 
1034(1975), citing Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 
2d 193, 381 P.2d 78 (1963) and also citing 
Del Porto v. Nicolo. 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 
P.2d 811 (1972) as to the effect of inad-
missible testimony because of dead man 
statute. 
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Turning now to the matter of estoppel, the evidence is 
that Frank and Joe would not have agreed to the 
Christensen sale except for the agreement reached in 
1975 *712 with Bernice. That agreement was only 
reached after all of the sale documents were modified 
to reflect a one-third interest in Joe and to permit his 
one-third participation in the proceeds of the sale. The 
actual conveyance also was modified to reflect he and 
his wife as grantors. In reliance upon Bernice's con-
duct all parties bound themselves to sell and thus gave 
up a substantial legal right. It was not until some three 
weeks later that Bernice opposed the equal, one-third 
division of the sale proceeds, and such was the first 
challenge or repudiation of Joe's interest. 
[T311T41 These facts clearly meet the test of equitable 
estoppel set forth in Koch, Inc. v. J. C. Penney 
CoJFN171 which is: conduct by one party which leads 
another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of 
action resulting in detriment or damage if the first 
party is permitted to repudiate his conduct. 
FN17. Utah, 534 P.2d 903 (1975). 
Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondents. 
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, MAUGHAN and 
WILKINS, JJ., concur. 
Utah 1977. 
Carnesecca v. Carnesecca 
572 P.2d 708 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
ONEIDA/SLIC, an Arizona Partnership, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
ONEIDA COLD STORAGE AND WAREHOUSE, 
INC., a Colorado corporation, Defendant, Third-party 
Plaintiff, and Appellant, 
v. 
METALCLAD INSULATION CORPORATION OF 
CALIFORNIA, a California Corporation, Third-party 
Defendant, Fourth-party Plaintiff, and Appellee. 
No. 920434-CA. 
April 1, 1994. 
Rehearing Denied May 3, 1994. 
Lessor appealed from order of the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., 
which dismissed claims against supplier. The Court of 
Appeals, Jackson, J., held that lessor which merely 
presented carefully selected facts and excerpts of trial 
testimony in support of its position did not properly 
marshal the evidence as required to challenge trial 
court's factual findings. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
HI Appeal and Error 30 €^>1008.1(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
3QXVI Review 
30XVKI) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and 
Findings 
30XVKD3 Findings of Court 
30kl008 Conclusiveness in General 
30kl008.1 In General 
30kl008.1(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual 
findings lightly and, to successfully challenge trial 
court's findings of fact, appellate counsel must play 
the devil's advocate and must present every scrap of 
evidence which supports those findings. 
121 Appeal and Error 30 €^1008.1(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVKI) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and 
Findings 
3QXVI(I)3 Findings of Court 
30kl008 Conclusiveness in General 
30kl008.1 In General 
30kl008.1(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Once appellants who challenge trial court's factual 
findings have established every pillar supporting their 
adversary's position, they must ferret out a fatal flaw 
in the evidence and show why those pillars fail to 
support the findings. 
131 Appeal and Error 30 €^>757(3) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30X11 Briefs 
30k757 Statement of Case or of Facts 
30k757(3) k. Statement of Evidence. Most 
Cited Cases 
Appellant which merely presented carefully selected 
facts and excerpts of trial testimony in support of its 
position did not properly marshal the evidence as 
required to challenge trial court's factual findings. 
HI Appeal and Error 30 €^>757(3) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30X11 Briefs 
30k757 Statement of Case or of Facts 
30k757(3) k. Statement of Evidence. Most 
Cited Cases 
Strict requirement that appellant challenging trial 
court's factual findings marshal all the evidence in 
support of the findings grows from and nurtures court 
objectives of fairness and efficiency. 
*1051 Robert G. Gilchrist, Salt Lake City, Kermit A. 
Brashear, II, Craig A. Knickrehm, and Donald J. 
Straka, Omaha, NE, for plaintiff-appellant. 
Jeffrey E. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for defen-
dant-appellee. 
*1052 Before DAVIS and JACKSON, JJ., and 
REGNAL W. GARFF, Senior District Judge.— 
FN1. Senior Judge Regnal W. Garff, acting 
pursuant to appointment under Utah Code 
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OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc. (Oneida) 
challenges the trial court's dismissal of breach of 
contract, breach of warranty, and negligence claims 
against Metalclad Insulation Corporation (Metalclad). 
Oneida specifically disputes the findings of fact upon 
which the trial court based its dismissal. Because 
Oneida has failed to marshal all the evidence in sup-
port of those findings, we refuse to consider its chal-
lenge and summarily affirm the trial court's dismissal. 
BACKGROUND m 
FN2. The parties do not dispute the following 
statement of the case. 
In 1981 Roth Company (Roth) contracted to design 
and build the shell of a cold storage warehouse in Salt 
Lake City, Utah for Oneida/SLIC (SLIC). In connec-
tion with the development of the warehouse, SLIC 
entered into a lease agreement with Oneida, under 
which Oneida agreed to lease approximately 65,000 
square feet of warehouse space. As part of the lease 
agreement, Oneida agreed to supply all insulation and 
vapor barrier materials necessary for construction of 
the warehouse's insulated areas. 
To fulfill its lease obligation, Oneida entered into two 
separate contracts with Metalclad, under which Me-
talclad agreed to supply the insulation materials to be 
used for the warehouse and to supervise the installa-
tion of those materials. 
Oneida filed a third-party complaint against Metalclad 
to recover damages resulting from defects in the 
warehouse's insulated concrete floor slab system.— 
The concrete floor cracked, buckled, and broke up, 
both during and after construction. Oneida claimed 
that Metalclad had breached express and implied 
warranties relating to the floor insulation that Metal-
clad had supplied. 
FN3. SLIC filed the original complaint 
against Roth for breach of contract, negli-
gence, and breach of warranties. At trial the 
Page 2 
court entered a judgment against Roth for 
$1,909,401.57 plus interest and costs. Roth 
does not appeal that judgment. 
The trial court found that Oneida failed to prove Me-
talclad had breached either of the contracts or had 
breached express and implied warranties relating to 
the insulation products. The trial court also found that 
Oneida failed to prove Metalclad was involved in 
designing the floor slab system. Finally, the trial court 
found that Oneida failed to prove Metalclad negli-
gently caused or contributed to the damages which 
Oneida sustained. Accordingly, the trial court dis-
missed all of Oneida's claims against Metalclad. 
Oneida now appeals that dismissal. 
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE 
Oneida presents six issues in its brief, four of which 
are indisputably issues of fact and two of which 
Oneida characterizes as issues of law. The first issue 
that Oneida characterizes as one of law challenges the 
trial court's denial of damages resulting from alleged 
breaches of contract and warranties. The trial court's 
denial of Oneida's claim for damages, however, 
simply followed its finding that Metalclad did not 
breach its contracts or warranties. The second issue 
that Oneida characterizes as one of law challenges the 
trial court's ruling that Metalclad was not jointly liable 
with Roth. The trial court's determination that Metal-
clad was not jointly liable, once again, simply fol-
lowed its finding that Metalclad was not negligent. In 
other words, the trial court's dismissal of Metalclad's 
damages and liability claims resulted from the trial 
court's findings of fact and not from its application, 
interpretation, or choice of law. Thus despite Oneida's 
characterization, all the issues presented on appeal 
dispute the trial court's findings of fact. 
[1][2] Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' 
factual findings lightly. We repeatedly have set forth 
the heavy burden appellants must bear when chal-
lenging factual findings. To successfully appeal a trial 
court's findings of fact, appellate counsel *1053 must 
play the devil's advocate. "[Attorneys] must extricate 
[themselves] from the client's shoes and fully assume 
the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge 
the [marshaling] duty ..., the challenger must present, 
in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports 
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the very findings the appellant resists." West Valley 
City r. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 
App.1991); accord In re Estate of Bar tell 116 P.2d 
885, 886 (Utah 1989); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 
193 (Utah 1987); Commercial Union Assocs. v. 
Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App.1993); Ohline 
Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah 
App.1993). Once appellants have established every 
pillar supporting their adversary's position, they then 
"must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and show 
why those pillars fail to support the trial court's find-
ings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314. They must 
show the trial court's findings are "so lacking in sup-
port as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' 
thus making them 'clearly erroneous.' " B artel I, 776 
P.2dat886 (quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193). 
This rigorous standard reflects the doctrine that ap-
pellate courts "do not sit to retry cases submitted on 
disputed facts." Bartell, 776 P.2d at 886. Accordingly, 
"[w]hen the duty to marshal is not properly dis-
charged, we refuse to consider the merits of challenges 
to the findings and accept the findings as valid." 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 
551, 553 (Utah App.1989). 
[31 Oneida has failed to marshal the evidence in sup-
port of the trial court's factual findings. Rather than 
bearing its marshaling burden, Oneida has merely 
presented carefully selected facts and excerpts of trial 
testimony in support of its position. Such selective 
citation to the record does not begin to marshal the 
evidence; it is nothing more than an attempt to reargue 
the case before this court-a tactic that we reject. 
Commercial Union, 863 P.2d at 36; Ohline, 849 P.2d 
at 604. Because Oneida has failed to marshal the 
evidence supporting the trial court's findings, we hold 
that those findings are accurate and affirm the trial 
court's dismissal based on those findings. 
[41 As we decline to consider the merits of Oneida's 
appeal, we take the occasion to further articulate our 
rationale behind the marshaling requirement. We 
recognize that requiring appellants who challenge trial 
courts' factual findings first to marshal all the evidence 
in support of those findings and second to demonstrate 
why that evidence remains insufficient to support 
those findings is a rigorous standard. Nonetheless, this 
strict requirement both grows from and nurtures two 
interrelated court objectives: efficiency and fairness. 
The deference we afford to trial courts' findings is 
based on and fosters the principle that traditional fact 
finders, whether judges or juries, are better equipped 
to consider, weigh, and assess the evidence that liti-
gants bring before the courts. Efficient resolution of 
disputes demands that, unless the facts found by the 
trial court are clearly erroneous, they will be upheld on 
appeal. In short, "[w]e do not sit to retry the facts." 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789. 800 (Utah 
1991). Successful challenges to findings of fact thus 
must demonstrate to appellate courts first how the trial 
court found the facts from the evidence and second 
why such findings contradict the weight of the evi-
dence. These demonstrations in appellants' briefs not 
only avoid retrying the facts but also assist us in our 
decision-making and opinion-writing, thus increasing 
our efficiency. 
Additionally, the deference we afford to trial courts' 
factual findings is based on and fosters the principle 
that appellants rather than appellees bear the greater 
burden on appeal. When appellants do not marshal the 
evidence in support of disputed findings, they place 
appellees or respondents in a precarious position. 
Prudent appellees likely will not rely solely on an 
assertion that the appellant has failed to marshal the 
evidence; rather, appellees are compelled to perform 
the marshaling process to protect their position. In 
short, appellees are constrained to do the appellant's 
work, usually at considerable time *1054 and ex-
pense.— When appellants challenge findings of fact, 
fairness requires that they bear the costs of demon-
strating how the trial court found those facts from the 
evidence and why those findings contradict the weight 
of the evidence. The marshaling requirement, there-
fore, enhances both fairness and efficiency as appel-
late courts hear appeals of trial court rulings. 
FN4. In the instant case, Metalclad's attor-
neys admirably marshalled the evidence to 
protect their client on appeal. That evidence 
supports the trial court's findings. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Oneida has failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the factual findings which it disputes, we 
decline to reach the merits of its appeal. We hold that 
the trial court's findings of fact are accurate, and ac-
cordingly we affirm the trial court's dismissal of 
Oneida's claims against Metalclad. 
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Judge, concur. 
Utah App., 1994. 
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, 
Inc. 
872 P.2d 1051 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
Henry S. PARKS, Plaintiff, Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, individually and 
as Executor of the Estate of Lucile M. Parks, de-
ceased, Intermountain Health Care, Inc. dba Primary 
Children's Medical Center, and Joseph J. Taylor, Jr., 
Defendants, Appellants and Cross-Respondents. 
No. 18580. 
Sept. 22, 1983. 
Surviving husband brought action against executor of 
his deceased wife's estate and others seeking imposi-
tion of a constructive trust upon real and personal 
property included in estate of decedent. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J., 
imposed constructive trust, and appeal and cross ap-
peal were taken. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held 
that: (1) evidence was sufficient to support imposition 
of constructive trust, and (2) surviving husband was 
entitled to receive his share of income and profits 
realized upon trust res as a result of its wrongful dis-
position. 
Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. 
Howe, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes 
HI Trusts 390 €^>91 
390 Trusts 
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity 
3901(C) Constructive Trusts 
390k91 k. Nature of Constructive Trust. 
Most Cited Cases 
With certain exceptions, constructive trusts generally 
are not based upon intention of parties. 
12] Trusts 390 €>^>91 
390 Trusts 
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity 
3901(C) Constructive Trusts 
390k91 k. Nature of Constructive Trust. 
Most Cited Cases 
Most notable distinction between constructive trusts 
and other types of trusts, such as express and resulting 
trusts, is generally the intention element. 
131 Trusts 390 €^>91 
390 Trusts 
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity 
3901(C) Constructive Trusts 
390k91 k. Nature of Constructive Trust. 
Most Cited Cases 
Constructive trusts which may arise without proof of 
the parties' intention to create a trust cannot and do not 
require that some form of agreement be manifested. 
HI Trusts 390 €^>110 
390 Trusts 
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity 
3901(C) Constructive Trusts 
390kl06 Evidence to Establish Trust 
390kll0 k. Weight and Sufficiency. 
Most Cited Cases 
Evidence showing that surviving husband was gain-
fully employed throughout entire course of marriage 
and that deceased wife was only employed for a brief 
period, evidence that at time each of the subject 
properties was acquired, husband was employed and 
had a substantial income, while wife had no outside 
employment or separate income, and evidence show-
ing that husband's income and individual labor were 
responsible for improvements made on the properties, 
as well as the maintenance of the properties, supported 
finding that husband's labors and earnings were re-
sponsible for acquisition of a substantial portion of the 
marital estate, so that it was appropriate to conclude 
that husband had an equitable interest in the subject 
property, and that the total inclusion of such property 
in estate of wife constituted an unjust enrichment of 
her estate, and thus imposition of constructive trust 
upon estate of wife was justified, at least as to that 
portion representing husband's proven interest therein. 
151 Trial 388 €^>395(1) 
388 Trial 
388X Trial by Court 
388X(B) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
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Law 
388k395 Sufficiency in General 
388k395(l) k In General Most Cited 
Cases 
Trial 388 €^>397(1) 
388 Trial 
388X Trial by Court 
388X(B) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law 
388k397 Failure to Find on Particular 
Questions 
388k397(l) k In General Most Cited 
Cases 
Findings of fact required to be made by trial court in 
all actions tried upon facts without a jury must clearly 
indicate the mind of the court, and must resolve all 
issues of material fact necessary to justify the conclu-
sions of law and judgment entered thereon Rules 
Civ Proc Rule 52(a) 
161 Appeal and Error 30 €^>1177(8) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVII Determination and Disposition of Cause 
30XVIKD) Reversal 
30kl 177 Necessity of New Trial 
30kl 177(8) k Insufficiency of Verdict 
or Findings Most Cited Cases 
Failure of trial court in actions tried upon facts without 
a jury to enter adequate findings requires judgment to 
be vacated Rules Crv Pioc , Rule 52(a) 
121 Trial 388 €^>395(5) 
388 Trial 
388X Trial by Court 
388X(B) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law 
388k395 Sufficiency m General 
388k395(5) k Ultimate or Evidentiary 
Facts Most Cited Cases 
Trial 388 €^396(3) 
388 Trial 
388X Trial by Court 
388X(B) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law 
388k396 Confoimity to Pleadings, Lsues, 
and Proofs 
388k396(3)k Scope of Issues Raised by 
Pleadings Most Cited Cases 
Trial 388 €^>396(4) 
388 Trial 
388X Trial by Court 
388X(B) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law 
388k396 Conformity to Pleadings Issues, 
and Proofs 
388k396(4) k Facts and Evidence in 
General Most Cited Cases 
Although trial court's findings with respect to ele-
ments of constructive trust and affirmative defenses of 
estoppel and waiver in action tried without a jury were 
not as full and complete as might be desired, they did 
ascertain the ultimate facts and sufficiently conformed 
to pleadings and evidencesupporting the judgment 
Rules Civ Proc , Rule 52(a) 
18] Trial 388 €^>391 
388 Trial 
388X Trial by Court 
388X(B) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law 
388k391 k Facts and Conclusions to Be 
Found Most Cited Cases 
Substantial compliance with rule requiring that trial 
court find facts specially m all actions tried upon facts 
without a jury does not require that the trial court 
negative every allegation contained in the pleadings, 
rather, the rule is satisfied if, from the findings trial 
court makes, there can be no reasonable inference 
other than that it must have found against such alle-
gations Rules Civ Pioc , Rule 52(a) 
I£l Trusts 390 €^>103(3) 
390 Trusts 
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity 
3901(C) Constructive Trusts 
390kl03 Contracts and Transactions Be-
tween Persons in Confidential Relations 
390kl03(3) k Husband and Wife Most 
Cited Cases 
Deceased wife's testamentary disposition of trust 
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property, with knowledge of her husband's interest 
therein, constituted a breach of her responsibility as a 
constructive trustee, earning her the status of a "con-
scious wrongdoer," and thus surviving husband was 
entitled to receive his share of income and profits 
realized upon trust res as a result of its wrongful dis-
position. 
[101 Appeal and Error 30 €^>1177(8) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVII Determination and Disposition of Cause 
30XVIKD) Reversal 
30kl 177 Necessity of New Trial 
30kl 177(8) k. Insufficiency of Verdict 
or Findings. Most Cited Cases 
Requisite link between value of property subject to 
constructive trust and award to surviving husband 
proceeding from imposition of a constructive trust was 
missing, so as to require reversal of judgment and 
remand of case for making of adequate findings. 
fill Trusts 390 €^>362 
390 Trusts 
390VII Establishment and Enforcement of Trust 
390VIKC) Actions 
390k362 k. Defenses. Most Cited Cases 
Even if averment that surviving husband's conduct, 
i.e., acquiescence in administration of estate and fail-
ure to assert his claim of ownership for three years 
following death of his wife, led executor of estate and 
others to sell estate assets and invest the proceeds, sale 
of assets and investment of proceeds was not detri-
mental to executor and others, or to the estate, and thus 
surviving husband was not equitably estopped from 
seeking imposition of constructive trust upon real and 
personal property included in estate. 
U21 Trusts 390 €^>362 
390 Trusts 
390VII Establishment and Enforcement of Trust 
390VIKC) Actions 
390k362 k. Defenses. Most Cited Cases 
Notwithstanding surviving husband's delay in assert-
ing his claim and his acknowledgment of and com-
pliance with provisions of will, he did not at any time 
intentionally and distinctly relinquish his right to 
assert claim of ownership against property, and thus 
he did not waive his right to seek imposition of con-
structive trust upon real and personal property in-
cluded in estate of his deceased wife. 
1131 Witnesses 410 €^>159(2) 
410 Witnesses 
41011 Competency 
41011(C) "Dead Man'S" Statutes and Rules 
410kl57 Subject-Matter of Testimony 
410kl59 Transactions or Communica-
tions Between Witness and Person Subsequently De-
ceased or Incompetent 
410kl59(2) k. Nature of Testimony in 
General. Most Cited Cases 
In action brought against executor of deceased wife's 
estate and others by surviving husband seeking im-
position of constructive trust upon real and personal 
property included in estate of deceased wife, trial 
court's employment of the dead man's statute to ex-
clude evidence which allegedly established an oral 
trust between surviving husband and his deceased 
wife in connection with the marital estate was proper. 
*591 John A. Snow, Michael N. Emery, Salt Lake 
City, for appellant. 
Richard H. Thornley, Ogden, for respondent. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Defendants appeal a judgment imposing a construc-
tive trust upon real and personal property included in 
the estate of Lucile M. Parks. They raise the following 
six points: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support 
the imposition of a constructive trust; (2) the findings 
of fact do not comply with Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure; (3) the award is not supported by the 
evidence or the findings and conclusions of the trial 
court; (4) the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings concerning purchase of the property; (5) 
plaintiff is estopped from raising his claim of owner-
ship; and (6) plaintiff has waived his claim of own-
ership. 
Plaintiff Henry S. Parks, who was born February 17, 
1909, and Lucile M. Parks, who was born November 
25, 1904, were married September 1, 1927, and were 
husband and wife at the time of the death of Lucile M. 
Parks on October 25, 1974. Their marriage was de-
scribed as congenial and happy. 
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*592 During the marriage, plaintiff was continuously 
and gainfully employed until September, 1974, at 
which time he retired from his position as Chief of the 
Chemical (Mechanical) Engineering Section and Base 
Consulting Engineer at Hill Air Force Base. Plaintiff 
testified that his retirement was necessitated by the 
incapacitating illness of Mrs. Parks. 
Mrs. Parks, on the other hand, was not employed on a 
regular basis during the marriage. At the time of the 
marriage and for approximately four months thereaf-
ter, she worked for the telephone company. She later 
worked at the Plantation Inn and Ambassador Club 
Restaurants for approximately six months while 
plaintiff was in the military service. After the conclu-
sion of her restaurant employment, in November, 
1932, Mrs. Parks was never again gainfully employed 
outside of the home. She did, however, conduct 
business from time to time with her mother, Elizabeth 
Colemere, who was described as a business woman. 
In 1943, Henry and Lucile Parks moved to a small 
farm located on 9400 South Street in Salt Lake City, 
where they commenced raising and selling turkeys. 
They also developed an orchard on the farm and sold 
the fruit. Although the income generated by this fam-
ily operation was very meager, the labor required of 
both plaintiff and his wife to maintain it was substan-
tial. 
During the time this farm was in operation, plaintiff 
continued to work on a full-time basis at his outside 
employment. He described a typical workday as fol-
lows: 
I would get up at 4:30 a.m., do a few chores, get ready 
to leave the house at 6:00, go to Ogden by a carpool, 
arrived at 7:14, worked a normal 8-hour shift, came 
back, make my rounds of the 21st South property, take 
care of the lawns, water, mow, or whatever, and arrive 
back at the farm, probably 7:00 at night. 
Upon arriving back at the farm, plaintiff testified that 
he typically did the following: 
Q Now, I want to go over that a little more. You get 
home at night and what do you do, say, from 6:00 to 
10:00 in the evening? 
A That was putting out feed for turkeys, repairing 
equipment, building equipment. See, as we were pro-
gressing in the size of our flock, the flock required 
more and more equipment and the responsibilities 
increased. As we acquired the property, our re-
sponse-or my responsibility for the maintenance and 
so on increased. 
Q When did you eat supper? 
A I never ate supper before-I can't ever recall, ever in 
my life, eating supper before 10:00 at night. 
Q And then after your meal at 10:00, you went out 
with the turkeys? 
A Yes. 
Q For how long? 
A Well, that would be from then until I arose the next 
morning. 
Mrs. Parks' brothers, George and Burgess Colemere, 
testified that Mrs. Parks was the money and business 
manager of the Parks family. She did all the banking, 
kept the records, paid family expenses and signed the 
checks. It was also shown that Henry and Lucile Parks 
had a joint checking account. 
During their years of marriage, the Parks acquired 
various pieces of real property, all of which are located 
in Salt Lake County. At the time of her death, the title 
to each of these properties was vested in Mrs. Parks 
alone. The evidence concerning the acquisition of 
each parcel is different, and each parcel will hereafter 
be discussed separately. 
1. 21 st South Property 
The 21st South property consisted often different lots 
situated at 1427 and 1431 East 2100 South. These lots 
were obtained by four separate conveyances. 
The first conveyance consisted of four lots, which 
were described as Lots 38 to 41. The only evidence 
concerning the acquisition of title to these lots is a 
deed from Salt Lake County dated March 4, 1940, 
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which quitclaims these lots to Lucile M. Parks. Al-
though the deed itself recites a consideration of 
$352.72 for the purchase of the lots, *593 a tax sale 
redemption certificate attached to the deed in the 
record indicates that only $156.72 was actually paid, 
and that such payment was made by Mrs. Parks. It is 
noted that Mrs. Parks was not employed at the time 
she made this payment. 
Mr. Parks testified that he later constructed a fourplex 
on Lots 38 to 41, which generated rental income over 
the years. 
The second conveyance occurred on December 3, 
1945. A warranty deed conveying Lots 42 and 43 was 
executed by O.P. Hendricksen and Kemilla Hen-
dricksen, as grantors, in favor of Henry S. Parks and 
Lucile M. Parks, as grantees. Mr. Parks testified that 
he personally paid approximately $700 cash for this 
purchase. 
A second warranty deed conveying Lots 42 and 43 
was executed in 1963 by Henry S. Parks, as grantor, in 
favor of Lucile Parks, as grantee. There is no evidence 
in the record as to why Mr. Parks made this con-
veyance. 
Lots 46 and 47 were purchased on December 28, 
1945, by tax deed from Salt Lake County for the sum 
of $300, naming Mrs. Parks as the sole grantee. Again 
it is noted that Mrs. Parks was not gainfully employed 
in 1945, or anytime after 1932, while Mr. Parks was 
employed full-time. 
The only evidence concerning the acquisition of the 
final two lots, Lots 48 and 49, is a warranty deed dated 
March 9,1946, executed by "E. Rogers," as grantor, in 
favor of Lucile Parks. E. Rogers, also known as 
Elizabeth Rogers, Elizabeth Colemere Rogers and 
Elizabeth Colemere, was Mrs. Parks' mother. 
2. 33rd South Property 
With respect to the 33rd South property, the only 
evidence concerning the title to the property is a 
warranty deed dated June 23, 1959, and executed by 
W.H. Florence in favor of Mrs. Parks, as grantee. It 
was also shown, however, that mortgages had been 
placed upon this property in the names of both plain-
tiff (Mr. Parks) and Mrs. Parks, and that the mortgage 
money had been used to construct two fourplexes on 
the same property. 
3. 9800 South Property 
A warranty deed was executed on this property by 
Elizabeth Colemere, as grantor, in favor of Lucile 
Parks in 1962. Mr. Parks testified that he was unaware 
that this conveyance had occurred until Mrs. Parks' 
will was read, and then, he was under the impression 
that the property had been inherited by his wife. He 
further testified, however, that he later found out that 
this property had been purchased, and that the family's 
only sources of income at that time were his salary and 
the rents from the investment properties. 
With respect to the purchase of this property, Burgess 
Colemere (Mrs. Parks' brother) testified that his 
mother, Elizabeth Colemere, had owned a 100-acre 
parcel of land, which included the 9800 South prop-
erty, and that she conveyed 25 acres to each of her four 
children. The 9800 South property constituted Lucile's 
25-acre portion. He further testified that each of the 
children was to pay approximately $100 to $200 per 
month for his or her 25-acre parcel, but that Lucile had 
not made her payments. 
4. Lincoln Street Property 
Record title to the Lincoln Street property was evi-
denced by an executor's deed dated November 27, 
1968, executed by George and Burgess Colemere, 
co-executors of the estate of Elizabeth Colemere 
Rogers, in favor of Lucile Parks. 
Although the executor's deed recites payment of 
$17,700 for this property, Burgess Colemere testified 
that nothing was actually paid by Lucile Parks. Ac-
cording to Mr. Colemere, Mrs. Parks was awarded a 
credit by her mother's estate in the amount of 
$7,142.62 for improvements that she and her husband 
(plaintiff) had made on the property while living 
thereon. As to the remaining amount of the purchase 
price, Mrs. Colemere testified that such amount was 
deducted from Lucile's share of her mother's estate. 
5. 9400 South Property 
The 9400 South property consists of two parcels, 
which are identified as parcels H and I. Parcel H, 
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consisting of 4.83 net *594 acres, was inherited by 
Mrs. Parks from her mother, while parcel I, which 
consists of approximately 20 acres, was purchased 
from Mrs. Parks' mother. Parcel I was known as the 
family farm and was the Parks' residence from 1943 
until the death of Mrs. Parks in 1974. 
The purchase of parcel I was evidenced by a uniform 
real estate contract dated June 5, 1943, executed by E. 
Colemere, as seller, and Henry Parks and Lucile 
Parks, as buyers. The contract indicated a purchase 
price of $3,000. The property (parcel I) was later 
(1951) conveyed by warranty deed from E. Colemere 
to Tucile Parks as sole grantee. 
Within a week after Lucile Parks' funeral services, 
plaintiff contacted attorney Grant Macfarlane, Sr., and 
inquired whether Mrs. Parks had executed a will. Mr. 
Macfarlane told plaintiff that he had drawn a will for 
Mrs. Parks some two or three years prior, and that the 
will was being kept at Zions First National Bank. 
Thereafter, plaintiff went to Zions Bank, where he met 
with Mr. Macfarlane, and Jay Jeppson and Troy 
Thornton of the Zions Bank Trust Department, and 
read the will. 
The will of Lucile Parks, dated November 17, 1971, 
provides that all real property in her estate, except 
parcel I of the 9400 South property, should be sold and 
the proceeds from such sale held in trust by Zions 
Bank. As trustee, Zions Bank was directed to hold, 
manage and distribute such funds in accordance with 
the provisions of the will. The will also provided that 
plaintiff was to retain a life estate in the farmhouse 
used by himself and Mrs. Parks as their residence, and, 
at the discretion of Zions Bank, Mr. Parks was to be 
provided with support in an amount not exceeding 
$200 a month and financial assistance in the event of 
illness or emergency. However, all of the benefits 
provided to plaintiff under the will would terminate if 
he remarried, and, as to the life estate, such would also 
terminate if he failed to occupy the farmhouse for one 
year. Upon the death or remarriage of plaintiff, the 
will dictated that a sum not exceeding $10,000 was to 
be paid to Joseph J. Taylor, and the remainder paid to 
Primary Children's Medical Center. 
With respect to the personal property, the will declares 
that the household furniture and miscellaneous per-
sonal property belong to plaintiff, having been pur-
chased by him with his own separate funds. However, 
approximately one month after the execution of the 
will, Mrs. Parks executed a codicil thereto declaring 
that all household furniture and miscellaneous per-
sonal property, including carpets, books, pictures and 
musical instruments were hers, and that plaintiff had 
the right to use such property during his lifetime. 
At the time of the review of the will, plaintiff was 
grieving for his wife and apparently continued to do so 
for approximately two years. His sister-in-law, LaRue 
Colemere, testified that he was in a state of shock and 
"seemed like a man that was dazed ...." His broth-
er-in-law, George Colemere, testified that plaintiff 
u[c]ame close to a breakdown ...." 
Plaintiffs recollection of his condition is as follows: "I 
think I reacted much in the manner of a zombie. I 
didn't know what was going on or how to raise any 
verbal statements." Plaintiff testified, "I had very little 
realization of any of the consequences." 
As noted previously, Grant Macfarlane, Sr., was the 
first attorney contacted by plaintiff after the death of 
his wife. Mr. Macfarlane arranged for the reading of 
the will at Zions Bank, but did not offer any legal 
advice with respect thereto. In fact, he later appeared 
as the attorney for the executor (Zions Bank) of the 
estate. 
LaRue Colemere, plaintiffs sister-in-law, testified that 
she and her husband, George Colemere, suggested that 
plaintiff see an attorney and finally took him to at-
torney Sam Bernstein. Plaintiff testified that Mr. 
Bernstein read the will and told him that he could get 
half of the estate without even going to court, but that 
he would have to act quickly. Plaintiff did not, how-
ever, return to Mr. Bernstein. 
*595 In January of 1976, plaintiff retained Leo Jardine 
to handle his claim against his deceased wife's estate. 
Mr. Jardine advised him that he would take care of the 
matter. He later prepared and had plaintiff sign an 
objection to petition for amendment of the last will 
and testament, but failed to file the document or do 
anything further in the case. 
In November, 1977, plaintiff went to a third attorney, 
David Stott, about the estate. Plaintiff was concerned 
at that time with a petition he had received to close the 
estate. Mr. Stott wrote a letter to Zions Bank dis-
cussing plaintiffs rights under the will, and gave the 
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bank ten days to respond. Because Mr. Stott gave the 
bank an extension on the ten-day period to respond to 
the letter, plaintiff terminated Mr. Stott and engaged 
the attorneys presently appearing in this matter on his 
behalf. 
In December, 1975, it was discovered that Mrs. Parks' 
will did not conform to the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 
and that as a consequence, the estate was going to 
incur a substantial tax liability. In an effort to reduce 
such liability, Mr. Macfarlane, acting on behalf of the 
executor, Zions Bank, convinced plaintiff to agree to 
an amendment of the trust to increase plaintiffs 
monthly allowance from $200 to $500, and to relin-
quish the health and accident support provision. 
As noted above, the will provided plaintiff a life estate 
in the farmhouse, so long as he did not move out for 
longer than one year, and did not remarry. In April, 
1975, plaintiff decided to move from the farm to a 
house on Lakeline Drive in Salt Lake City. Plaintiff 
went to Mr. Thornton of Zions Bank and requested the 
move. The court was petitioned and an order was 
entered approving the move. The petition indicated 
that the Lakeline Drive residence could be purchased 
for $95,000 and the farmhouse and farm could be sold 
for approximately $600,000, making an annual return 
to the estate of $40,000 per year which it would not 
otherwise have realized. 
Plaintiff remained at the Lakeline Drive residence 
until March, 1977. He thereafter moved to a condo-
minium at Canyon Road Towers, Unit 415. The peti-
tion for such move was again prepared by representa-
tives of Zions Bank and Primary Children's Medical 
Center. It was indicated in the petition that the resi-
dence on Lakeline Drive could be sold for approx-
imately $100,000 and the condominium unit could be 
purchased for $72,250, and that the difference could 
be invested, resulting in an $8,000 per year return to 
the estate which would not otherwise be realized.— 
FN1. Plaintiff later moved from Unit 415 to 
Unit 709 of the same condominium complex, 
Canyon Road Towers. 
On December 3, 1977, plaintiff remarried. Shortly 
thereafter, upon discovering his remarriage, Zions 
Bank discontinued the $500 per month support check, 
pursuant to the clause of the will conditioning such 
support upon plaintiffs remaining unmarried. This 
monthly allowance was, however, reinstated by sti-
pulation during the trial. 
The beginning inventory in the Lucile Parks estate 
listed the gross estate at $839,159.43. At the time the 
petition for final settlement and distribution was filed, 
the estate had earned $344,394.54, making a gross 
estate of $1,183,553.97 before estate expenses and 
deductions. At the time of trial, all real estate inven-
toried in the estate had been sold by the executor and 
the estate assets at that time were $920,500. 
Plaintiff initiated this action in response to the petition 
to close the estate filed by Zions Bank, the executor, 
on November 22, 1977. Plaintiff filed an objection in 
the probate proceeding and filed the complaint in this 
proceeding seeking to impose an oral, resulting or 
constructive trust in his favor on certain household 
furnishings and on the real property set forth above. 
The lower court found that the real property was 
subject to a constructive trust, and awarded judgment 
in favor of plaintiff for the sum of $175,000. Addi-
tionally, the *596 court awarded plaintiff fee title to 
the condominium in which he was then residing. 
Appellants herein seek a reversal of the trial court's 
judgment, or in the alternative, a new trial. Plaintiff 
cross-appeals, seeking an increase in the damage 
award and a finding of an oral trust. 
I. 
The first point defendants raise on appeal is that there 
is no evidence in the record to justify the trial court's 
imposition of a constructive trust upon the estate of 
Lucile Parks. They argue that the circumstances or 
elements which must be present in order to justify 
imposing such a trust are a "confidential relationship" 
between a transferor and transferee of property and a 
breach by the transferee of an "oral or implicit 
agreement" to hold the property in trust for the trans-
feror. 
The purported authority for defendants' argument 
regarding constructive trusts is the case of Nielson v. 
RasmussenP^ In Nielson, this Court affirmed the trial 
court's decision not to impose a trust and made the 
following statement with regard to the circumstances 
under which a constructive trust could be imposed: 
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FN2. Utah, 558 P.2d511 (1976). 
The "certain circumstances" which the trial court ... 
would have had to find were that the defendants at the 
time of the transfer of property to them by plaintiffs 
...orally agreed to hold said lots for Rasmussens |be-
neficiaries] and were in a confidential relationship to 
the plaintiffs.^ [Emphasis added.] 
FN3.M at 513. 
The Court further noted in Nielson that these "certain 
circumstances" must be shown to exist by "clear and 
convincing evidence." — 
FN4. Id. See also Matter of Estate of Hock, 
Utah, 655 P.2d 1111 (1982). 
As additional support for this argument, defendants 
cite fr 44 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which 
states: 
(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transfers it 
inter vivos to another in trust for the transferor, but no 
memorandum properly evidencing the intention to 
create a trust is signed, as required by the Statute of 
Frauds, and the transferee refuses to perform the trust, 
the transferee holds the interest upon a constructive 
trust for the transferor, if 
(b) the transferee at the time of the transfer was in a 
confidential relation to the transferor.... 
Defendants further contend that under certain condi-
tions the requisite promise or agreement between the 
transferor and transferee need not be expressly stated 
at the time of the conveyance. They cite Haws v. 
Jensen,— wherein this Court affirmed the imposition 
of a constructive trust despite the lack of an express 
promise, and explained its decision by quoting the 
following passage from a New York Court of Appeals 
decision: "Though a promise in words was lacking, 
the whole transaction, it might be found, was 'instinct 
with an obligation' imperfectly expressed." — Based 
upon these authorities, defendants draw the conclu-
sion that, universally, courts require an oral, or at least 
implicit, agreement and a breach thereof before they 
will impose a constructive trust. 
FN5. 116 Utah 212. 209 P.2d 229 (1949). 
FN6. Id. 209 P.2d at 232. quotmg Sinclair v 
Purdy, 235 N.Y. 245. 139 N E. 255, 258 
(1923). 
Defendants point out that not one single witness tes-
tified to any conversation wherein Mrs. Parks prom-
ised or agreed to hold any of the subject parcels of 
property in trust for plaintiff. Furthermore, defendants 
argue that not one witness testified to any conversa-
tions wherein plaintiff and his wife made any state-
ment which would indicate that either of them recog-
nized that Mrs. Parks took said property subject \o an 
obligation to hold it in trust for plaintiff. 
Defendants argue that not only does the evidence fail 
to demonstrate a promise or *597 obligation between 
plaintiff and his wife, it suggests the opposite conclu-
sion. During the three-year period between the death 
of Mrs. Parks and the filing of this suit, plaintiff par-
ticipated and acquiesced in the administration of the 
estate in accordance with the provisions of the will. He 
did not, during that period, make any claim of own-
ership as to the real property included in the estate. 
We are unable to countenance defendants' narrow 
construction of the law pertaining to constructive 
trusts. Contrary to the implications of their position, 
neither § 44 of the Restatement of Trusts nor this 
Court's statement (above) in the Nielson decision 
constitutes an exclusive definition of constructive 
trusts and exhausts the possible circumstances under 
which a trust such as this may be imposed. Ralher, 
these authorities merely describe the circumstances 
and requirements necessary to impose just one of the 
numerous types of constructive trusts. 
It has been said of constructive trusts: 
[A]n attempt to define or describe a constructive trust 
would be inadequate because such definition or de-
scription would be too narrow in its scope and fail to 
include important types of constructive t rusts .^ 
FN7. Winner v Brosuis' Estate, 184 Kan. 
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273, 336 P.2d 455. 460 (1959). 
And further, u[t]he forms and varieties of these trusts 
... are practically without limit." — 
FN8. Fitz-Gerald v. Hull 150 Tex. 39, 237 
S.W.2d 256, 263 (1951). 
The intended scope of § 44 (Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts) is clearly identified by the following passage 
from the Restatement of Restitution: 
Constructive trusts are not dealt with in the Restate-
ment of Trusts, except insofar as they arise out of 
express trusts or attempts to create express trusts. 
[Emphasis added.] — 
FN9. Restatement of Restitution § 160 
comment a (1937). 
According to this statement, unless an "express trust" 
has been established, or at least asserted, as the basis 
of entitlement to property, this section does not apply. 
In other words, § 44 applies to only one type of con-
structive trust, that which uarise[s] out of express 
trusts or attempts to create express trusts." 
That the scope of § 44 is thus limited is further re-
vealed by the language of the section itself. Such 
language describes the applicable situation as one in 
which an express trust has been rendered unenforce-
able for failure to comply with the requirements of the 
Statute of Frauds. In this situation, § 44 provides that 
the intended trust may be imposed, notwithstanding 
the Statute of Frauds violation, under the guise of a 
constructive t r u s t / ^ upon the condition that "the 
transferee at the time of the transfer was in a confi-
dential relation to the transferor." Supra. 
FN10. Restatement (Second) of Trusts g 44 
comment a (1959). 
The scope of this Court's statement in the Nielson 
decision (quoted above) is likewise limited to that 
particular type of constructive trust which arises from 
an express trust. In Nielson, the original dispute arose 
between plaintiffs and the Rasmussens. Defendants, 
the Carters, were subsequently joined as third parties. 
Plaintiffs and the Rasmussens eventually settled. By 
the terms of the settlement agreement, plaintiffs were 
to transfer to the Rasmussens four building lots. 
However, these same four building lots, along with 
other real property, had previously been sold to the 
Carters. Plaintiffs contended that they had not actually 
sold these lots to the Carters, but that they had trans-
ferred them to the Carters subject to an oral agreement 
that said lots would be held in trust (express trust) for 
the benefit of plaintiffs and the Rasmussens. This is 
precisely the situation to which § 44, as well as § 45, 
of the Restatement of Trusts applies. 
Inasmuch as the basis of plaintiffs claim of entitle-
ment to the four lots was an unenforceable*598 
trust,1^ this Court held, citing § 45 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts ("Effect of Failure of Oral 
Trust for a Third Person"),^2 that the intended ex-
press trust could be imposed as a constructive trust 
upon proof of an oral agreement and a confidential 
relationship. 
FN11. The express trust was unenforceable 
because there was no written memorandum 
evidencing the intention to create it, as re-
quired by the Statute of Frauds. 
FN12. Section 45 was applied in Nielson, 
rather than Section 44 because Section 45 
deals with third-party beneficiaries, and the 
party holding the equitable interest in Nielson 
(the Rasmussens) was a third party. Section 
44, although very similar to Section 45 in 
substance, applies where the settlor of the 
alleged trust is also the beneficiary thereof. In 
light of the similarities between the two sec-
tions, the previous discussion regarding Sec-
tion 44 is wholly pertinent to Section 45. 
The type of constructive trust described above is a 
species of the express trust out of which it arises. It 
therefore inherits certain fundamental characteristics 
of the express trust, one of which is "intention." An 
express trust is generally described as "a fiduciary 
relationship with respect to property, arising as a result 
of a manifestation of an intention to create it and 
subjecting the person in whom the title is vested to 
equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit of oth-
ers." ^-^ (Emphasis added.) 
FN13. 5 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts § 462.1 
(1967). See also supra n. 9. 
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[U[21 Aside from the type of constructive trust de-
scribed above, constructive trusts generally are not 
based upon the "intention" of the parties.^1^ Indeed, 
the most notable distinction between constructive 
trusts and other types of trusts, such as express and 
resulting trusts, is generally the "intention" element. 
FN14. Id. See also Matter of Estate of Hock, 
supra n. 4, at 1114. 
[31 It is axiomatic that an essential element of any 
agreement is the "intention" to create it. Accordingly, 
those constructive trusts which may arise without 
proof of the parties' "intention" to create a trust cannot 
and do not require, as defendants propose, that some 
form of agreement be manifested. 
In the present case, plaintiffs claim against his de-
ceased wife's estate was based upon theories of oral, 
resulting and constructive trusts. In other words, he 
was not relying solely upon the oral express trust 
theory, as did the plaintiffs in the Nielson case, and as 
occurs in most cases wherein §§ 44 and 45 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts are applied. The trial 
court rejected his claims based on theories of oral and 
resulting trusts, but found sufficient evidence to sup-
port his claim based on the theory of constructive 
trusts. 
In rejecting plaintiffs claim that a resulting trust 
should be applied, the trial court commented: "[A] 
resulting trust does not result merely because the 
husband puts up the money to purchase property in his 
wife's name." This statement was apparently based 
upon the rule of law articulated in § 442 of the Res-
tatement (Second) of Trusts, which reads thus: 
Where a transfer of property is made to one person and 
the purchase price is paid by another and the transferee 
is a wife, child or other natural object of bounty of the 
person by whom the purchase price is paid, a resulting 
trust does not arise unless the latter manifests an in-
tention that the transferee should not have the bene-
ficial interest in the property. [Emphasis added.] 
This rule, like the rule referred to above governing the 
imposition of an oral express trust, requires a "ma-
nifestation of intent," i.e., intent to retain the beneficial 
interest in the property. The trial court apparently 
concluded that the element of intent necessary to give 
rise to a resulting trust was absent. 
While we acknowledge that the resulting trust theory 
set forth in § 442, supra, is commonly applied under 
circumstances as herein presented (i.e., where a hus-
band pays the purchase price for real property and 
places the title thereto in either his wife's *599 name 
solely,^^ or in both his and his wife's name jointly 
^ ^ ) , we are not aware of any rule of law that would 
inhibit or discourage the application of the construc-
tive trust theory advanced in $ 160 of the Restatement 
of Restitution under such circumstances. 
FN15. See Anderson v. Cercone, 54 Utah 
345, 180 P. 586 (1919); Scanlon v. Scanlon, 6 
I11.2d 224, 127 N.E.2d 435 (1955). 
FN 16. SeeS9 C.J.S. Trusts S 127 (1955); 
Gorden v. Gorden, 93 Nev. 494, 569 P.2d 
397(1977). 
Section 160 presents the broadest possible application 
of a constructive trust. It provides that a constructive 
trust may arise "where a person holding title to prop-
erty is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to 
another on the ground that he would be unjustly 
enriched if he were permitted to retain it...." ^-^ Such 
breadth has also been described as follows: 
FN17. Restatement of Restitution § 160 
(1937). See also Matter of Estate of Hock, 
supra n. 4; Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, supra n. 8; G 
& MMotor Co. v. Thompson, Okl„ 567 P.2d 
SO (1977); Huberr. Coast Investment Co., 30 
Wash.App. 804, 638 P.2d 609 (1981). 
Constructive trusts include all those instances in 
which a trust is raised by the doctrines of equity for the 
purpose of working out justice in the most efficient 
manner, where there is no intention of the parties to 
create such a relation, and in most cases contrary to the 
intention of the one holding the legal title, and where 
there is no express or implied, written or verbal, dec-
laration of the trust.1^1 
FN18. J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 
1044(1941). 
The recent pronouncements of Pennsylvania courts 
are particularly apt on the question of whether § 160 
may be applicable under circumstances outlined in £ 
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442. In Kohr v. Kohrp^- under circumstances 
somewhat similar to those before us now, the Superior 
Court of Pennsylvania, applying § 442, held that a 
resulting trust could not be imposed because no "intent 
to retain a beneficial interest" had been shown. The 
court then resorted to the § 160 constructive trust 
theory. However, a constructive trust was not imposed 
in that case for the reason that the plaintiff failed to 
prove "unjust enrichment" to the transferee of the 
disputed property. Similarly, in the case of Yoke v. 
Yoke ^^ where the plaintiff/husband had conveyed 
his one-half interest in the family residence (which 
had been purchased by both spouses) to his wife, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered both the £ 
160 and § 442 trust theories and determined that a & 
160 constructive trust was the most appropriate re-
medy. In both these cases, the Pennsylvania courts 
considered and applied the provisions of § 160 under 
circumstances described in § 442. 
FN19. 271 Pa.Super. 321, 413 A.2d 687 
(1979). 
FN20. 466 Pa. 405, 353 A.2d 417 (1976). 
Yet another jurisdiction to apply § 160 under the spe-
cific circumstances posed in § 442 is Delaware. In a 
very recent decision, Adams v. Jankouskas,—=- the 
Delaware Supreme Court held that it was appropriate, 
not only to apply both theories under such circums-
tances, but to actually impose both types of trusts, 
provided, of course, the elements of such trusts were 
proven. The factual situation in the Adams case is 
remarkably similar to the present case. There, as here, 
the toils and labors of a husband and wife over the 
course of their marriage resulted in the accumulation 
of a substantial estate. The wife, who was considered 
the dominant spouse, managed the financial affairs. 
As a result of her management, most of the accumu-
lated properties and assets were held in her name. 
Upon her death, it was discovered, much to her hus-
band's surprise, that she had devised the majority of 
the estate to a niece and left little to her husband. Some 
two years after her death, the husband brought suit to 
have a constructive or resulting trust imposed upon his 
share of the estate. The lower court granted his re-
quest, imposing a resulting and constructive trust upon 
what it determined to be the husband's share of the 
estate, and on the subsequent appeal brought by the 
deceased wife's estate, the *600 Delaware Supreme 
Court affirmed with the following observation: 
FN21. Del.Supr., 452 A.2d 148(1982). 
It is important to note that this is not a case where a 
party was disappointed with what he received under a 
will. Rather, it is one in which joint funds were 
committed in obvious trust to one partner and then 
pooled to purchase property and make investments for 
the mutual benefit of both. Under these circumstances 
Chancery may impose this trust upon the accumulated 
assets in whatever form they now take.^^ 
FN22.A/. at 153. 
In light of the foregoing authority, as well as the in-
herent broad scope of the § 160 constructive trust, we 
conclude that the facts and circumstances of the in-
stant case warrant application of the provision of £ 
160. The question remaining is whether the record 
contains clear and convincing evidence to satisfy even 
the broad requirements of § 160 for the imposition of a 
constructive trust. 
The evidence clearly shows that the title to each of the 
subject parcels of property was in the name of Mrs. 
Parks alone. The question as to whether Mrs. Parks 
(her estate) would be "unjustly enriched" by retaining 
sole ownership of these properties depends upon 
whether plaintiff actually had an "equitable interest" 
in such properties. 
With respect to the question of plaintiffs "equitable 
interest" in the properties, the trial court found that 
during the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Parks, Mr. Parks 
(plaintiff) "was continuously employed and a sub-
stantial part of the marital estate was acquired from his 
earnings." Defendants contend, however, that this 
finding is not supported by the evidence. They con-
tend that the evidence shows that plaintiff had no part 
in the acquisition or ownership of the subject property 
and that Mrs. Parks alone acquired and owned it all. 
They conclude that inasmuch as the property was 
exclusively owned by Mrs. Parks, plaintiff had no 
"equitable interest" therein, and therefore its inclusion 
in her estate did not constitute an "unjust enrichment." 
Our survey of the record reveals that it contains much 
conflicting evidence regarding the acquisition and 
ownership of the property included in Mrs. Parks' 
estate. Our review of conflicting evidence in equity 
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cases is governed by the following well-settled rule: 
The findings of the trial courts on conflicting evidence 
will not be set aside unless it manifestly appears that 
the court has misapplied proven facts or made findings 
clearly against the weight of the evidence.^^-
FN23. 209 P.2d at 233, quoting Olivero v. 
Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P. 313. 315 
(1923). See also 655 P.2d at 1114. 
The evidence clearly shows that plaintiff was gain-
fully employed throughout the entire course of the 
marriage, and that Mrs. Parks was only employed for a 
brief period (approximately ten months). It shows that 
at the time each of the subject properties was acquired, 
plaintiff was employed and had a substantial income, 
while Mrs. Parks had no outside employment or sep-
arate income. It further shows that plaintiffs income 
and individual labor were responsible for improve-
ments made on many of the properties, as well as the 
maintenance of the properties. 
[4] This evidence clearly and adequately supports the 
trial court's finding that plaintiffs labors and earnings 
were responsible for the acquisition of a substantial 
portion of the marital estate. It is therefore appropriate 
to conclude that plaintiff had an "equitable interest" in 
the subject property, and that the total inclusion of 
such property in the estate of Mrs. Parks constituted an 
"unjust enrichment" of her estate. Accordingly, we 
hold that the trial court's imposition of a constructive 
trust upon the estate of Mrs. Parks was justified, at 
least as to that portion representing plaintiffs proven 
interest therein. 
II. 
Defendants next contend that the trial court's findings 
of fact do not comply with *601 Rule 52(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore the judgment 
entered pursuant to such findings must be vacated. 
[51F61 Rule 52(a) requires that a trial court find facts 
specially in all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury. Such findings of fact must clearly indicate the 
"mind of the court," ^ ^ and must resolve all issues of 
material fact necessary to justify the conclusions of 
law and judgment entered thereon.^^ Furthermore, 
failure of a trial court to enter adequate findings re-
quires the judgment to be vacated.1^ 
FN24. State ex rel K.D.S., Utah. 578 P.2d 9, 
11 (1978). 
FN25. Rom rel I v. Zions First National Bank, 
Utah, 611 P.2d 392. 394-95 (1980); Boxer 
Company v. Lignell, Utah. 567 P.2d 1112. 
1113(1977). 
FN26. Kinkella v. Baugh, Utah. 660 P.2d 
233, 236 (1983); Anderson v. Utah County 
Board of Com'rs, Utah, 589 P.2d 1214, 1216 
(1979). 
Defendants allege that the trial court's findings of fact 
do not address any of the issues germane to the causes 
of action and defenses raised in the pleadings. Spe-
cifically, they allege that no findings were made with 
respect to the elements of a constructive trust, and 
further, that none were entered regarding defendants' 
affirmative defenses of estoppel and waiver. (Addi-
tional deficiencies in the trial court's findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are alleged under subsequent 
points of the appeal.) 
In addition to the rules set forth above regarding the 
sufficiency of the trial court's findings of fact, this 
Court has observed: 
The importance of complete, accurate and consistent 
findings of fact in a case tried by a judge is essential to 
the resolution of dispute under the proper rule of law. 
To that end the findings should be sufficiently detailed 
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual 
issue was reached.^1 [Citations omitted.] 
FN27. Rucker v. Dalton, Utah, 598 P.2d 
1336.1338(1979). 
[7] Upon reviewing the pleadings, the evidence and 
the findings of fact in this matter, we conclude that, 
although the findings with respect to the issues deli-
neated under this particular point are not as full and 
complete as might be desired, they do ascertain the 
ultimate facts and sufficiently conform to the plead-
ings and the evidence supporting the judgment. 
As noted above in our discussion of constructive 
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trusts, the trial court's findings that the title to the 
property had been held solely by Mrs Parks that 
plaintiff had worked continuously during the marriage 
and that a substantial part of the marital estate had 
been acquired with his efforts and earnings adequately 
established the elements necessary to justify the lm 
position of a constructive trust 
£8] It is true that the findings do not specifically neg-
ative defendants' allegations of estoppel and waiver 
Substantial compliance with Rule 52(a) does not 
however, require that the trial court negative every 
allegation contained in the pleadings, rather, the Rule 
is satisfied if, from the findings it (the trial court) 
makes, there can be no reasonable inference other than 
that it must have found against such allegations In 
our view, the findings herein clearly infer the trial 
court's denial of these allegations 
FN28 Patton\ Kukman, 109 Utah 487 167 
P 2d 282, 283 (1946) 
III 
Next, defendants argue that, even assuming a con-
structive trust was properly imposed, the award pro-
ceeding from the judgment was not supported by the 
evidence or the findings and conclusions 
Defendants allege that they occupy the status of a 
"gratuitous transferee" ^ ^ with *602 respect to the 
property subject to the constructive trust They allege 
further that, inasmuch as they have already sold the 
real property originally included m the estate, the 
measure of recovery against them, pursuant to the 
constructive trust, is determined as follows 
FN29 A "gratuitous transferee" is defined m 
the Restatement of Restitution fr 204 (1937) 
as one who "receives the title to property of 
which another has the beneficial interest 
without notice of the other's interest but 
without paying value " 
Where a person receives the title to property of which 
another has the beneficial interest without notice of the 
other's interest but without paying value, and being 
still without such notice exchanges it for other prop-
erty, he is under a duty either 
(a) to surrender the property which he acquired m 
exchange, or, at his option, 
(b) to pay the value of the property which he originally 
received, the property which he acquired in exchange 
being subject to an equitable lien for such pay-
ment 
FN30 Restatement of Restitution fr 204 
(1937) 
And further, 
[The transferee] is liable to the claimant to the ex-
tent, but only to the extent, to which he is unjustly 
enriched at the expense of the claimant If the 
[transferee] makes a profit, he can keep the profit, if he 
incurs a loss, he need not make it good ^-^ 
FN31 Restatement of Restitution ft 204 
comment a (1937) 
Based upon these authorities, defendants suggest that 
their liability is limited to the value of the property 
subject to the trust, and further, that there must be a 
link between said value and the amount awarded to 
plaintiff 
Defendants argue that the requisite "link" is missing m 
the present case They point out that the property 
subjected to the constructive trust consisted of the 
entire estate, while the amount awarded plaintiff was a 
sum of $175,000 and a condominium They argue that 
there are no findings or conclusions which even re-
motely explain, justify or link this award to the value 
of the estate Accordingly, they contend that the 
judgment should be vacated 
The propriety of the damages award in this case is also 
challenged by plaintiff He contends that, given the 
size of the estate ($920,500), his award should be 
substantially increased to more closely reflect his 
contribution to the marital estate 
Plaintiffs position is that Mrs Parks herself, not the 
defendants, is the party whose status, with respect to 
the property subject to the constructive trust, is rele-
vant to the determination of liability He contends that 
Mrs Parks, as the original trustee under the construc-
tive trust, wrongfully disposed of the trust property 
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through her undisclosed (secret) will and thereby 
incurred liability as a "conscious wrongdoer " Plain-
tiff points out that the major distinction between this 
classification and the classification to which defen-
dants allegedly belong ("gratuitous transferee") is that 
a 'conscious wrongdoer' is liable, not only for the 
value of the property wrongfully transferred, but also 
for the value of whatever/?/ ofits are realized as a result 
of such transfer 
[91 We are in agreement with plaintiffs position in-
sofar as it classifies Mrs Parks as a "conscious 
wrongdoer" and holds her estate accountable and 
liable to plaintiff for his share of any profits realized 
on the res of the constructive trust Under the con-
structive trust theory, Mrs Parks, as transferee of the 
property, assumed the role of a "constructive trustee " 
^-^ Although her role as a "constructive trustee" did 
not entail the numerous fiduciary obligations which 
are imposed upon a trustee of an express trust, it did 
require that she respect and account for the equitable 
interest held by plaintiff in his beneficiary capaci-
ty ^ ^ Mrs Parks' testamentary disposition of the trust 
property, with knowledge of her husband's interest 
therein, constituted a breach of her responsibility as 
constructive trustee, earning her the status of a "con-
scious wrongdoer " 
FN32 5 A Scott, The Law of Trusts § 462 
(1967) 
FN33 Id 
*603 A "conscious wrongdoer" is one who "wrong-
fully disposes of property of another knowing that the 
disposition is wrongful and acquires in exchange other 
property " ^^ Under the circumstances as here pre-
sented, Mrs Parks herself did not receive property m 
exchange for the original property in the constructive 
trust, however, her estate, and more specifically her 
personal representative (Zions Bank/executor), who 
stands in the same position of the decedent had she 
lived,^^2 did receive exchange property, as well as a 
substantial profit therewith 
FN34 Restatement of Restitution fc 202 
(1937) 
FN35 Supra n 7, 336 P 2d at 463 
The liability of a "conscious wrongdoer" may e >ctend 
beyond the mere restoration of the status quo We 
acknowledge with approval the following principle of 
law and consider it dispositive herein 
Where a person by the consciously wrongful disposi-
tion of the property of another acquires other property, 
the person whose property is so used is not only en-
titled to hold the wrongdoer personally liable for the 
value of the property wrongfully disposed of but he is 
entitled as an alternative to the property so acquired If 
the property so acquired is or becomes more valuable 
than the property used in acquiring it, the profit thus 
made by the wrongdoer cannot be retained by him, the 
person whose property was used in making the profit 
is entitled to it ^ ^ 
FN36 Restatement of Restitution fr 202 
comment c (1937) 
The reasoning behind this rule has been stated thus 
If, however, the wrongdoer were permitted to keep the 
profit, there would be an incentive to wrongdoing, 
which is removed if he is compelled to surrender the 
profit The rule which compels the wrongdoer to bear 
any losses and to surrender any profits operates as a 
deterrent upon the wrongful disposition of the prop-
erty of others ^ ^ 
FN37 Id 
The record shows that the value of the estate of Lucile 
Parks has increased substantially since her death The 
petition for final settlement and distribution listed 
gross income at $344,394 54, for a total gross estate of 
$1,183,553 97 At the time of the trial (July 6,1982), it 
was stipulated that the net value of the estate was 
$920,500 
In accordance with the foregoing reasoning, we hold 
that plaintiff is entitled to receive his share of the 
income and profits realized upon the trust res as a 
result of its wrongful disposition 
riOl We also consider meritorious defendants' argu-
ment that the requisite link between the value of the 
property subject to the constructive trust and the award 
is missing Although the net value of the estate was 
stipulated at $920,500, there was no indication m the 
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findings as to what portion of the net estate 
represented plaintiffs share (taking into account in-
come and profits as indicated above), and thus, there 
was no support for the amount of the award as set forth 
in the conclusions 
In light of the insufficiency of the findings with re-
spect to the award, we must vacate the judgment and 
remand the case for the purpose of making adequate 
findings as to the value of plaintiff s equitable interest 
in the estate Em 
FN38 It is noted that plaintiff did not have 
any interest in the property denominated as 
parcel H of the 9400 South property due to 
the fact that it was inherited by plaintiffs 
wife from her mother's estate Nor did plain-
tiffs interest in the Lincoln Street property 
exceed his share of the credit extended by his 
wife's mother's estate on the purchase price 
of the property for work and improvements 
made on said property by plaintiff and his 
wife And further, inasmuch as no payment 
or improvements were ever made by plaintiff 
on the 9800 South property or lots 48 and 49 
of the 21st South property, which properties 
were conveyed to plaintiffs wife by her 
mother, plaintiff should have no interest 
therein 
IV 
Defendants' fourth point on appeal is that the findings 
concerning the purchase of the property are not sup-
ported by the *604 evidence The particular findings 
referred to by defendants are as follows 
6 During the course of said marriage, plaintiff and 
decedent purchased real and personal property 
8 During said marriage, plaintiff was continuously 
employed and a substantial part of the marital estate 
was acquired from his earnings 
Under Point I of this opinion, we discussed the suffi-
ciency of the evidence and the findings with regard to 
plaintiffs participation in the acquisition of the prop-
erty included m Mrs Parks' estate We determined that 
the evidence and the findings on this particular point 
adequately supported the judgment We now, there-
fore, defer to that previous determination 
V and VI 
Under defendants' final two points of contention, they 
allege that plaintiff is precluded on theories of estop-
pel and waiver from asserting ownership of the subject 
property 
In order to prevail in their estoppel claims, defendants 
must satisfy the test of equitable estoppel set forth in 
Koch, Inc \ J C Penney Co, which is 
[WJhether there is conduct, by act or omission, by 
which one party knowingly leads another party, rea-
sonably acting thereon, to take some course of action, 
which will result in his detriment or damage if the first 
party is permitted to repudiate or deny his conduct or 
FN39 
representation 
FN39 Utah, 534 P 2d 903, 905 (1975) See 
also Carnesecca i Camesetca, Utah, 572 
P 2d 708 (1977) 
fill We have reviewed the evidence alleged by de-
fendants as supportive of this claim and find that it is 
insufficient to satisfy the test articulated in the Koch 
decision, supra Even if we were to concede to their 
averment that plaintiffs conduct, I e , acquiescence m 
the administration of the estate and failure to assert his 
claim of ownership for three years following the death 
of his wife, led them to sell the estate's assets and 
invest the proceeds, we could not also concede that the 
course of action (sale of assets and investment of 
proceeds) taken by defendants was detrimental to 
them or to the estate 
The evidence shows that when plaintiff moved from 
the farmhouse and farm, the estate received an addi-
tional $40,000 per year because of the ability to sell 
the farm and the farmhouse and invest the proceeds 
The estate also received the benefit from plaintiffs 
move from Lakelme Drive to the condominium since 
the residence on Lakelme Drive was sold for more 
money than was paid for the condominium, and the 
estate received an additional benefit of approximately 
$8,000 annually Clearly, there was no detriment rea-
lized from these or any of the transactions which oc-
curred during the three-year administration of the 
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FN40 At the conclusion of the trial, the 
judge made the following observation with 
regard to the claim of equitable estoppel 
Again, I might say this I don't think there's 
an estoppel The bank-there is no detriment 
to the hospital by anything that he did I 
can't see any detriment at all And they still 
got the money It's presumably still draw-
ing interest 
Defendants claim that the test for establishing a waiver 
of rights is less demanding than the test for equitable 
estoppel They rely upon the following statement 
made by this Court m Sullivan v Beneficial Life In-
surance Co 
FN41 91 Utah405, 64 P 2d 351,361 (1937) 
[A] waiver operates as an estoppel upon the party who 
waives, but it is not essential to a waiver that a party in 
whose favor it is made must prove all the elements of 
an estoppel m pais before he is entitled to avail himself 
of the waiver 
In Amencan Savings & Loan Association v Blom-
quist ^^ this Court held that waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right and there must be an 
existing right, benefit or advantage, knowledge of its 
existence, and an intention to relinquish *605 it, and it 
must be distinctly made, although it may be express or 
implied 
FN42 21 Utah 2d 289, 445 P 2d 1 (1968) 
Similar language is found in Bjork v April Industries, 
Inc p^ where this Court held that waiver must be 
intentional relinquishment of a known right 
FN43 Utah, 547 P 2d 219 (1976) 
[T2] Defendants' claim of waiver is based upon the 
same facts alleged as supportive of their estoppel 
argument Again, we do not find adequate support in 
these facts, or elsewhere in the record, for the impo-
sition of the doctrine of waiver Notwithstanding 
plaintiffs delay m asserting his claim and his ac-
knowledgement of and compliance with the provi-
sions of the will, he did not at any time intentionally 
and distinctly relinquish his right to assert a claim of 
ownership against the property Furthermore, it is 
noted that plaintiffs actions herein were accomplished 
well withm the appiopnate statute of limitations 
Plaintiff has raised two points of contention on 
cross-appeal, one of which has been dealt with and 
resolved previously in this opinion under defendants' 
Point III[~^ The remaining contention raised by 
plaintiff is that evidence improperly excluded under 
the dead man's statute *-^ established an oral trust 
between plaintiff and his deceased wife in connection 
with the marital estate 
FN44 Under defendants' Point III, we re-
solved plaintiffs assertion of entitlement to 
increased damages 
FN45 U C A 1953 ^78-24-2(3) 
Plaintiffs challenge to the propriety of the trial court's 
employment of the dead man's statute is grounded 
upon two arguments 1) defendants waived their right 
to the provisions of said statute, and 2) the statute is 
inapplicable to this case 
[131 With respect to the first argument (waiver), it is 
plaintiffs position that defendants' failure to enter an 
objection when he first took the witness stand and 
before he gave any testimony, resulted in a waiver of 
their right to invoke the dead man's statute In other 
words, he claims that once he testified, the dead man's 
statute was waived This position allegedly rests upon 
the following rule stated by this Court in the case of 
Obradovich \ Walker Brothei s Bankers ^^ 
FN46 80 Utah 587 16 P 2d 212 (1932) 
The rule is well settled that a party desiring the pro-
tection of the statute here invoked by the appellant 
must make a propei and seasonable objection to the 
competency of the witness Under the statute it is the 
witness and not the proffered testimony which is in-
competent Therefoie, the objection must be specifi-
cally directed to the incompetency of the witness and 
not to the proffered testimony 
We do not agree with this argument, nor do we view 
the Obradovich case as supportive thereof It is well 
settled in this jurisdiction that a witness who is m-
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competent to testify to some matters because of the 
dead man's statute may properly testify concerning 
other matters We so held mDallof\ Robinson 
FN47 Utah, 520 P 2d 191 193(1974) 
This [dead man's] statute does not mean that a party 
may not be called to testify to matters not pertaining to 
transactions with the deceased without opening up the 
matter so that the survivor may testify to forbidden 
transactions 
Furthermore, m the case of Burk \ Petei ^^ the 
Court held that a party may testify concerning some 
transactions with the decedent, where as to such 
transactions the dead man's statute had been pre-
viously waived, yet the same witness could be ex-
cluded from testifying to other transactions with the 
decedent which were not subject to the waiver Ob-
viously, under the Burk decision, a witness is compe-
tent to testify to transactions not covered by the dead 
man's statute, and yet can be excluded from testifying 
to matters covered by the statute 
FN48 115 Utah 58, 202 P 2d 543 544-45 
(1949) 
Plaintiffs reliance upon the Obradovich decision for 
the proposition that one must object to a witness's 
competency prior to *606 any testimony is misplaced 
In Obradovich, an objection was made against certain 
testimony on grounds that it was "irrelevant and im-
material, self-serving declarations on the part of the 
deceased " ^ ^ The trial court overruled the objection 
on those grounds and allowed the testimony The dead 
man's statute was raised for the first time on appeal 
FN49 16 P 2d at 218 
In view of these particular circumstances, the Court 
made the statement (above) relied upon by plaintiff, 
and further observed 
It will be observed that the objection made only goes 
to the testimony which might be responsive to the 
question to which the objection was made In this 
connection it should also be noted that no objection 
was interposed to the competency of the witness The 
objection being overruled, the appellant is entitled to a 
review of the ruling only upon the grounds stated and 
pointed out by his objection, which were irrelevancy 
and immateriality and "self serving statements on the 
part of the deceased " The objection was properly 
overruled, for the proffered evidence was both rele-
vant and material —— 
FN50 Id 
It is the opinion of the Court that the language from the 
Obiado\ich decision relied upon by plaintiff, when 
considered in its true context, is not supportive of 
plaintiffs position 
As noted above, plaintiff also argues that the dead 
man's statute is not applicable to this case Again, we 
must disagree The statute provides, in pertinent part 
The following persons cannot be witnesses 
(3) a party to any civil action and any person di-
rectly interested in the event thereof when the ad-
verse party in such action claims or opposes, sues or 
defends as the executor of any deceased person, 
as to any statement by or transaction with, such 
deceased person which must have been equally 
within the knowledge of both the witness and such 
deceased person unless called to testify thereto by 
[the executor] E ^ i 
FN51 Supra n 45 
Its scope of application has been described by this 
Court as follows 
When an executor, etc , sues or defends m an action to 
protect or recover assets of the estate, neither the other 
party to the action, nor the person through whom he 
claims or deraigns his title, nor any other person 
having a direct interest in the claim of the party op-
posing the executor, etc , that is, an interest in the 
cause of action, adverse to the claims of the executor, 
can testify as to any transaction had with the deceased, 
which is involved in the lawsuit, nor as to any state-
ment made by the deceased relative to the transac-
tions, matters and claims involved in the lawsuit, 
unless such person is called to so testify by the ex-
ecutor, etc ^ ^ 
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FN52. Maxfield v. Sainsbun, 110 Utah 280, 
172P.2d 122. 125(1946). 
Clearly, therefore, its employment in the present case 
is proper. 
In light of our disposition of the foregoing issues, we 
affirm the trial court's judgment in all aspects, with the 
exception of the amount of the award to plaintiff. We 
therefore vacate that particular aspect of the judgment 
and remand for the purpose of making a redetermina-
tion of the award and adequate findings in support 
thereof. 
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., and PETER F. 
LEARY, District Judge, concur. 
OAKS, J., having disqualified himself, does not par-
ticipate herein; LEARY, District Judge, sat. 
HOWE, Justice (dissenting): 
This case is controlled by the rule of law stated in 
Section 442 of the Restatement of Trusts 2d (1959), 
which reads as follows at p. 402: 
*607 Where a transfer of property is made to one 
person and the purchase price is paid by another and 
the transferee is a wife, child or other natural object of 
bounty of the person by whom the purchase price is 
paid, a resulting trust does not arise unless the latter 
manifests an intention that the transferee should not 
have the beneficial interest in the property. 
We recognized and applied the rule in Anderson v. 
Cercone, 54 Utah 345, 180 P. 586 (1919). In Com-
ment A to Section 443 at p. 404, it is stated that it is the 
intention of the payor at the time of the transfer, and 
not at a later time, which determines whether a re-
sulting trust arises. "The conduct of the payor and of 
the transferee subsequent to the transfer, however, 
may be such as to show that at the time of the transfer 
the payor did not intend to make a gift to the transfe-
ree." 
The plaintiffs case must rise or fall by the application 
of the foregoing rule of law. If the evidence does not 
support a finding by clear and convincing evidence 
that the plaintiff manifested an intention that his wife 
should not have the beneficial interest in each piece of 
property as it was acquired, thereby rebutting the 
inference of a gift, the plaintiff is entitled to no relief. 
A constructive trust does not arise under those cir-
cumstances and the majority opinion is in error in so 
holding. The law presumes that a gift was intended 
and unless that inference is rebutted, a resulting trust 
does not arise because the payor gave the transferee 
the full beneficial interest. That being so, a construc-
tive trust cannot arise either since the payor reserved 
no equitable interest to himself as the majority opinion 
maintains. 
In the recent case of In the Matter of the Estate of Ruth 
M. Hock, Deceased, v. Fennemore, Utah, 655 P.2d 
1111 (1982), Jack Fennemore brought suit against the 
personal representative of his sister's estate to impress 
a purchase money resulting trust upon certain real 
estate to the purchase of which he claimed to have 
contributed. Although title had been taken in the name 
of the deceased, the trial court impressed a construc-
tive trust upon the property. On appeal to this Court 
we held that a purchase money resulting trust arose 
under those circumstances and not a constructive trust. 
Since the payor and the transferee were siblings (and 
not husband and wife as in the instant case), Section 
442 was not applicable. Instead, Sections 440 and 441 
controlled, raising a rebuttable inference that no gift 
was intended and thus a resulting trust arose in favor 
of the payor (Jack). We affirmed the trial court's 
finding by clear and convincing evidence that a re-
sulting trust arose in favor of Jack. The Supreme Court 
of California refused to impress a constructive trust in 
Altramano v. Swan, 20 Cal.2d 622, 128 P.2d 353 
(1942), where it stated "a constructive trust does not 
arise upon the transfer of property from a husband to a 
wife without consideration." The court held that the 
rule found in Section 442 of the Restatement of Trusts 
was controlling, citing many earlier decisions of that 
court. 
The rule stated in Section 442 that a donative intent is 
presumed has universally been followed by the courts 
in the country, both prior to and since the promulga-
tion of the Restatement of Trusts. For cases relying on 
the rule in husband to wife transfers (and sometimes 
broadening the rule to wife to husband transfers) see 
Anderson v. Cercone, supra; Blaine v. Blaine, 63 Ariz. 
100, 159 P.2d 786 (1945); Peterson v. Massev, 155 
Neb. 829, 53 N.W.2d 912 (1952); Nussbacher v. 
Manderfeld, 64 Wyo. 55, 186 P.2d 548 (1947); Tar-
kington v. Tarkington, 45 N.C.App. 476, 263 S.E.2d 
294 (1980); Walter v. Home National Bank & Trust 
Co. ofMeriden, 148 Conn. 635, 173 A.2d 503 (1961); 
Scanlon v. Scanlon, 6 I11.2d 224. 127 N.E.2d 435 
(1955); Norman v. Kernan, 226 Wis. 78. 276 N.W. 
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127 (1937), &?o/M Cume, 7 Wash 2d 301 109 P 2d 
526 (1941), Altramano v Swan supra See Bogert, 
Trusts and Trustees, 2d Ed , § 459 (1977), Scott on 
Trusts, Vol 5 ^442(1967) 
The same rule that infers a gift likewise applies to the 
improvements made to the several properties by the 
labor and money of the plaintiff *6084)<:o<s/v ^ got 
toms, 201 Ark 104 144 S W 2d 43 (1940), Hoef \ 
Hoef, 323 111 170 153 NE 658 (1926), Lewis \ 
Bowman, 113 Mont 68 121 P 2d 162 (1942), over-
ruled on another ground, Mont 495 P 2d 591 (1972) 
The majority opinion grants relief to the plaintiff un-
der Section 160 of the Restatement of Restitution 
(1937), which states at p 640 
Where a person holding title to property is subject to 
an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground 
that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permit-
ted to retain it, a constructive trust arises 
That rule of law does not here apply because the law 
infers that a gift was intended by the plaintiff when he 
placed title to the property in his wife's name Unless 
he can rebut that inference, which he failed to do here, 
he has no equitable or beneficial interest because he 
reserved none His wife's estate is under no equitable 
duty to convey it to him, nor is her estate unjustly 
enriched by retaining it The donee of a gift is always 
enriched thereby but no one would claim that he is 
unjustly enriched See Koh v Kohi 111 Pa Super 
321,413 A 2d 687 (1979), where the court rejected the 
application of Section 160 of the Restatement of Res-
titution when the evidence did not rebut the inference 
of a gift from mother to son, and establish that a re-
sulting trust was intended by her 
At the trial the defendant moved to dismiss the plain-
tiffs case on several grounds, including that the evi-
dence did not establish a resulting trust The trial court 
apparently granted the motion as to a resulting trust, 
but made no written finding of fact as to whether the 
inference of a gift had been overcome In his bench 
ruling, which apparently granted the defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss as regards a resulting trust, the court 
said 
but a resulting trust does not result merely because 
the husband puts up the money to purchase property in 
his wife's name Mr Park's testimony, as I recall it, 
with regard to why this was done, even when they 
were younger and first started to acquire property, 
apparently the decision was made by the two of them 
that he was going to die first And therefore, they 
ought to put all of the property in her name I think that 
I paid some attention to that because to me it's quite 
important as to the reason that it was done 
I interpiet that statement of the trial judge to mean that 
he concluded that Mr Park intended that his wife 
should have the full beneficial interest in the several 
properties, since both he and she believed that he 
would die first This assumption was based on the fact 
that he was in poor and frail health Having so ruled, 
and having failed to make a finding of fact that the 
inference of a gift was rebutted, the trial court should 
have dismissed the plaintiffs complaint and not 
granted him relief under inapplicable rules governing 
constructive trusts 
The majority opinion cites two cases in support of 
imposing a constructive trust but those cases are dis-
tinguishable \ohex Yoke, 466 Pa 405,353 A 2d 417 
(1976) involved a husband suing his wife to set aside a 
deed which he signed conveying to her his interest in 
their jointly held residence He claimed that he signed 
the deed believing it was a new deed they were getting 
as a consequence of their paying the mortgage in full 
The court held that it was a question of fact whether a 
confidential relationship between husband and wife 
existed which would have required her to disclose 
material facts concerning the deed The court re-
manded the case for a full evidentiary hearing on that 
question Obviously, the case dealt with an entirely 
different problem than we have m the instant case 
Adams \ Jankouskas, Del Supr , 452 A 2d 148 (1982) 
involved a similar fact situation to our case The court 
affirmed a lower court finding that the husband turned 
over his earnings to his wife "m obvious trust" be-
cause they had agreed that the survivor of them should 
have everything The rule of Section 442 of the Res-
tatement of Trusts 2d was not mentioned, but the 
lower court's finding that a trust was intended sup-
ported its imposition of a "constructive or resulting 
*609 trust" (without deciding which) A similar find-
ing m the instant case that a trust was intended is 
completely lacking In fact, the trial court's bench 
ruling is to the contrary-that no trust was intended 
There was no agreement here between Mr and Mrs 
Parks that the survivor was to have everything 
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rected m the majority opinion, two important consid-
erations should be observed upon remand: 
First, the trial court should segregate those properties 
which were purchased with funds contributed either 
wholly or in part by Mr. Park from those properties 
which were acquired by inheritance or gift from Mrs. 
Parks' mother or her estate. As to the latter properties, 
there is no basis in the law whatever for imposing any 
kind of a trust on them, even under plaintiffs theory. 
Furthermore, as to the property which they originally 
took title to in their names as joint tenants but which 
Mr. Parks afterwards quitclaimed to her, no construc-
tive trust would arise except under the circumstances 
stated in Section 44 of the Restatement of Trusts 2d 
where the transferee agrees to hold the property, or an 
interest therein, for the benefit of the transferor. 
Secondly, in any property in which a constructive or 
resulting trust has arisen, the trial court should deter-
mine the extent of the interest which is subject to the 
trust. Although Mrs. Parks did not work outside of the 
home and had no income from employment, she con-
tributed her full time and labor to the maintenance of 
the home and the small orchard and farm surrounding 
it. If Mr. Parks did not intend that she have the full 
beneficial interest in the properties to which he pro-
vided the purchase money, it is difficult for me to 
believe that he intended that she was not to have at 
least a half interest therein. Under that view of the 
evidence, a trust should not be imposed on more than 
one-half of the property. Her one-half should be free 
for her to dispose of by will as she saw fit. Comment B 
to Section 443 of the Restatement of Trusts 2d (1954) 
states at p. 404: 
Where one person pays the purchase price for property 
which is transferred at his direction to another who is a 
natural object of his bounty, and it is shown that the 
payor intended to have a partial interest in the prop-
erty, a resulting trust arises in favor of the payor as to 
such interest but only as to such interest. 
Accord: Dougherty v. Duckworth, Mo., 388 S.W.2d 
870(1965). 
Utah, 1983. 
Parks v. Zions First Nat. Bank 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
HAWS et al. 
v. 
JENSEN. 
No. 7267. 
Aug. 18, 1949. 
Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Cache 
County; M. M. Morrison, Judge. 
Action by Edwin N. Haws, and others, against John P. 
Jensen to impress a trust upon certain realty standing 
on the record in the name of defendant. From the 
judgment, defendant appeals. 
Judgment modified, and as modified affirmed. 
FN1. Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 
P.2d 940; Peterson v. Peterson, 105 Utah 
133, 141P.2d882. 
FN2. Barrett v. Vickers, 100 Utah 534, 116 
P.2d772. 
FN3. Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 
P.2d 465, 466; Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 
475,214P.313,315. 
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tee as to the time, and as to which of the persons 
should use the realty. U.C.A.1943, 33-5-1. 
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Where mother conveyed realty to daughter by war-
ranty deed on oral trust to maintain realty as a family 
home to be used by mother and either her children or 
grandchildren, and thereafter daughter died, daugh-
ter's husband as her sole heir at law held an undivided 
equitable interest in the property and would be re-
quired to convey title to trustee named by the court to 
hold for benefit of living heirs of the grantor and 
successors in interest of her deceased heirs. 
U.C.A.1943, 33-5-1. 
[12] Limitation of Actions 241 € ^ 3 7 ( 2 ) 
241 Limitation of Actions 
2411 Statutes of Limitation 
2411(B) Limitations Applicable to Particular 
Actions 
241k37 Relief on Ground of Fraud or Mis-
take 
241k37(2) k. Actions to Which Statute 
Applies. Most Cited Cases 
Action by grantor's heirs against grantee's husband as 
record owner of realty to impress oral trust for their 
benefit, begun more than three years after the con-
veyance, was not barred by three year statute of limi-
tations affecting actions for relief on ground of fraud 
or mistake, in absence of allegations of fraud or mis-
take in the complaint, or of allegations that grantee 
fraudulently procured conveyance of property to her 
upon promise to hold it for use and benefit of the 
beneficiaries. U.C.A.1943, 33-5-1, 104-2-24(3). 
**230 *214 Newell G. Daines, Logan, L. Delos 
Daines, Salt Lake City, Clinton D. Vernon, Salt Lake 
City, for appellant. 
Bullen & Bell, Logan, LeRoy B. Young, Ogden, for 
respondents. 
WOLFE, Justice. 
Action by the respondents, plaintiffs below, to impress 
a trust upon certain real property situated in Hyrum, 
Cache County, Utah, standing on the record in the 
name of John P. Jensen, defendant below. The parties 
will be referred to as they appeared in the lower court. 
**231 Mrs. Maria A. Haws on August 18, 1927, ex-
ecuted a warranty deed to her home in Hyrum, the 
property here in question, to Amber Haws, her 
daughter. Mrs. Haws was then residing upon the 
property; Amber was unmarried and living in Los 
Angeles, California. On December 2, 1933, the deed 
was recorded in Cache County by Lucinda Haws 
Ballam, a daughter of Mrs. Haws and a sister of 
Amber, at *215 the direction of Mrs. Haws. There is 
no evidence that Amber had any knowledge of the 
existence of the deed until sometime after its recorda-
tion. Mrs. Haws continued to live upon the premises 
until her death on March 24, 1939. Fifteen days the-
reafter, Amber married the defendant Jensen and they 
took up residence in the Haws home. On March 16, 
1945, Amber died. The defendant continued to reside 
upon the property and in his petition for letters of 
administration of the estate of his deceased wife, he 
listed the property as an asset of the estate. He alleged 
that he was the sole heir at law of his wife. On March 
19, 1947, the property was distributed to him in fee 
simple. The same day, the plaintiffs, four of whom are 
brothers and sisters of Amber, and two of whom are 
children of Noble Haws, a brother of Amber who died 
in 1940, instituted the present action against the de-
fendant. They alleged in their complaint that while the 
deed executed by Mrs. Haws to Amber in 1927 was in 
form a warranty deed, it was intended to create an oral 
trust; that the terms of the oral trust provided that 
Amber should maintain the property as a family home 
to be used by Mrs. Haws and/or by the children of 
Mrs. Haws, or children of said children for so long as 
any of the said persons should need a home with 
complete discretion in the trustee as to the time and as 
to which of the said persons should use the property; 
that shortly after the recordation of the deed, Amber 
accepted the trust and proceeded to perform and carry 
out the terms thereof in accordance with the intention 
of Mrs. Haws until the death of Amber; that the de-
fendant knew of the existence of the trust at the time of 
his marriage with Amber, but that the defendant now 
refuses to recognize the existence of the trust, but 
claims the property for himself by right of succession 
free of any equities owned by the plaintiffs. The de-
fendant demurred to the complaint on the grounds that 
there were not facts stated sufficient to consitute a 
cause of action and that the plaintiffs' action was 
barred by the statute of frauds. The demurrer was 
overruled. On August 17, 1948, the court made find-
ings of fact and conclusions of *216 law in favor of the 
plaintiffs and entered a decree directing the defendant 
to convey the property to Verba Haws, the wife of 
Garland Haws, one of the plaintiffs, as successor 
trustee to hold the property for the use and benefit of 
the heirs at law of Mrs. Maria A. Haws. 
It is first contended by the defendant that the lower 
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court erred in overruling his demurrer because the 
complaint on its face showed that the plaintiffs were 
suing upon an oral express trust which is within the 
statute of frauds. In this state a trust in real property 
can be created in two ways: (1) by act or operation of 
law (2) by deed or conveyance in writing.Sec. 33-5-1. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides: 
'No estate or interest in real property, other than leases 
for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or 
power over or concerning real property or in any 
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, 
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by 
act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in 
writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, 
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by 
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.' 
[11F21 Admittedly there is no writing evidencing Mrs. 
Haws' intention that the property conveyed by her be 
held in trust by Amber. However, under certain cir-
cumstances existing at the time a conveyance in trust 
is made, no writing evidencing an intent to create a 
trust is required. In those instances, equity will im-
press a constructive trust upon the property in favor of 
the person or persons designated by the grantor as the 
beneficiary or benefiaries of the oral trust. A con-
structive trust, being an equitable remedy to prevent 
unjust enrichment, arises by operation of law and is 
not within the statute of frauds. Section**232 
45(1 )(b), of the Restatement of the Law of Trusts is 
applicable to the facts of the instant case: 
'(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transfers in 
inter vivos to another in trust for a third person, but no 
memorandum properly evidencing the intention to 
create a trust is signed, and the transferee refuses to 
perform the trust, the transferee holds the interest upon 
a *217 constructive trust for the third person, if, but 
only if, (a) * * * (b) the transferee at the time of the 
transfer was in a confidential relation to the transfe-
ror, or (c) * * *' (Italics added.) 
[31T41 The defendant contends that there is no allega-
tion of a confidential relation between Amber and 
Mrs. Haws. True, it is not specifically alleged that 
there was a confidential relation. However, in the 
complaint it is alleged that Mrs. Haws conveyed the 
property to Amber intending that the latter hold the 
property in trust for the benefit of the whole family. 
Implicit in this allegation is that Mrs. Haws reposed 
confidence in Amber; otherwise, Mrs. Haws would 
have not made the conveyance. Thus this allegation 
along with the fact that the grantor and grantee were 
mother and daughter, which appears on the face of the 
complaint, is a sufficient allegation of a confidential 
relation. Scott on Trust, Vol. I, Sec. 44.2, states: CA 
constructive trust is imposed even if there is no fidu-
ciary relationship sueh as rhat be\\veer\ attorney and 
client, principal and agent, trustee and beneficiary; it is 
sufficient that there is a family relationship or other 
personal relationship of such a character thai the 
transferor is justified in believing that the transferee 
will act in his interest.'Restatement of the Law of 
Trust, Sec. 44, comment (c), accord. A constructive 
trust will be imposed even though at the time of the 
transfer the transferee intended to perform the 
agreement, and even though he was not guilty of un-
due influence in procuring the conveyance. The abuse 
of the confidential relation consists merely in the 
failure of the transferee to perform his promise. Scott 
on Trusts, Vol. I, Sec. 44.2. A court of equity in de-
creeing a constructive trust, is bound by no unyielding 
formula, but is free to effect justice according to the 
equities peculiar to each transaction wherever a failure 
to perform a duty to convey property would result in 
unjust enrichment. 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, 
Parti , 1946 Ed., §471. 
Nor is it necessary, as argued by the defendant, that 
the complaint contain an allegation that the grantee 
made a *218 promise to the grantor to hold the prop-
erty in trust as a condition of the conveyance of the 
property to her. In Sinclair v. Purdy, 235 N.Y. 245, 
139 N.E. 255,258, the grantor, a court clerk, owned an 
interest in certain real property. His ownership sub-
jected him to constant importunities to go bail for 
persons in trouble. In order to escape these importun-
ities, he executed a deed conveying his interest in the 
property to his sister. After his death litigation arose as 
to whether the conveyance had been made in trust for 
him. Said the New York Court of Appeals, speaking 
through Justice Caruozo, 'Even if we were to aeeept 
her [the sister's] statement that there was no distinct 
promise to hold it for his [the grantor's] benefit, the 
exaction of such a promise, in view of the relation, 
might well have seemed to be superfluous. * * * 
Though a promise in words was lacking, the whole 
transaction, it might be found, was 'instinct with an 
obligation' imperfectly expressed. Wood v. Lucy, 
Tady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214. It 
was to be interpreted, not literally or irrespective of its 
setting, but sensibly and broadly with all human im-
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plications.' 
[51[61[71 The defendant's second contention that the 
lower court erred in admitting parol testimony tending 
to establish an oral trust must also fail.Restatement of 
the Taw of Trusts. Sec. 38(3) states: 
Tf the owner of property transfers it inter vivos to 
another person by a written instrument in which it is 
not declared that the transferee is to take the property 
for his own benefit or that he is to hold it in trust, 
extrinsic evidence may be admitted to show that he 
was intended to hold the property in trust either for the 
transferor or for a third party.' 
**233 We similarly held in Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 
445, 25 P.2d 940; Peterson v. Peterson, 105 Uath 133. 
141P.2d882; and in Barrett v. Vickers, 100 Utah 534. 
116 P.2d 772, that a deed absolute on its face can be 
shown to have been intended to be in trust. 
\8]\9] The third contention of the defendant is that the 
plaintiffs failed to prove by clear, unequivocal and 
conclusive *219 evidence that Amber took the prop-
erty subject to the condition that she hold it for the use 
and benefit of the grantor's heirs. With this contention 
we cannot agree. The scope of the review of facts in 
equity cases has long been settled in this jurisdiction. 
In Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P.2d 465, 466, 
we quoted with approval from Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 
Utah 475, 214 P. 313, 315, where we stated that in 
equity cases, 'the findings of the trial courts on con-
flicting evidence will not be set aside unless it mani-
festly appears that the court has misapplied proven 
facts or made findings clearly against the weight of the 
evidence.' 
The plaintiffs produced ten witnesses who testified as 
to statements made either by Mrs. Haws or Amber in 
support of the plaintiffs' contention that the property 
was conveyed in trust. Only some of that testimony 
need be here detailed. Anna Gardner, a neighbor of 
Mrs. Haws who visited with her frequently, testified 
that 'directly after she made her deed,' Mrs. Haws told 
the witness that 'she had made the deed to Amber, her 
daughter, because she figured Amber would be the 
most fair. And after her death Amber was going to 
divide it equally among all of the children.'Again, a 
'couple of months' before Mrs. Haws' death in 1939, 
Mrs. Gardner testified, Mrs. Haws 'was glad she had 
her property fixed, because now she knew it would be 
equally divided after she was gone,' and that Mrs. 
Haws 'didn't want to have it probated. She figured 
there wasn't much and what little there was she wanted 
it divided the way it should be and Amber would do 
it.' 
Christina Jensen, another neighbor of Mrs. Haws, 
testified that sometime either in 1936 or 1937, she 
called in at the Haws home to see Mrs. Haws. The 
witness told Mrs. Haws, *220 T had just had a deed 
made out on my property to my children so that there 
wouldn't be any trouble if I passed away and she [Mrs. 
Haws] said, 'Well, that's fine.' And she says T hope I 
got mine fixed all right.'Says, T wanted it divided 
equally between my children', and she said, T hope 
I've got it fixed right.'But she didn't say whether there 
was a deed or not. Then her daughter, Amber, was 
there and she went over and said, 'Ma, don't worry 
about that. It will be taken care of." 
W. F. Ballam, the husband of Lucinda Haws Ballam, 
one of the plaintiffs, testified that in the fall of 1928 or 
1929, Mrs. Haws told him 'she had the deed fixed on 
the property * * * and she said she had them fixed in 
Amber's name because Amber was single. All the rest 
of them were married. And she felt certain that Amber 
would keep the property there for a place for any of the 
children to use if they wanted to come home for any 
reason. And if it was decided that the property should 
be disposed of after her death that she knew that 
Amber would make a fair distribution to all the 
children.'He testified that in 1934, he and his wife 
were visiting with Mrs. Haws and Amber in the Haws 
home. A discussion arose concerning the 'fact that the 
property had been left-or recorded in Amber's name 
here, and that Ma (meaning Mrs. Haws) wanted the 
property to be left there in case any of the children 
ever would want to come back and use the place for 
vacation headquarters or have a temporary home,' and 
that Amber said, 'Well, that's just the way it's going to 
be left.'The witness claimed to have heard Amber on 
numerous occasions affirm that the property was for 
the benefit of all the family. Mr. Ballam further testi-
fied that after Amber's funeral some of the family were 
discussing what was to be done with the property and 
who should care for it. Only one of the plaintiffs lived 
in Utah at that time. The defendant offered to move 
out of the house because *221 'he said he knew he had 
no right to the property; that he knew what Mrs. Haws' 
wishes were, and he knew Amber's wishes were the 
same as her mother's. '**234 But, Mr. Ballam testified, 
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the family agreed that the defendant could stay in the 
house so long as he wanted to, provided he pay the 
taxes and maintain the property. The witness's testi-
mony as to this agreement of the family to allow the 
defendant to continue to reside upon the property was 
corroborated by Lawrence Rose, Hermoine Haws 
Rose, Garland Haws, and Lucinda Haws Ballam. 
Mrs. Ballam testified that in 1927, just before she was 
married, Mrs. Haws, her mother, told her that 'she had 
had the place made into Amber's name. But she says, 
T don't want you to feel bad about it, because it's put in 
her name so that you can all have an equal share." 
Later in 1933, Mrs. Ballam recorded the deed at the 
request of her mother, the latter declaring that 'she 
didn't want us to have our feelings hurt because she 
wanted to be fair with all of us, and she said the home 
would always be there for us if any of us wanted to 
come back; that we were welcome; and that after her 
death it should be divided equally among all of us and 
she wasn't leaving it for Amber. It was for all of the 
family.' 
Lawrence Rose, husband of Hermoine Haws Rose, 
one of the plaintiffs testified that Amber and the de-
fendant visited in his home in California in 1939 while 
they were on their honeymoon, and that Amber at that 
time mentioned that the family home had been con-
veyed to her to take care of for the rest of the family, 
and that she would 'see everything was done that was 
all right with them.'Mr. Rose further testified that in 
1945 the defendant and Amber were again visitors in 
his home. Amber was ill and had to return to Salt Lake 
City for medical treatment. Mrs. Ballam and Mrs. 
Rose, who were present, asked Amber why she didn't 
sell the old home in Hyrum and move to California. 
Amber answered, *222 "no', that she'd never sell the 
property; that her mother didn't want it that way. And 
as long as there was any of them living there would 
always be a home for them. And Mr. Jensen, why he 
said something, I don't remember what it was, and she 
told him that it was none of his business what hap-
pened to that property; that he'd never get anything out 
of it.' 
It would serve no useful purpose to detail the evidence 
relied upon by the defendant to support his contention 
that the property was conveyed unconditionally to 
Amber. There is testimony in the record that Mrs. 
Haws 'had given' or was 'going to give' the property 
to Amber; that Amber and the defendant had made 
improvements upon the property; and that Amber had 
told the defendant and others that the property be-
longed to her. The lower court evidently did not be-
lieve this testimony, but believed the plaintiffs who 
were closer to Mrs. Haws and with the exception of 
the defendant, closer to Amber than were the defen-
dant's witnesses. It is to be noted that the defendant 
admitted that the plaintiffs asserted their rights to the 
property shortly after Amber's funeral. 
The defendant points out that there is no evidence that 
Amber, prior to the delivery of the deed on December 
2, 1933, promised to hold the property in trust, bul that 
the earliest occasion appearing in the record upon 
which Amber expressed even having knowledge of 
the conveyance was in 1934 when she was visiting 
with her mother. (See the testimony of W. P. Ballam, 
supra). Admittedly, the defendant is correct in his 
contention that an oral promise to hold real property in 
trust after the acquisition of title falls before the statute 
of frauds. However, it can fairly be inferred from all 
the evidence that Amber, prior to December 2, 1933, 
knew of her mother's intention to convey to her 
(Amber) the property in trust. It was testified that Mrs. 
Haws, in 1927 when she signed the deed and in 1933 
when she directed that it be recorded, remarked to her 
son-in-law and daughter, Mr. and Mrs. Ballam, that 
the property was for the use and benefit of the whole 
family. Mrs. Gardner *223 testified that about in 1927, 
Mrs. Haws stated that she had conveyed the property 
in trust to Amber. While Amber may not have known 
just when her mother would make the conveyance, it 
can fairly be inferred that when Amber first learned 
that the conveyance had been made, she knew of the 
condition attached to it, and that by her silence she 
acquiesed**235 in the conveyance with that condition 
imposed. It is not necessary that it be proved that 
Amber expressly agreed to hold the property in trust. 
Here as in Sinclair v. Purdy, supra, in view of the 
confidential relation between the grantor and the 
grantee, the exaction of an express promise would be 
superfluous. Amber was the oldest in the family and 
the only one unmarried. It was testified that Mrs. 
Haws had the utmost confidence that Amber would 
deal fairly with her brothers and sisters. 
[10] The defendant's fourth contention is that the 
lower court erred in allowing two of the plaintiffs' 
witnesses to testify as to self-serving declarations 
made by the grantor after the execution and delivery of 
the deed, and also m allowing Mrs. Rose and Mrs. 
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Ballam to testify as to conversations had with Amber 
regarding the property. Assuming that the court did err 
in not excluding this testimony, there is ample evi-
dence to sustain its findings irrespective of this tes-
timony. None of the evidence which has been detailed 
in this opinion was objected to on either of the above 
grounds. 
[111 As his fifth contention, the defendant contends 
that assuming the existance of a trust, the lower court 
erred in ordering the defendant to convey all of his 
right, title, and interest in the property to a trustee 
named by the court because as an heir of his wife, he is 
entitled to a one-sixth interest in the property. The 
plaintiffs admit that the defendant has succeeded to the 
interest of Amber and that as such he is the holder of 
an undivided equitable interest in the property. But the 
plaintiffs urge that since the probate division of the 
court had decreed legal title to the entire property to be 
in the defendant, the subsequent*224 decree made by 
the court below was necessary to nullify the original 
decree. In order that the defendant's interest in the 
property be protected, the lower court's decree order-
ing the defendant to convey the property to Verba 
Haws who should hold the property as trustee for the 
use and benefit of the heirs at law of Mrs. Haws is 
modified to provide that the defendant convey the 
property to Verba Haws who should hold the property 
as trustee for the use and benefit of the living heirs of 
Mrs. Haws and the successors in interest of the de-
ceased heirs of Mrs. Haws. 
ri21 The defendant's final contention is that plaintiffs' 
cause of action, if any, is barred by 104-2-24(3), 
U.C.A.1943, which provides that an action for relief 
on the ground of fraud or mistake must be commenced 
within three years. This contention too must fail. 
There is no allegation of fraud or mistake in the com-
plaint. The plaintiffs do not rely upon either ground 
for recovery in this action. It is not contended that 
Amber fraudulently procured the conveyance of the 
property to her upon a promise to hold it for the use 
and benefit of the plaintiffs. Clearly the statute relied 
upon by the defendant is not here applicable. 
The judgment below as modified is affirmed. Costs to 
the respondents. 
PRATT, C. J., and WADE, LATIMER, and 
MCDONOUGH, JJ., concur. 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
R.C. TOLMAN, an individual; Eaglebrook Corpora-
tion, a Utah corporation; and Lava Bluff Water 
Company, Inc., a Utah corporation, Plaintiffs, Ap-
pellant, and Cross-appellees, 
v. 
WINCHESTER HILLS WATER COMPANY, INC., 
Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-appellant. 
No. 930761-CA. 
Feb. 23, 1996. 
Subdivision developer and developer's companies 
brought action against subdivision water company for 
damages for water company's use of developer's 
company's one-third interest in water company's water 
system. Water company counterclaimed for return of 
developer's company's one-third interest, transfer of 
water from developer as result of alleged shortfall at 
time of his termination of business relations with other 
developer, and attorney fees from developer resulting 
from water company's defense of developer's com-
pany's claims. After granting directed verdict against 
water company on its claim against developer for 
water shortfall, the District Court, Washington 
County, J. Philip Eves, J., entered judgment for water 
company and awarded water company attorney fees 
against developer under third-party attorney fees rule, 
and imposed constructive trust on developer's com-
pany's title to one-third interest in water system for 
benefit of water company. Developer appealed and 
water company cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Billings, J., held that: (1) it would refuse to consider 
issue, raised by developer for first time on appeal, as 
to whether third-party attorney fees rule was inap-
plicable because of alleged privity between develop-
er's company and developer; (2) neither developer nor 
his company owed alleged water shortfall to water 
company; and (3) trial court reasonably imposed 
constructive trust on developer's company's title to 
one-third interest in water system for benefit of water 
company according to terms of water agreement be-
tween parties, despite contention that court should 
have required developer's company to transfer 
one-third interest directly to water company. 
Affirmed. 
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Tolman. 
Jeffrey C. Wilcox, St. George, for Appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON, and WILKINS, JJ. 
AMENDED OPINION m 
FN1. This Amended Opinion replaces the 
Opinion in Case No. 930761-CA issued on 
February 8, 1996. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
R.C. Tolman appeals the trial court's award of attorney 
fees. Winchester Hills Water Company (WHWC) 
cross-appeals the trial court's water rights rulings. We 
affirm. 
FACTS 
In 1979, a group of individuals organized Shad In-
vestment and Development Company (SIDCO) to 
develop the Winchester Hills subdivision in Wash-
ington County, Utah. In 1980, this group organized 
WHWC to provide water service to the subdivision. 
By the mid-1980s, Russell Walter and R.C. Tolman 
remained as the only owners and director-officers of 
both corporations. 
In 1989, Tolman and Walter, in order to terminate 
their business relationship, entered into a Water 
Agreement and a Settlement Agreement which were 
retroactively effective to December 31, 1988. Under 
the Settlement Agreement, Tolman and Walter agreed 
that SIDCO would transfer one-half of its assets and 
liabilities to Eaglebrook Corporation, and that Tolman 
would own 100 percent of the Eaglebrook stock. 
Tolman would then surrender his SIDCO stock and 
Walter would own 100 percent of SIDCO. As part of 
the separation of assets, each party received undeve-
loped lots in Winchester Hills. Under the Water 
Agreement, the parties also agreed that Winchester 
Hills' water production, storage, and delivery system 
would be divided and assigned one-third to WHWC, 
one-third to SIDCO, and one-third to Eaglebrook. 
SIDCO and Eaglebrook agreed they would turn over 
their respective one-third interests in WHWC's water 
system to WHWC proportionally when and if they 
developed lots. 
Many post-agreement disputes arose between Tolman 
and the other entities. In July 1989, Tolman attempted 
to circumvent a WHWC building moratorium by 
forming Lava Bluff Water Company and transferring 
Eaglebrook's one-third interest in WHWC's water 
system to that company. 
Disputes between WHWC and Tolman continued and 
this lawsuit was eventually filed. Tolman and his 
companies, Eaglebrook and Lava Bluff, as plaintiffs, 
sued WHWC for damages for WHWC's use of Lava 
Bluffs one-third interest in WHWC's water system. 
WHWC, as defendant, counterclaimed for a return of 
Lava Bluffs one-third interest in WHWC's v/ater 
system, a transfer of twenty-five acre feet of v/ater 
from Tolman as a result of the alleged shortfall at the 
time of his separation of business relations with Wal-
ter, damages for Tolman's unauthorized use of 
WHWC water and unpaid WHWC water-stock as-
sessments, and attorney fees from Tolman resulting 
from WHWC's defense of Lava Bluffs claims. 
The parties' claims were tried to a jury. At the close of 
plaintiffs' case, the trial court granted WHWC's mo-
tion for a directed verdict on the claim that WHWC 
damaged Lava Bluff by its use of Lava Bluffs 
one-third interest in WHWC's water system. A1 the 
close of WHWC's case, the trial court granted Tol-
man's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of 
Tolman's transfer of twenty-five acre feet of water to 
WHWC. Also, Lava Bluff stipulated that it would 
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reconvey its one-third interest in WHWC's water 
system back to Eaglebrook, and the court imposed a 
constructive trust on Eaglebrook's title to that interest 
for the benefit of WHWC The issues of damages and 
attorney fees were submitted to the jury 
The jury found that Tolman damaged WHWC as a 
result of his unauthorized use of WHWC water and 
that he was responsible for WHWC's attorney fees 
under the third-party attorney fees rule Tolman ap-
peals the award of attorney fees 
*460 WHWC cross-appeals the trial court's directed 
verdict as to the twenty-five acre feet shortfall it 
claims Tolman owes it and the trial court's imposition 
of a constructive trust on the other disputed water 
shares 
I ATTORNEY FEES 
mr21 On appeal, Tolman argues the award of attorney 
fees to WHWC was error — Tolman claims there was 
privity of interest between himself and Lava Bluff, 
and thus the trial court erred by allowing the 
third-party tort attorney fees issues to go to the jury or, 
at the least, by improperly instructing the jury on this 
issue WHWC responds that Tolman did not raise the 
privity issue nor object to the attorney fees instructions 
at trial and thus cannot raise this issue for the first time 
on appeal 
FN2 Tolman admits that Utah recognizes 
attorney fees under the "third-party tort rule " 
Under this rule, "it is settled that when the 
natural consequence of one's negligence is 
another's involvement m a dispute with a 
third party, attorney fees reasonably incurred 
in resolving the dispute are recoverable from 
the negligent party as an element of damag-
es " South Sanpitch Co \ Pack, 765 P 2d 
1279, 1282-83 (Utah App 1988) WHWC 
seeks only those fees incurred m litigation 
against entities to undo the problems that 
Tolman negligently caused by his breach of 
fiduciary duty 
[3] Rule 51 of Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure states 
"[i]n objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party 
must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and 
the grounds for his objection " Utah R Ci\ P 51, see 
Godesky v Provo City Coiy , 690 P 2d 541 546 (Utah 
1984) Utah courts have repeatedly held that an ob-
jection must "be specific enough to give the trial court 
notice of the very error complained of and that an 
objection couched in language such as 'the instruction 
is not suggested by and is contrary to the law,' or like 
terms, lacks the specificity required by the rule" 
Beehne Medical Elecs , Inc \ Squate D Co , 669 
P2d 859 860 (Utah 1983) (footnote omitted), see 
Moigan ^ Quail biook Condo Co , 704 P 2d 573, 579 
(Utah 1985), Godesfo, 690 P 2d at 546-47, Redeve-
lopment Agenc\ \ Banutia, 526 P 2d 47, 51 (Utah 
1974) Although this rule "serves the purpose of pre-
serving the objection for appeal," Nielsen \ Pioneer 
\alle\ Hosp, 830 P 2d 270 271 (Utah 1992), see 
Moigan, 704 P 2d at 579, its primary purpose "is to 
direct the attention of the court to the claimed errors in 
the instruction so that [the court] might have an op-
portunity to correct them if [the court] deems it prop-
er " Banutia, 526 P 2d at 51 accord Nielsen, 830 
P 2d at 271, Godesfo, 690 P 2d at 547, Beehne Med-
ical 669 P 2d at 861 
Tolman's attorney made a blanket objection that he did 
not believe the law allowed attorney fees "in any way 
m this particular case" and somewhat more specifi-
cally objected that the law did not allow attorney fees 
as damages m breach of fiduciary duty situations 
Tolman did not alert the court to the claim he now 
makes on appeal that the third-party attorney fees rule 
was inapplicable because of privity between Lava 
Bluff and himself Therefore, the trial court never 
determined whether privity of parties existed under 
the facts in this case 
WHWC contends and we agree that Tolman's actions 
at trial were similar to those of the plaintiff in Colhei 
\ Fienchs, 626 P 2d 476 (Utah 1981) In Collier, the 
plaintiff tried to argue on appeal that failure to drive at 
a prudent speed constituted negligence as a matter of 
law Id at 477 The supreme court noted, "He neither 
objected to the stock instruction on negligence nor 
proposed an instruction that Defendant was negligent 
as a matter of law No motion was made for a directed 
verdict or for a judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict Nor did Plaintiff propose an instruction di-
recting the jury to find negligence " Id (citations 
omitted) The court thus refused to address the issue 
on appeal 
As in Collier, Tolman failed to object specifically to 
the jury instructions on privity grounds, failed to 
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submit instructions on privity to refute the application 
of the third-party attorney fees rule, and also failed to 
argue the privity exception in any motions to the 
court.— We therefore refuse to consider *461 this 
issue for the first time on appeal. — 
FN3. We note that Tolman has retained new 
counsel for this appeal. 
FN4. As a result of the outcome we reach 
today, we also dispose of WHWC's Rule 23 
motion and conclude all costs incurred in this 
action should be released to WHWC. 
II. WATER SHORTFALL 
[41 WHWC cross-appeals the trial court's directed 
verdict ruling that Tolman did not owe WHWC 
twenty-five acre feet of water upon his separation of 
business relations with Walter.— 
FN5. Tolman argues that WHWC waived its 
challenge to the directed verdict on appeal 
because WHWC made its claim at trial 
against Tolman and not Eaglebrook. We 
disagree. 
WHWC's claim at trial was against "Tol-
man, through Eaglebrook." Eaglebrook 
was a party to the litigation. The trial 
transcript shows both parties and the court 
used Tolman and Eaglebrook interchan-
geably concerning the return of the water 
shares. More importantly, the trial judge, 
in his bench ruling on the directed verdict, 
stated "there is nothing in that [Water] 
[A]greement that says that Mr. Tolman or 
Eaglebrook or Lava Bluffs is responsible 
for making sure that [WHWC] has ade-
quate water." (Emphasis added.) 
WHWC properly raised a claim against 
Eaglebrook at trial. In its bench ruling, the 
court concluded that neither Tolman nor 
Eaglebrook were liable to WHWC for the 
water shortfall. The court's subsequent 
written ruling, which specified only Tol-
man, should not restrict WHWC's right to 
appeal an issue that was properly argued 
before the trial court. We therefore reach 
the merits of WHWC's claim that the trial 
court improperly directed a verdict in favor 
of Tolman and Eaglebrook. 
[5][61 On appeal from a directed verdict, u[w]e must 
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom 
that would support a judgment in favor of the losing 
party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained." 
Management Comm. v Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 
P.2d 896. 898 (Utah 1982). "In directing a verdict, the 
court is not free to weigh the evidence and thus invade 
the province of the jury." Id at 897. Rather, "[a] di-
rected verdict is only appropriate when the court is 
able to conclude as a matter of law, that reasonable 
minds would not differ on the facts to be determined 
from the evidence presented." Id at 897-98. 
The trial court ruled "WHWC agreed to be bound by 
the [Water] Agreement. Pursuant to the [Wrater] 
Agreement, WHWC agreed that it owned sufficient 
water to service [the developed lots] in the Winchester 
Hills area." The court stated from the bench "there is 
nothing in that agreement that says that Mr. Tolman or 
Eaglebrook or Lava Bluffs is responsible for making 
sure that [WHWC] had adequate water.... That re-
sponsibility, under all the agreements, falls squarely 
on the shoulders of SIDCO. They're the ones who 
agreed to provide the water." 
[7][8] We agree with the trial court that WHWC did 
not advance a legal theory to the court to circumvent 
the applicability of the Water Agreement. Although 
WHWC submitted testimony that there were discus-
sions about the shortfall between Walter and Tolman 
at the time of their separation and Walter testified that 
the Water Agreement contained a calculation error, 
WHWC never argued or proved there was a mistake 
that legally voided the agreement. "The 'mere men-
tion' of an issue without introducing supporting evi-
dence or relevant legal authority does not preserve that 
issue for appeal." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 
(Utah App. 1993) (quoting LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel 
Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah App.1991)). 
WHWC failed to provide the court with a legal theory 
to prevent enforcement of the clear language of the 
Water Agreement. Therefore, the trial court properly 
directed a verdict in favor of Tolman and Eaglebrook. 
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III. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
[9] Finally, the trial court required Lava Bluff to return 
the one-third interest in WHWC's water system to 
Eaglebrook, and required Eaglebrook to hold the in-
terest in a constructive trust for the benefit of WHWC 
according to the terms of the Water Agreement. 
WHWC appeals the trial court's imposition of the 
constructive trust on Eaglebrook, contending the trial 
court should have required Eaglebrook to transfer its 
one-third *462 interest in the water system directly to 
WHWC. 
[IQIfin We can reverse the trial court's imposition of 
a constructive trust only for an abuse of discretion. 
Thurston v. Box Elder Count]', 892 P.2d 1034. 1041 
(Utah 1995). This court will only conclude the trial 
court abused its discretion if the ruling was "beyond 
the limits of reasonability." State v. Hamilton, 827 
P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992). 
F12HT31 A constructive trust is an equitable remedy to 
prevent unjust enrichment in the absence of any ex-
press or implied intention to form a trust. In re Estate 
of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982); ^Restatement 
of Restitution § 160 cmt. c (1937). "A court of equity 
in decreeing a constructive trust, is bound by no un-
yielding formula, but is free to effect justice according 
to the equities peculiar to each transaction wherever a 
failure to perform a duty to convey property would 
result in unjust enrichment." Haws v. Jensen, 116 
Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229, 232 (1949). 
WHWC relies on the Restatement's pronouncement 
that a constructive trust should restore the property to 
the party who has been "unjustly deprived" and take 
property from the party who has been "unjustly 
enriched." "[I]n other words[,] the effect is to ... put 
each of them in the position in which he was before the 
defendant acquired the property." Restatement of 
Restitution^ 160 cmt. d (1937). 
|T41 WHWC cannot expect to be placed in a better 
position than it agreed to under the Water Agree-
ment.— Under the Water Agreement, WHWC would 
have received its interest in the water proportionally as 
Eaglebrook developed more lots in the Winchester 
Hills subdivision. The trust required Eaglebrook to 
hold legal title to the one-third interest for the benefit 
of WHWC according to the terms of the Water 
Agreement. As such, Eaglebrook is required, as the 
Water Agreement states, to transfer the interest to 
WHWC proportionally as it develops further in the 
Winchester Hills area. Thus, the constructive trust is a 
temporary vehicle to carry out the terms of the parties' 
agreement, and the court has returned WHWC to the 
position it would have been in had Eaglebrook prop-
erly carried out the terms of the Water Agreement. 
Therefore, we find the terms of the court's ruling 
reasonable. 
FN6. WHWC now claims the terms of the 
Water Agreement are unfair and are 
one-sided. However, it is not the prerogative 
of this court to prevent the enforcement of 
contracts that a party subsequently regrets. 
Ted R. Brown and Assocs. v. Carries Corp., 
753 P.2d 964. 970-71 (Utah App.1988) ( 
"[A] court may not make a better contract for 
the parties than they have made for them-
selves ...."). 
CONCLUSION 
We hold Tolman cannot raise the issue of privity 
before this court, having not raised the issue before the 
trial court. We therefore affirm the attorney fees 
award. In addition, we hold the trial court's directed 
verdict regarding the alleged water shortfall was cor-
rect under the clear language of the Water Agreement. 
Also, we conclude the trial court reasonably imposed a 
constructive trust on Eaglebrook for the benefit of 
WHWC according to the terms of the Water Agree-
ment. We therefore affirm. 
JACKSON and WILKINS, JL, concur. 
Utah App., 1996. 
Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc. 
912P.2d457 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (NOT FOR OFFI-
CIAL PUBLICATION) 
DAVIS. 
*1 "On appeal from a bench trial, we view the evi-
dence in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
findings...." Lake Phil gas Serv. v. Valley Bank & Trust 
Co., 845 P.2d 951, 953 n. 1 (Utah Ct.App.1993). 
Further, it is well settled that "[w]e do not reverse a 
trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous," and "[w]e review a trial court's conclu-
sions of law for correctness." Young v. Young, 979 
P.2d338, 342 (Utah 1999). Moreover, "[w]hen chal-
lenging a trial court's findings, '[a]n appellant must 
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and 
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial 
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 
"against the clear weight of the evidence." ' " Id. 
(citations omitted; second alteration in original). 
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in deter-
mining the amount Robin owes for past due child 
support and alimony. The trial court determined that 
Robin owed Laree a total of $76,137.99.—This 
amount included $11,616.44 for incomplete payment 
of Laree's share of Robin's retirement funds and 
$64,521.55 for child support and alimony arrearages. 
The court based the $11,616.44 retirement funds fig-
ure on a May 15, 1987 judgment (1987 judgment) of 
$13,815.74,— less a payment made by Rod on Rob-
in's behalf totaling $10,288.93, plus post-judgment 
interest on the remaining balance of $3,526.81 at the 
rate of 12% per annum, which interest totaled 
$8,089.63 as of February 1998. The court based the 
$64,521.55 amount for child support and alimony 
arrearages on a February 1, 1988 judgment (1988 
judgment) of $8,000: —1 amounts accruing as of De-
cember 1987 at $100 per month for alimony and $100 
per month per child (until each child reached the age 
of eighteen); plus interest on the total unpaid balance 
each month at a rate of 7.23% per annum. 
FN1. The court found that Robin had made 
no payments for child support or alimony 
since November 1987. 
FN2. Laree obtained this judgment when she 
successfully petitioned to modify the divorce 
decree, based on the changed circumstances 
that Robin was incarcerated. The judgment 
for the retirement funds was ordered because 
Robin had liquidated the fund of which Laree 
was entitled to one-half. The modification 
also awarded Laree custody of the children, 
lowered Robin's child support obligations to 
$100 per month per child ($400), and lo-
wered his alimony obligation to $100 per 
month. 
FN3. The court found that Robin made no 
objection to this judgment at the time it was 
rendered. This judgment represented $6,400 
for child support due from August 1986 to 
November 1987 at $400 per month-i.e., $100 
per child per month-and $ 1,600 alimony due 
during the same period at $ 100 per month. 
Defendants first contend the court made mathematical 
errors in calculating the amount of child support and 
alimony in arrears. Defendants point to their illustra-
tion which shows that the total alimony and child 
support due from July 1984 to July 1998 was 
$44,000-i.e., $17,600 for alimony and $26,400 for 
child support-in contradistinction to the $64,521.55 
determined by the trial court. This discrepancy, 
however, is partially accounted for. First, defendants 
examine only the obligation as determined in the di-
vorce decree and the May 1987 decree modification as 
of the date the modification was entered. The court's 
findings, however, take into account the 1988 judg-
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ment when the court found that Robin owed $8,000 
alimony and child support for the period from August 
1986 to November 1987. The discrepancy occurs 
because, according to defendants' illustration, the 
change of his child support obligation (from $200 to 
$400 per month) began on June 1, 1987, whereas 
under the decree modification, the change was ac-
tually effective July 18, 1986. The 1988 judgment and 
the trial court's determination here both account for 
the correct effective date of the modified decree. De-
fendants' illustration is simply inaccurate. 
*2 Second, defendants' illustration also differs from 
the trial court's determination because the illustration 
does not account for interest on the unpaid alimony 
and child support. This interest has accrued since 
December 1987 and partially accounts for the dis-
crepancy between the trial court's determination and 
the principal alone in defendants' illustration. SeeUtah 
Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1999) (authorizing interest on 
judgments); id. § 30-3-10.6(l)(a) (1998) (providing 
that "[e]ach payment or installment of child or spousal 
support under any child support order ... is, on and 
after the date it is due ... a judgment"); Stroud v. 
Stroud, 758 P.2d 905, 906 (Utah 1988) (holding that 
interest accrues on child support arrearages until 
paid); Hoazland v. Hoazland, 852 P.2d 1025, 1029 
(Utah Ct.App.1993) (holding that interest accrues on 
unpaid alimony arrearages). 
Nonetheless, it appears that although interest is ap-
propriate, the method by which the court calculated 
the interest is in error. Regarding the 1987 judgment, 
the court correctly applied the 12% interest rate that 
was effective at the time the judgment was en-
tered mSeeUtah_Coo^_An^^ 
("The postjudgment interest rate in effect at the time 
of the judgment shall remain the interest rate for the 
duration of the judgment."). Regarding both the 1987 
and 1988 judgments, however, the court erred by 
compounding the interest. See Estate Landscape & 
Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States 
Tel & Tel. Co., 793 P.2d 415, 420 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990), rev'd on other grounds, 844 P.2d 322 
(Utah 1992). Accordingly, although the court made no 
mathematical errors, we conclude the methodology it 
employed in arriving at the $76,137.99 total judgment 
was flawed and reverse the judgment in this respect. 
On remand, the court should recalculate the total 
judgment without compounding the interest. 
FN4. The record is unclear as to how Laree 
arrived at the 7.23% per annum interest rate 
in preparing the exhibit on which the court 
relied. On remand the court should verify 
whether this rate correctly applies to the 1988 
judgment and the child support and alimony 
arrearages accruing during the years the-
reafter. 
Defendants next argue that the 1987 and 1988 judg-
ments had expired and therefore the court erred by 
including them in its determination of the amount 
Robin owes Laree. We conclude the 1987 and 1988 
judgments were properly renewed. This action was 
commenced March 7, 1995, at which time the statute 
of limitations on the 1987 and 1988 judgments had not 
expired. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 78-12-22(1) (1996) 
(providing that an action may be brought upon a 
judgment or decree within eight years). Assuming the 
complaint was insufficient to state a cause of action to 
renew the 1987 and 1988 judgments, the court granted 
Laree's motion to amend the complaint to renew the 
judgments at trial February 9, 1998.—SeeUtah 
R.Civ.P. 15(b). Although this was done after expira-
tion of the limitations period, such amendment relates 
back to the filing of the original complaint. SeeUtah 
R.Civ.P. 15(c); Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497, 501 
(Utah Ct.App.1999). Consequently, the 1987 and 
1988 judgments were renewed and the court did not 
err in including the amounts Robin owed to Laree 
from those judgments as part of the judgment in this 
case. 
FN5. Defendants argue the court abused its 
discretion in allowing amendment under 
Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
because amendment would prejudice defen-
dants, who were unprepared to argue items of 
payment or set-off or show that the judg-
ments were in error. However, the court 
specifically found that defendants were not 
prejudiced by the amendment. See Fibro 
Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin ., Inc., 974 P.2d 
288, 292 (Utah 1999). Although the pretrial 
order was not signed by the trial court, it was 
signed by counsel for plaintiff and defen-
dants and put Robin on notice of Laree's in-
tention to pursue the judgments, especially 
by listing such judgments both as part of 
Laree's claims and as uncontested facts. 
Consequently, the court acted within its dis-
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3 We also reject defendants1 argument that the tnai 
court erred in finding that Robin did not prove an 
entitlement to the $3,500 insurance proceeds which 
would be offset against his arrearages. We review for 
clear error the trial court's rejection of defendants' 
claim because it was not persuaded by the evidence. 
See Sorenson v. Kennecott Utah Copper Cory., 873 
P.2d 1141. 1144 (Utah Ct.App.1994). The trial court 
found there was insufficient evidence that Robin 
owned the car when the accident occurred. Although 
title to the automobile remained in Robin's name, this 
finding is supported by the divorce decree that 
awarded ownership to Laree and testimony that indi-
cated Robin was sent the check by the insurance 
company only because the name on the title had not 
been changed. See Lake Philgas Sen>., 845 P.2d at 957 
(holding that name on registration and title "estab-
lishes only a presumption of ownership, rebutted by 
legally relevant evidence presented at trial and 
deemed credible by the court"). Because the court's 
finding is supported by the evidence, and it is not 
clearly erroneous, we will not disturb it on appeal.— 
FN6. We further reject defendants' conten-
tion that the unsigned pretrial order bound 
the court to conclude that Robin owned the 
vehicle and was therefore entitled to an offset 
for the insurance proceeds. The language in 
the order indicates only that Laree received 
the insurance proceeds; it does not stand for 
the proposition that Robin owned the vehicle 
or was otherwise entitled to the proceeds. 
Defendants also challenge the court's determination 
that the original decree's intent was that the household 
items accompany the house for the childrens' benefit 
and thus Robin was not entitled to an offset for the 
value of such personal property retained by Laree. 
This court reviews the trial court's interpretation of a 
prior judicial decision for correctness. See State v. 
Montova, 887 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1994). 
In awarding personal property, the divorce decree 
provided with respect to Robin, "Defendant is 
awarded all household furniture and furnishings, 
personal effects and clothing and personal effects and 
clothing of the minor children residing immediately 
with him and all other personal property in his pos-
session/This paragraph awards four categories of 
Page 3 
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property to Robin: (1) the household furniture and 
furnishings; (2) his personal effects and clothing; (3) 
the childrens' personal effects and clothing; and (4) 
other property in his possession. By its plain language, 
the decree places no conditions or restrictions on 
Robin's right to the personal property. The modified 
divorce decree provided only that Laree may occupy 
the home and did not transfer title of the household 
furniture and furnishings to Laree. It cannot be said 
that based on the decree and modification Robin held 
title to the household furniture and furnishings only so 
long as he resided in the house and had custody of the 
children. The trial court, however, made no findings as 
to the value of the property at the time Laree received 
it. Consequently, we reverse and remand for further 
proceedings to determine the value of the household 
goods when received by Laree to be credited against 
the arrearages owed Laree.— 
FN7. We reject Laree's contention that 
Robin's offset claims are barred by the statute 
of limitations. Even if Robin would be barred 
from asserting such claims as a plaintiff in a 
separate action, under Rule 13(i), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, he may nonetheless 
"utilize a counterclaim, normally barred by 
the statute of limitations, to offset a plaintiffs 
claim, but only to the extent the claims equal 
each other," so long as the claims coexisted. 
Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069, 1072 
(Utah Ct.App. 1996); see Jacohsen v. Bunker, 
699 P.2d 1208. 1210 (Utah 1985). 
Finally, we turn to defendants' argument that the court 
erred in imposing a constructive trust, determining 
that Rod thus held only a legal interest for Robin's 
benefit, and quieting title to the home in Laree. This 
court reviews the imposition of a constructive trust for 
an abuse of discretion and "will only conclude the trial 
court abused its discretion if the ruling was 'beyond 
the limits of reasonability.' " Tolman v. Winchester 
Hills Co., 912 P.2d 457. 462 (Utah Ct.App.1996) 
(citation omitted). UA constructive trust is an equitable 
remedy to prevent unjust enrichment in the absence of 
any express or implied intention to form a trust." Id . 
First, defendants have not demonstrated that because 
Laree was not a party to the quitclaim deed, she may 
not enforce a constructive trust. "[A] constructive trust 
may arise 'where a person holding title to property is 
subject to an equitable duty to convey it ro another on 
the ground that he would be unjustly enriched ' he 
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were permitted to retain it....' " Parks v. Zions First 
Nat'l Bank, 673 P.2d 590. 599 (Utah 1983) (quoting 
Restatement of Restitution S 160 (1937)) (omission in 
original). In Parks, the court relied on a Delaware case 
in which the court found there was a constructive trust 
in favor of a husband when his wife transferred prop-
erty in which the husband had an interest to her rela-
tive before her death. See id.(citing Adams v. Jank-
ouskas, 452 A.2d 148 (Del. 1982)). Notwithstanding 
that the husband in Adams, like Laree, was not a party 
to the transfer, the Parks court agreed that the trial 
court properly imposed a constructive trust where 
equity required. See id. at 599-600.We conclude that 
the trial court here did not abuse its broad discretion in 
determining that equity required the imposition of a 
constructive trust transferring title from Rod to Rob-
FN8. Defendants did not appeal the propriety 
of the implementation of the trust which in 
effect transferred his interest in the home 
back to Robin and then awarded Robin's in-
terest to Laree by quieting title, essentially 
relieving Laree from the need to execute on 
her judgment. Notwithstanding, should re-
calculation of amounts due Laree show 
Robin's entitlement to net affirmative relief, 
the same should be ordered. 
*4 Further, defendants incorrectly assert that Laree's 
action for constructive trust is barred by the three year 
statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) 
(1996), as an action based on fraud. Unlike Laree's 
claim based on fraudulent conveyance, for which the 
court granted partial summary judgment in favor of 
defendants, her claim for constructive trust sounds in 
equity and therefore falls within the catch-all, four 
year statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-25(3) (\996).See American Tierra Cory, v. City 
ofW. Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 761 (Utah 1992). The trial 
court found that Laree first discovered the conveyance 
to Rod on May 15, 1991, pursuant to her application 
for a loan, a factual finding that defendants do not 
dispute on appeal. See Sew v. Security Title Co., 902 
P.2d 629, 634 (Utah 1995) ("We hold that the issue of 
when a claimant discovered or should have discovered 
the facts forming the basis of a cause of action is a 
question of fact, and the fact finder's conclusion can-
not be overturned on appeal unless it is clearly erro-
neous."). Although the record shows Laree may have 
had constructive notice of the deed when it was rec-
orded, defendants have failed to marshal any evidence 
that she had actual or constructive notice of the facts 
which would justify imposing the constructive trust 
before May 15, 1991. See zc/.("The discovery rule is an 
exception to the general rule, and it delays the running 
of the limitation period ' "until the discovery of facts 
forming the basis for the cause of action." ' ") (cita-
tions omitted); see also Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 
1118, 1195-97 (Utah 1993) (holding that although 
deed was recorded, limitations period commenced 
when claimant should have acquired knowledge that 
transfer was fradulent). Because defendants have not 
shown the limitations period commenced before May 
15, 1991, we cannot say that Laree's claim for con-
structive trust, filed within four years on March 7, 
1995, was barred. 
In sum, we affirm the trial court's judgment except to 
the extent that it incorrectly calculated the interest and 
failed to properly value Robin's household furniture 
and furnishings, on which points we reverse and re-
mand. On remand, the court should recalculate the 
total owed to Laree, make factual findings as to the 
value of said personal property when received by 
Laree, offset the same against amounts due Laree, and 
recalculate its judgment accordingly. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for 
further proceedings. 
GREENWOOD, P.J., and ORME, J., concur. 
Utah App.,2000. 
Nielsen v. Nielsen 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33249399 (Utah 
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DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
TI1 This case requires us to decide whether rule 504 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, which delineates the 
lawyer-client privilege, protects communications 
between a lawyer and a client's representative, even if 
Page 2 
that client is an individual and not a corporation or 
other business entity. We hold that such communica-
tions may be privileged regardless of whether the 
client is a corporation or a natural person so long as the 
requirements of rule 504 are met. Under rule 
504(a)(4), a client's representative is "one having 
authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act 
on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the 
client, or one specifically authorized to communicate 
with the lawyer concerning a legal matter." 
BACKGROUND 
H 2 The parties to this case dispute whether commu-
nications between Dennis and Marilynn Moler (the 
"Molers") and their daughter, Wendy Moler-Lewis, 
are protected by the lawyer-client privilege. In 2002, 
the Molers contracted to purchase a new home from 
Franklin Homes in a new gated community named 
Redfeather Estates in Sandy, Utah. At the time the 
Molers first met with Redfeather Estates' real estate 
agent, Christopher McCandless, the homes in Red-
feather Estates were burdened with covenants, condi-
tions, and restrictions ("CC & Rs") that limited oc-
cupancy to households with at least one person fif-
ty-five years of age or older. But before the Molers 
closed on their purchase, the sellers executed and 
recorded amended CC & Rs removing the age re-
striction from Redfeather Estates. The Molers learned 
of the restriction's removal only after they closed on 
the purchase of their residence. They eventually filed 
this lawsuit against McCandless, Franklin Homes, and 
other entities involved in Redfeather Estates' devel-
opment and sale (collectively, the "Sellers").— The 
lawsuit alleged several causes of action related to the 
sale of the property and the removal of the restriction. 
FN1. Several of the original defendants 
named in this lawsuit settled with the Molers 
and are no longer parties. For convenience 
and because which of the defendants sought 
to compel Mr. Moler's testimony is irrelevant 
to the issue before us, we refer throughout 
this opinion to any and all defendants as the 
"Sellers." 
K 3 Before filing suit, the Molers enlisted their 
daughter, Moler-Lewis, to help them with various 
aspects of the dispute. Although Moler-Lewis gradu-
ated from law school and was at one time a practicing 
attorney, she has never represented the Molers in this 
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action. She did, however, assist the Molers in identi-
fying and retaining a law firm to represent them. In 
addition, Moler-Lewis was present and participated in 
some conversations between the Molers and 
McCandless. Therefore, Moler-Lewis is also a witness 
to some of the facts underlying the lawsuit. 
II 4 rhere are two sets of communications between the 
Molers and Moler-Lewis at issue in this case. The first 
set occurred before the Molers retained counsel in 
anticipation of litigation. The second set occurred after 
the Molers retained counsel. After the Molers filed 
suit, counsel for the Sellers deposed Mr. Moler. Mr. 
Moler was asked to describe in detail all communica-
tions he and Mrs. Moler had with Moler-Lewis con-
cerning the lawsuit, including those where the Molers' 
counsel was present. Counsel for the Molers objected 
and instructed Mr. Moler not to answer, invoking the 
lawyer-client *1252 privilege. But later in the same 
deposition, Mr. Moler recounted some conversations 
he and Mrs. Moler had with Moler-Lewis prior to 
retaining counsel. 
j | 5 The Sellers moved the district court to compel Mr. 
Moler to answer the questions that he had refused to 
answer about those conversations, and the district 
court granted the motion, holding that the law-
yer-client privilege did not apply. The court reasoned 
that the conversations with Moler-Lewis could not be 
privileged because Moler-Lewis was neither the Mo-
lers' attorney nor their representative as contemplated 
by rule 504(a)(4) in that she was not retained for legal 
advice and her services were not "essential to [the 
Molers'] representation." In addition, the district court 
held that even if Moler-Lewis was the Molers' repre-
sentative, Mr. Moler had waived the privilege by 
testifying as to other conversations between himself 
and Moler-Lewis that occurred before the Molers 
retained counsel in anticipation of litigation. 
H 6 The Molers filed this interlocutory appeal, and we 
have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 
78A-3-102(3)(a) (2008). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
III *\\ 7"The existence of a privilege is a question of 
law for the court, which we review for correctness, 
giving no deference to the trial court's determination.*1 
FN2 
Page 3 
FN2. Price v. Armour. 949 P.2d 1251. 1254 
(Utah 1997). 
ANALYSIS 
*\\ 8 We begin and end our analysis with a 
plain-language review of Utah Rule of Evidence 504: 
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent any other person from disclosing confiden-
tial communications made for the purpose of faci-
litating the rendition of professional legal services 
to the client between the client and the client's 
representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, 
and lawyers representing others in matters of 
common interest, and among the client's represent-
atives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and law-
yers representing others in matters of common in-
terest, in any combination.— 
FN3. Utah R. L\id. 504(b) (emplui.so .Hid-
ed). 
!orc. in oruer to determine whether each com-
n.-.i: cation at issue was privileged, the district court 
was required to answer two questions: First, was 
Moler-Lewis a representative of the Molers as defined 
in rule 504(a)(4)? Second, was each communication at 
issue a "confidential communication" as defined in 
rule 504(a)(5) and (6)? We will first discuss whether 
the district court correctly applied rule 504 to the 
communications at issue. Then we will review the 
district court's ruling that Mr. Moler waived the pri-
vilege by testifying as to conversations between the 
Molers and Moler-Lewis that occurred before the 
Molers retained counsel in anticipation of litigation. 
I. WAS MOLER-LEWIS A "REPRESENTA 1 \\ H 
OF THE CI IENT"? 
121 11 9Utah Rule of Evidence 504(a)(4) defines a 
"representative of the client" as "one having authority 
to obtain professional legal services, or to act on ad-
vice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client, 
or one specifically authorized to communicate with 
the lawyer concerning a legal matter." Whether Mo-
ler-Lewis qualified as such a representative depends, 
in part, on whether the Molers qualified as "clients." 
The Sellers contend that the Molers could not have 
been "clients" as that term is used in the definitional 
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subsection (a)(4) because "client" in that subsection is 
limited to corporate entities and other legally recog-
nized entities that must act through human beings to 
conduct their affairs. In support of this argument, the 
Sellers point to the advisory committee note to rule 
504: "The committee revised the proposed rule .. to 
address the issues raised in Upjohn Co. v. United 
States as to when communications involving repre-
sentatives of a corporation are protected by privilege." 
(Citation omitted.) They argue that because the rule 
was revised in response to Upjohn, which resolved the 
issue of who may represent a corporate entity, only 
corporations,* 1253 and not natural persons, can have 
representatives.—The Sellers urge us to adopt a rule 
restricting to corporations and other business entities 
the right to have representatives with whom commu-
nications might be confidential. 
FN4. 449 U.S. 383. 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 
L.Ed.2d 584 (1981). 
H 10 We disagree with the Sellers' reasoning as to the 
meaning of the term "client" in rule 504. In our view, 
the term "client" as used throughout the rule refers not 
just to corporations or other business entities, but to 
natural persons as well. Indeed, "client" is specifically 
defined in subsection (a)(1) to include "a person." 
T| 11 Further, the fact that this rule was revised in 
response to the Upjohn case does not lead to the con-
clusion that "client" in rule 504(b) should be read to 
exclude individuals. In Upjohn, the United States 
Supreme Court held that low-level and mid-level 
employees-not just those in the "control group"-could 
potentially be protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege.— While this holding defines the potential scope 
of the federal privilege in the corporate context, it does 
not purport to limit the term "representative of a 
client" to that context. The Sellers would read "client" 
as used in the first line of subsection (b) to be different 
from the same term as used subsequently in the same 
subsection and throughout the rule. That is, in the first 
line of subsection (b), under the Sellers' interpretation, 
"client" refers only to corporate entities, but in every 
other usage throughout the rule, "client" includes 
natural persons as well. Such a reading is contrary to 
the plain language of the rule and without justification. 
The plain language of the rule, which explicitly de-
fines client to include a person, leads us to reject the 
inference the Sellers draw from the Upjohn case. 
Page 4 
FN5.M at 391-92. 101 S.Ct. 677. 
K 12 We recognize that some jurisdictions have 
adopted the contrary rule that only corporate clients or 
similar entities may have representatives.— We also 
recognize the concern that allowing individuals to 
have representatives could extend the privilege to a 
limitless number of third parties, potentially subvert-
ing the truth-finding function of courts. But in our 
view, this concern is adequately addressed bv the 
language of the rule, which carefully limits a "repre-
sentative" to "one having authority to obtain profes-
sional legal services, or to act on advice rendered 
pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client, or one spe-
cifically authorized to communicate with the lawyer 
concerning a legal matter." Because the rule so limits 
who may be a representative, our holding will not 
unduly expand the privilege. 
FN6. See, e.g., State v. Jancsek, 302 Or. 270, 
730 P.2d 14, 21 (1986) (holding thai the 
"client" to which the definition of "repre-
sentative" applies must be a business entity). 
K 13 Moreover, from a policy perspective, we find it 
salutary that natural persons should be afforded the 
same level of protection when communicating with 
their representatives as corporations now enjoy. In 
many cases, an individual's need to consult with an 
advisor regarding the facilitation of legal services may 
be every bit as acute as the need of a corporation to do 
so, often more so. 
[31 T| 14 In this case, however, the district court found 
that such protection did not extend to the Molers be-
cause Moler-Lewis did not qualify as their represent-
ative. The district court drew this conclusion because 
Moler-Lewis was not retained to give legal advice and 
her services were not "essential to [the Molers'] re-
presentation." In so concluding, the district court 
imposed a requirement not found in rule 504. In order 
to resolve whether Moler-Lewis was a representative 
of the client, the district court need make only the 
following factual determination: Was Moler-Lewis 
"one having authority to obtain professional legal 
services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, 
on behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized 
to communicate with the lawyer concerning a legal 
matter"? Because the district court applied the wrong 
standard, it did not make the findings necessary for us 
to conduct a review using the correct standard. 
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Therefore, we remand for the district court to make 
factual determinations and apply the *1254 correct 
standard to resolve whether Moler-Lewis qualified as 
ihe Molers' representative. 
IT DID EACH COMMUNICATION AT ISSUE 
CONSTITUTE A "CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNI-
CATION"' SI JCH THAT IT MIGHT QUAI IFY AS 
PRIVILEGED? 
TJ 15 The second question that must be resolved is 
whether each communication at issue is a "confiden-
tial communication" such that it might qualify as 
privileged. Subsection (a)(5) of rule 504 defines a 
"communication" to include "advice given by the 
lawyer in the course of representing the client and 
includes disclosures of the client and the client's rep-
resentatives to the lawyer or the lawyer's representa-
tive incidental to the professional relationship." And 
under subsection (a)(6), a communication is confi-
dential if it is (1) "confidential" and (2) made for the 
purpose of "facilitating the rendition of professional 
legal services to the client." To satisfy the confiden-
tiality requirement under subsection (a)(6), the com-
ication must "not [be] intended to be disclosed to 
third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in 
furtherance of the rendition of professional legal ser-
vices to the client or those reasonably necessary for 
the transmission of the communication." -1— Because 
the district court concluded that Moler-Lewis was not 
the Molers' representative, it did not reach this ques-
tion. Thus, we remand for the district court to deter-
mine as to each communication in dispute whether the 
communication was (1) confidential and (2) made for 
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional 
legal services to the client. 
FN7. Utah R. Evid. 504(a)(6). 
ITT
 M \ PRIVILEGE DID ATTACH TO EACH 
LUMAIUNICATION AT ISSUE, DID MR. MOLER 
WAIVE IT BY ANSWERING CERTAIN DEPOSI-
TION OT T^TTONS? 
1 16 The resolution of the final is sue-whether Mr. 
Moler waived the privilege-is dependent upon the 
district court's resolution on remand of when, if at all, 
the lawyer-client privilege came into existence. Be-
cause the district court used the wrong legal standard 
in holding that Moler-Lewis was not the Molers' rep-
resentative and that question remains unresolved, we 
are unable to reach a conclusion as to whether Mr. 
Moler waived the lawyer-client privilege. 
r4~l[5T[6] 11 17 Waiver is the intentional relinquishment 
of a known right.— To establish waiver, a defendant 
must show that the plaintiff had (1) an existing right, 
(2) knowledge of its existence, and (3) an intent to 
relinquish the right.— Therefore, in order to waive the 
privilege as to any given communication, the law-
yer-client privilege must exist when the communica-
tion at issue occurred, and the holder of the privilege 
must consent to the disclosure. A plain-language 
reading of rule 507(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
confirms this principle: 
FN8. Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Saw & 
Loan Ass'ih 857 P.2d 935, 939-42 (Utah 
1993). 
FN9.M at 940. 
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege 
against disclosure of the confidential matter or 
communication waives the privilege if the person or 
a predecessor while holder of the privilege volunta-
rily discloses or consents to the disclosure of any 
significant part of the matter or communication. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The language of the rule suggests that there are two 
temporal requirements for waiver. First, the com-
munication must be privileged at the time it oc-
curred. Second, the disclosure that constitutes 
waiver of the privilege must be made while the 
person disclosing holds the privilege. 
1| 18 The district court, although concluding that the 
privilege never existed, nevertheless concluded that 
the privilege, if it did exist, had been waived. Un-
derstandably, the district court failed to make findings 
of fact as to when the privilege came into existence. 
Furthermore, the record provided to us on this appeal 
(and which, presumably, is the same record that was 
before the district court) does not contain a full tran-
script of the *1255 deposition at which Mr. Moler 
apparently testified about discussions between the 
Molers and Moler-Lewis. We therefore are unable to 
determine when the privilege attached and, without 
the benefit of a complete record, are also uncertain on 
what basis the district court concluded that Mr, Moler 
waived the privilege. 
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^ 19 Furthermore, it is apparent from the record we do 
have that Moler-Lewis was present on numerous oc-
casions both before and after the Molers retained 
counsel m anticipation of litigation. Even if Mr. Moler 
voluntarily testified regarding one or more confiden-
tial matters, it does not follow that he waived all 
lawyer-client privileges for all communications. Rule 
507(a) restricts the scope of each waiver to a com-
munication about which "any significant part of the 
matter or communication" has been disclosed. 
Therefore, Mr. Moler did not waive the privilege for a 
particular communication if he did not disclose any 
significant part of the particular matter or communi-
cation at issue. 
Tj 20 We therefore remand to the district court for an 
assessment of whether a privilege arose under the 
framework we have described and, if so, when it 
arose. Only when these questions are resolved may the 
district court properly determine whether Mr. Moler 
waived the privilege during his deposition. 
CONCLUSION 
TI 21 We conclude that communications between 
clients and their representatives may be privileged 
regardless of whether the client is a corporation or a 
natural person. Rule 504(a)(4) defines a representative 
as "one having authority to obtain professional legal 
services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, 
on behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized 
to communicate with the lawyer concerning a legal 
matter." We remand to the district court to make a 
determination as to each communication at issue in 
this case using the framework we have described. 
1| 22 Chief Justice DURHAM, Justice WILKINS, 
Justice PARRISH, and Justice NEHRING concur in 
Associate Chief Justice DURRANT'S opinion. 
Utah,2008. 
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R. E. WALKER et al., heirs of the Estate of John A. 
Walker, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
J. B. WALKER, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 10286. 
July 19, 1965. 
Suit by heirs of decedent, the probate of whose estate 
had not been completed, against decedent's oldest son 
for distributive shares of two parcels of land which 
plaintiffs claimed to be family property. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, A. H. Ellett, J., held 
that defendant held property as trustee and that plain-
tiffs should have their respective shares conditioned 
upon plaintiffs repaying to defendant amount of lien 
he had on property for moneys he had advanced to 
keep family from losing the property. Plaintiffs ap-
pealed and defendant filed cross-appeal. The Supreme 
Court, Crockett, J., held that evidence sustained 
finding that oldest son in whose name deeds to prop-
erty previously owned by his parents had been taken 
had been acting as trustee for family in regard to that 
property, and that he was entitled to reimbursement 
for moneys advanced to protect the family property. 
Affirmed. 
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390 Trusts 
3901 Creation, Existence, and Validity 
3901(A) Express Trusts 
390k40 Evidence to Establish Trust 
390k44 Weight and Sufficiency 
390k44(2) k. Evidence to Charge 
Grantee or Assignee as Trustee. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence sustained finding that one son in whose 
name deeds to property previously owned by his 
parents had been taken had been acting as trustee for 
family in regard to that property, in suit by other 
children for their distributive shares in property on 
ground that it was family property. 
1£ Equity 150 €==>88 
150 Equity 
150II Laches and Stale Demands 
150k88 k. Waiver of Objections. Most Cited 
Cases 
Burden of taking some affirmative action should be on 
him who accuses the other of delay and unless he has 
taken such action or in some manner put other party on 
notice that action is required, he cannot take advantage 
of the delay. 
151 Limitation of Actions 241 €=>103(4) 
241 Limitation of Actions 
24 III Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and 
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action 
241kl01 Existence of Trust 
241kl03 Repudiation or Violation of 
Trust 
241kl03(4) k. Notice of Repudiation. 
Most Cited Cases 
Trusts 390 €^>365(3) 
390 Trusts 
390VII Establishment and Enforcement of Trust 
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
404 P.2d 253 
17 Utah 2d 53, 404 P.2d 253 
(Cite as: 17 Utah 2d 53, 404 P.2d 253) 
390VIKC) Actions 
390k365 Time to Sue, Limitations, and 
Laches 
390k365(3) k. Repudiation or Violation 
of Trust, and Knowledge of Beneficiary as Affecting 
Laches. Most Cited Cases 
Defense of statute of limitations and laches are not 
available to trustee as against his beneficiaries until 
something has occurred to give clear indication to 
them that he has repudiated his trust or circumstances 
are such that they must be charged with knowledge of 
such repudiation. 
161 Trusts 390 €^365(2) 
390 Trusts 
390VII Establishment and Enforcement of Trust 
390VIKC) Actions 
390k365 Time to Sue, Limitations, and 
Laches 
390k365(2) k. Laches in General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Where oldest son undertook to raise money to save 
family property which had been sold at sheriffs sale 
and execution sale and received deeds to property and 
held property to provide home for his mother and her 
family, some of whom remained on property, other 
members of family were not precluded from claiming 
interest in property on ground of laches although they 
did not assert interest until after death of mother 42 
years after oldest son took property. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rules 8, 18, 54(c) and (1), 83; U.C.A.1953, 
78-37-6. 
121 Trusts 390 €^>236 
390 Trusts 
390IV Management and Disposal of Trust Prop-
erty 
390k236 k. Reimbursement and Indemnity to 
Trustee. Most Cited Cases 
Inasmuch as agreement whereby oldest son took title 
to family property making him a trustee was binding 
upon that son, agreement was binding upon other 
children and required them to recognize lien provided 
for therein and to reimburse oldest son for money he 
expended to protect the family property. 
181 Contracts 95 €^245(1) 
Page 2 
95 Contracts 
95III Modification and Merger 
95k245 Merger in Subsequent Contract 
95k245(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Court's refusal to go back of agreement entered into 
more than 40 years before making one son trustee of 
family property and providing lien for sums he ex-
pended to save property and court's assumption that all 
prior mutual claims and demands were merged into 
that agreement was proper. 
121 Descent and Distribution 124 € ^ 8 2 
124 Descent and Distribution 
124III Rights and Liabilities of Heirs and Distri-
butees 
124111(A) Nature and Establishment of Rights 
in General 
124k82 k. Conveyances and Other Trans-
actions Between Heirs and Distributees. Most Cited 
Cases 
Agreement whereby all of assets of corporation oper-
ated by two sons were assigned to one son reserving to 
the other only rights which he had in estate of his 
father did not reserve any share in rights to reim-
bursement for money used to protect family property 
as provided by prior agreement whereby such rights 
were to belong to son who acquired corporate assets. 
[101 Trusts 390 €=^236 
390 Trusts 
390IV Management and Disposal of Trust Prop-
erty 
390k236 k. Reimbursement and Indemnity to 
Trustee. Most Cited Cases 
Where whatever money may have been expended by 
corporation to protect family property was paid at 
instance of oldest son who had undertaken responsi-
bility of protecting family property and assets of 
corporation were assigned to him, he was entitled to 
reimbursement for any advancements corporation had 
made for that purpose. 
[Ill Trusts 390 €^>236 
390 Trusts 
390IV Management and Disposal of Trust Prop-
erty 
390k236 k. Reimbursement and Indemnity to 
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Trustee. Most Cited Cases 
Trustee is entitled to reimbursement for all expenses 
properly incurred in discharging responsibilities of his 
trust. 
[12] Trusts 390 €^>289 
390 Trusts 
390VI Accounting and Compensation of Trustee 
390k289 k. Duty to Account in General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Trusts 390 €^>325 
390 Trusts 
390VI Accounting and Compensation of Trustee 
390k325 k. Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
It is duty of trustee to keep full, accurate and orderly 
records and when any question arises as to their suf-
ficiency or accuracy, burden is upon him to show 
correctness of his accounts and doubts may be re-
solved adversely to him. 
[131 Trusts 390 €=^325 
390 Trusts 
390VI Accounting and Compensation of Trustee 
390k325 k. Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence sustained trial court's findings as to amount 
to be allowed to trustee for moneys he advanced in-
cluding taxes paid on family property, in suit wherein 
trustee claimed sums due for advancements to keep 
family from losing family property. 
[141 Trusts 390 €==^374 
390 Trusts 
390VII Establishment and Enforcement of Trust 
390VIKC) Actions 
390k374 k. Scope and Extent of Relief. 
Most Cited Cases 
Where parties were afforded opportunity for presen-
tation and adjudication of all their claims relating to 
family property and all claims were adjudicated, re-
fusal to resort to special procedure for foreclosure of 
oldest son's lien on property and adjudication that 
others should have their respective interests in prop-
erty, subject to their reimbursing oldest son for mo-
neys he had advanced to protect it was proper and 
others should be given reasonable time, 60 days after 
remittitur, to raise money and perform condition. 
**254 *55 Thomas C. Cuthbert, Frank J. Allen, Salt 
Lake City, for appellants. 
H. Arnold Rich, Max K. Mangum, Salt Lake City, for 
respondent. 
CROCKETT, Justice. 
Plaintiffs are heirs of the estate of John A. Walker 
who died in 1912 and the probate of whose estate has 
not been completed. They join in suing the oldest son, 
John B. Walker, for their respective distributive shares 
in two parcels of land in Union, in southeast Salt Lake 
County, which they claim to be family property. Title 
to the land in question has stood in the name of the 
defendant for over 40 years. After a plenary trial of the 
issues, the court found in accordance with the con-
tention of the plaintiffs: that the defendant held this 
property as trustee for the family and that **255 the 
plaintiff should have their respective shares therein, 
provided, however, that the defendant has a lien on 
such property for moneys he had advanced to keep the 
family from losing the property. The decree condi-
tioned plaintiffs recovery upon repayment to the de-
fendant of the amount of the lien in the sum of 
$5,614.00 principal and $16,143.36 interest, within 30 
days after demand by the defendant. 
HI Neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant appear to 
have been satisfied with the determination made by 
the trial court. The plaintiffs appeal challenging: (a) 
the amount of the lien; (b) the refusal to apply the 
statute of limitations and/or laches; (c) the period for 
which interest was allowed; and (d) the provision of 
the decree which would peremptorily divest them of 
their interest if the amount of the lien was not paid 
within 30 days after demand. On cross appeal defen-
dant urges: that he owns the property absolutely so the 
plaintiffs should be precluded from any recovery 
whatsoever; and that in any event the trial court did 
not allow him sufficient credits for money paid out to 
protect the family's interest in the lands. Where there 
is a *56 dispute in the evidence we view it in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's findings.— 
FN1. See Fleming v. Fleming-Felt Company, 
7 Utah 2d 293, 323 P.2d 712, 714 (1958); 
Buehner Block Company v. Glezos, 6 Utah 
2d 226, 310 P.2d 517, 520(1957). 
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When the father of this family died in 1912, he left his 
widow Mmnetta Walker and six children John B 
Walker, age 20, Robert E Walker, age 18, Alta F 
Walker, age 14, Ila M Walker, age 11, Austin L 
Walker, age 9, and Roma Walker, age 7 His widow 
was appointed administratrix of his estate, and pub-
lished notice to creditors No further proceedings were 
had until after Mmnetta Walker died in 1959 A suc-
cessor administrator was appointed in 1960 
Mmnetta Walker appears to have been a woman of 
considerable resourcefulness in mothering and man-
aging for her family They continued to operate the 
family store, the Union Co-Operative Mercantile 
Company, and the farm The two older sons, John B 
and Robert E were sent to college In 1915 a family 
enterprise of hauling ore by team and wagon from the 
Cardiff Mine in Cottonwood Canyon was initiated 
The horses and equipment were owned by the family 
and the work was done by the two older sons, John B 
and Robert E Walker This hauling business was 
continued and became known as the J B Walker and 
R E Walker Trucking Company and was ostensibly a 
partnership between them In succeeding years the 
mother and the boys both borrowed money on the 
family property to obtain trucks and equipment for this 
purpose In 1920 a mortgage was given on part of the 
family property to secure a loan of $4,000 00 some of 
which was to pay off a prior mortgage these boys had 
signed On default in paying the mortgage, it was 
foreclosed and on February 10, 1922 the property was 
sold at Sheriffs Sale to a Mr Dayton Meanwhile the 
store had not prospered sufficiently to meet expenses 
and support the family, and pursuant to judgments 
taken against it, was sold on execution sale 
In this setting, after the period of redemption on both 
of the sales just referred to had expired, the oldest son, 
defendant J B Walker, undertook to raise the money 
to save the family property and on October 9, 1922 a 
written agreement between members of the family 
was executed It states in part 
' 1 That second party [J B Walker] is hereby autho-
rized and directed to diligently attempt to pay any and 
all of the obligations hereinbefore referred to in so far 
as he is able to pay the same 
42 That the first parties [Walker heirs] agree to pay 
upon demand to second party * * * eight ninths of all 
the money which he shall advance and pay on account 
of the claims, * * * with interest thereon at the rale of 
eight per cent per annum from the date of any and all 
of said payments, it being *57 understood that the 
remaining onenmth**256 of said payments is the 
share which second party is required to pay of said 
obligations * * * 
'3 The first parties [Walker heirs] do hereby give and 
grant to the second party [defendant J B Walker] a 
lien upon all of the real estate in this contract specif-
ically described, together with said water rights, for 
the purpose of securing the payment of first partie s to 
second party of any and all payments which shall be 
made by second party, pursuant to the terms of this 
agreement' 
J B Walker did arrange finances to pay off the debts, 
and on October 19, 1922 received a deed from Mr 
Dayton for the mortgage foreclosed property, and on 
August 24, 1923 received a deed of the store property 
from the Association of Credit Men Members of the 
family have since continued to reside on the property 
including the mother until her death in 1959 The 
youngest brother, Austin Walker, has lived there and 
farmed the land with the understanding that he could 
do so for the payment of taxes, which he has done, 
except for some taxes which have been paid by J B 
Walker 
Meanwhile J B and R E Walker had incorporated 
their business in 1931 and jointly continued its opera-
tion until shortly after the death of their mother On 
June 6, 1959, after dissension between them, ihey 
arrived at a settlement in which R E conveyed to r B 
all of his interest in the corporation and any interest in 
the old partnership property, but reserved his interest 
in the estate of his father John A Walker 
It was upon the refusal of J B Walker to recognize 
the interests of the plaintiffs in the family property 
subsequent to the mother's death in 1959 that this 
action was commenced m 1962 to impose a trust upon 
the theory that in taking title to these properties J B 
Walker was acting tor his mother and brothers and 
sisters, the heirs of his father's estate 
The primary issues, to which other issues in this case 
are subordinate, are the contentions of the defendant 
that he owns the property in question absolutely and 
that the plaintiffs ha\e no interest whatsoever therein, 
and that in any event, their rights are barred by the 
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statute of limitations and/or laches. It is obvious that if 
the position of the defendant were correct in that re-
gard, other issues in the case would become moot. 
r21T3] We perceive nothing in the fact situation which 
would justify reversing the finding that J. B. Walker 
was acting as trustee for the family in regard to this 
property. In addition to the written agreement, which 
is entirely consistent with such a finding, there is the 
fact of the family relationship and their previous 
co-ownership*58 of the property. It is generally rec-
ognized that where one co-owner does something for 
the protection of their common property, it is pre-
sumed that his action was to preserve it for the benefit 
of all unless some indication to the contrary plainly 
appears.— That the trial court correctly regarded J. B. 
Walker as a trustee is pointed up by this recital in his 
own brief: 
FN2. See Sperry v. Tollev, 114 Utah 303, 
199 P.2d 542, 546 (1948); McCreadv v. 
Fredericksen, 41 Utah 388, 126 P. 316 
(1912); and Heiselt v. Heiselt 10 Utah 2d 
126, 349 P.2d 175 (1960). 
'The primary objective of defendant was to provide a 
home for his mother and her family and this was ac-
complished by defendant. For 42 years the family has 
lived in the home rent free, without even so much as 
payment of taxes, * * * and in his claims for credit 
defendant has asked no accounting for rentals or oc-
cupancy, by other members of the family, since he left 
the parental home in 1931.' 
[41 The problem of the statute of limitations and/or 
laches as involved here is somewhat unusual in that 
each side accuses the other of delay and invokes that 
defense. Defendant contends that inasmuch as he 
**257 took deeds to the property in his own name over 
40 years ago, if the plaintiffs ever had any rights 
therein, they have slept on those rights for so long that 
laches should prevent them from now attacking his 
ownership. On the other hand the plaintiff interpose 
the same objection to the defendant's claim to reim-
bursement for funds advanced many years since and 
for which the defendant has never heretofore made 
any demand for payment. This situation reminds one 
of a chess game in which the players each insist that 
the other has the next move. The question is posed: 
was it up to the heirs to make the first move by de-
manding the property from the defendant? Or was it 
the latter's duty to demand from the heirs the money 
advanced to protect the property? The answer to such 
a stalemate seems to be that the burden of taking some 
affirmative action should be upon him who accuses 
the other of delay; and unless he has taken such action, 
or in some manner put the other party on notice that 
action is required, he cannot take advantage of the 
delay. 
[5] Defendant's invocation of the statute of limitations 
and laches runs counter to the rule that such a defense 
is not available to a trustee as against his beneficiaries 
until something has occurred to give a clear indication 
to them that he has repudiated his trust;— or the cir-
cumstances are such that they must be charged with 
knowledge of such repudiation.— No such situa-
tion*59 existed here. But there are several factors 
which tend to support the trial court's determination. 
Where a near relative is involved courts are less in-
clined to find a repudiation. This is so because of the 
greater likelihood that the beneficiaries have reposed 
confidence in him; and also, they would have a natural 
reluctance to sue him unless circumstances forced 
them to do so. 
FN3. See Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 
P.2d981 (1958). 
FN4. See Acott v. Tomlmson, 9 Utah 2d 71, 
337P.2d720, 721 (1959). 
£6] Under the facts shown there wouldn't be anything 
strange or unreasonable about the plaintiffs assuming, 
as they say they did, that the defendant was holding 
the property for the family until after the death of their 
mother, so that she would be provided with a home; 
and that after her death, their father's estate would be 
settled and each would receive his share. These con-
siderations, together with the fact that some members 
of the family remained in the property, make the re-
fusal of the trial court to apply laches against the 
plaintiffs harmonize with reason. 
[7] The reasons stated above which militate against the 
defendant asserting laches against the plaintiffs also 
apply in principle to the plaintiffs' charge that the 
defendant J. B. Walker should be barred from claim-
ing reimbursement for the moneys advanced to protect 
the family property. In that connection it should be 
kept in mind that after he took title to the property in 
his own name, somewhere along the line he formed 
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the intention of claiming it for his own. Therefore 
from his point of view it is neither unnatural nor il-
logical that he made no demand for reimbursement for 
the moneys he had advanced. Where this impasse 
existed and both parties seemed satisfied with the 
statuts quo, and neither took any affirmative action to 
change it, neither is in a position to blame the other for 
delay and invoke laches against him. We think the trial 
court was patently correct in ruling that inasmuch as 
the 1922 agreement is binding upon the defendant, 
making him a trustee, by the same token it should be 
binding upon the plaintiffs and require them to rec-
ognize the lien provided for therein and reimburse him 
for the money he expended to protect the family 
property. 
[8] The plaintiffs also make several contentions at-
tacking the amount of reimbursement allowed defen-
dant. They assert that the trial court should have taken 
into account the fact that some of the money raised to 
pay off the family debts was used to discharge debts 
incurred by J. B. Walker **258 and his brother R. E. 
Walker prior to 1922. It will be recalled that at that 
time these two older brothers were working in con-
nection with the family enterprise and to support them 
all. We think the court wisely and correctly refused to 
go back of the 1922 agreement and to assume that all 
prior *60 mutual claims and demands were merged 
FN5. See Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 7 
Utah 2d 163,321 P.2d 221. 
r9iri01 Plaintiffs advance another argument that the 
money used to protect the family property was ac-
tually paid by the J. B. and R. E. Walker partnership 
and/or later by the corporation and that this was a 
family enterprise, so defendant J. B. Walker is not 
personally entitled to reimbursement. As to that ar-
gument, it is difficult to see how the other heirs 
[plaintiffs] could claim any benefit from payment 
from this business which was carried on by the de-
fendant and R. E. Walker. But beyond this, and in 
regard to the rights of all of the heirs, including R. E. 
Walker, in connection with the settlement of their 
affairs in 1959 all of the assets of the corporation were 
assigned to the defendant J. B. Walker, reserving to R. 
E. Walker only rights which he had in the estate of his 
father John A. Walker. The trial court correctly re-
garded this as not reserving any share in rights to 
reimbursement for money used to protect the family 
property, which right was by the 1922 agreement 
agreed to belong to J. B. Walker. Whatever money 
may have been so expended was paid at the instance of 
J. B. Walker who had undertaken the responsibility of 
protecting the family property and he was entitled to 
reimbursement for any advancements the first parly or 
corporation had made for that purpose. 
Tl nri2iri31 The defendant also takes his turn at cri-
ticizing the accounting. He avers that he was not al-
lowed sufficient credit for moneys advanced, includ-
ing particularly for taxes paid on family property 
which stood in his mother's name. We do not doubt the 
validity of his argument that a trustee is entitled to 
reimbursement for all expenses properly incurred in 
discharging the responsibilities of his trust.— But it is 
his duty to keep full, accurate and orderly records. 
When any question arises as to their sufficiency or 
accuracy, the burden is upon him to show the cor-
rectness of his accounts; and doubts may be resolved 
adversly to him.— In regard to the non-allowanc e of 
other expenses claimed, the trial judge made this ob-
servation which characterizes his view of the records 
kept: 
FN6. See Restatement (Second), Lav/ of 
Trusts, Section 244. 
FN7. See Bogert, Trusts and Trustees 
(Second Edition), Section 962; Wood v. 
Honevman. 178 Or. 484, 169 P.2d 131, 162, 
171 A.L.R. 587(1946). 
'Oh, I don't think I'm going to allow that. These ac-
counts kept with each other [J. B. and R. E.] here are 
inconclusive, impossible of reconcilement, kept for 
what I suppose was their own purposes * * *.' 
It is apparent that the trial court was not persuaded of 
the correctness of defendant's claims; and this court is 
not convinced that the evidence so preponderates 
against the *61 trial court's findings that they should 
be reversed.— On the contrary, we take occasion to 
observe that the trial judge appears to have done quite 
a commendable job in dealing with the multifarious 
activities of this family over a period of 40 years and 
in arriving at what impresses us as a just and equitable 
result. 
FN8. See Gibbons v. Brimm, 119 Utah 621, 
230P.2d983. 
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[141 The final point worthy of note is plaintiffs' con-
tention that the judgment was in error in providing that 
if they failed to reimburse defendant withm 30 days 
after demand they would lose their interest in the 
property They urged that if they so fail the defendant 
should only be entitled to foreclose his hen which 
would afford them some advantage in giving them 
time to **259 obtain finances and if necessary to 
redeem — This might be true if this were simply a 
hen foreclosure action But it is not It is a plenary suit 
in equity which, in harmony with the purposes of our 
new rules of civil procedure, in permitting the trial and 
settlement of all issues germane to the subject matter 
of a controversy and to avoid a multiplicity of law-
suits, ^ ^ afforded the parties an opportunity for the 
presentation and adjudication of all of their claims 
relating to the family property ^ ^ They availed 
themselves of that opportunity and the claims have 
been adjudicated It was consistent with that purpose 
for the trial court to not require resort to a special 
procedure for the foreclosure of defendant's lien, but 
to adjudicate that the plaintiff should have their re-
spective interests in the property, subject to their 
reimbursement of the defendant for the moneys he had 
advanced to protect it, and that they be given a rea-
sonable time to raise the money and perform that 
condition The court acted within its equitable powers 
providing a procedure which would deal fairly with 
and protect the rights of both parties ^ ^ We suggest 
that a reasonable time for meeting the condition would 
be 60 days after the remittitur of this case 
FN9 As to right of redemption upon forec-
losure of mortgages and hens see Section 
78-37-6, UC A 1953 
FN1Q See Rule 54(c)(1) U R C P , See also 
Taylor v E M Royle Corp , 1 Utah 2d 175, 
264 P 2d 279 (1953), and Prudential Federal 
Savings & Loan Association v Hartford 
Accident & Indemnity Co , 7 Utah 2d 366, 
325 P 2d 899 (1958) 
FN11 See Rules 8 and 18 ,URCP 
FN12Rule54(c)URCP provides that '* * 
* [E]very final judgment shall grant the relief 
to which the party * * * is entitled * * *' and 
Rule 83 provides that the District Courts ' * * 
* may regulate their practice in any manner 
not inconsistent with these rules and the sta-
tutes of this state ' 
Affirmed The parties to bear their own costs 
HENRIOD, C J , and McDONOUGH, WADE, and 
CALLISTER, JJ , concur 
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Beneficiary brought action against her sister, who was 
successor trustee of their mother's trust, to impose 
constructive trust on family home that was sold by 
father to sister at time father was trustee. The District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Glenn Iwasaki, J., granted 
partial summary judgment in favor of sister, and jury 
submitted special verdict in favor of beneficiary. Sis-
ter appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., 
held that: (1) beneficiary's cause of action accrued 
when beneficiary received documents from estate 
planning attorney concerning mother's trust and fa-
ther's transfer of family home to sister, and (2) statute 
of limitations was not tolled by concealment version 
of disco very rule. 
Reversed. 
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A trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness. 
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Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action 
241kl04 Concealment of Cause of Action 
241kl04(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
In certain circumstances, discovery rule applies which 
benefits plaintiff by operating to toll period of limita-
tions until the discovery of facts forming basis of 
cause of action; discovery rule is applied only when 
required by statute, when a defendant has affirma-
tively concealed plaintiffs cause of action, or when 
exceptional circumstances exist. 
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Most Cited Cases 
A statute of limitations period will not begin to run 
until the trust beneficiary knows or through reasonable 
investigation could have learned of a breach or re-
pudiation. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25. 
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Most Cited Cases 
Where a trustee is sued by a beneficiary or claims a 
violation of the trust, it constitutes an exceptional 
circumstance calling for application of the discovery 
rule to toll statute of limitations. U.C.A.1953, 
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78-12-25 
151 Limitation of Actions 241 €=>95(1) 
241 Limitation of Actions 
24 III Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and 
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action 
241k95 Ignorance of Cause of Action 
241k95(l) k In General, What Consti-
tutes Discovery Most Cited Cases 
To determine when rigid application of statute of 
limitations may be irrational or unjust, so as to warrant 
application of discovery rule, Court of Appeals applies 
a balancing test to weigh the hardship imposed on the 
claimant by the application of the statute of limitations 
against any prejudice to the defendant resulting from 
the passage of time UC A 1953,78-12-25 
1£ Limitation of Actions 241 €^>103(4) 
241 Limitation of Actions 
24 III Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and 
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action 
241kl01 Existence of Trust 
241kl03 Repudiation or Violation of 
Trust 
241kl03(4)k Notice of Repudiation 
Most Cited Cases 
Beneficiary's cause of action to impose constructive 
trust on property that was held in mother's trust and 
sold by father, as trustee, to beneficiary's sister, ac-
crued, and four-year limitations period began to run, 
when beneficiary received documents from estate 
planning attorney concerning mother's trust and fa-
ther's subsequent transfer of family home to her sister, 
not when her father passed away and she felt it ne-
cessary to obtain an actual copy of her mother's trust 
document from mother's estate planning attorney 
UC A 1953.78-12-25 
121 Limitation of Actions 241 €^>104(1) 
241 Limitation of Actions 
24 III Computation of Period of Limitation 
24111(F) Ignorance, Mistake, Trust, Fraud, and 
Concealment or Discovery of Cause of Action 
241kl04 Concealment of Cause of Action 
241kl04(l) k In General Most Cited 
Cases 
Four-year statute of limitations for beneficiary's 
claims of trustee's misconduct regarding trustee's 
transfer of family home to beneficiary's sister was not 
tolled by concealment version of discovery rule, even 
if beneficiary was told that mother's trust was no 
longer in existence, where beneficiary knew family 
home was sold from trust, she never actually asked 
anyone to see copy of mother's trust, and she was not 
precluded from obtaining the trust document at any 
time UC A 1953,78-12-25 
181 Appeal and Error 30 €^173(10) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30V Presentation and Reservation m Lower Court 
of Grounds of Review 
30V(A) Issues and Questions in Lower Court 
30kl73 Grounds of Defense or Opposition 
30kl73(10) k Time of Bringing Suit, 
Limitations, and Laches Most Cited Cases 
Whether beneficiary's action for constructive trust on 
real property that father, as trustee of mother's estate, 
sold to beneficiary's sister, was time-barred could be 
determined on appeal as a matter of law, even though 
jury decided disputed factual issues against sister, as 
successor trustee to mother's estate, in its special ver-
dict, where jury did not consider and resolve any 
factual issues that would establish that statute of li-
mitations did not begin to run until time beneficiary 
obtained copies of mother's trust documents, and those 
disputed facts submitted to jury were not dispositive 
of case UC A 1953,78-12-25 
*263 E Craig Smay, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
David W Scofield, Paige Bigelow, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice 
TI 1 This case arose from an action by Lynda Snow 
("Lynda"), against her sister, Gloria Rudd ("Glona"), 
to impose a constructive trust on real property that was 
sold to Gloria by their father The trial court granted 
Lynda's motion for partial summary judgment, hold-
ing that their father, as trustee of a trust which held the 
property, breached his trust obligation and, therefore, 
that the sale was voidable The trial court also denied a 
motion for summary judgment by Gloria, ruling, inter 
aha, that the statute of limitations did not begin to run 
on Lynda's claim until 1993 The matter was submit-
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ted to the jury on issues concerning an accounting for 
the trust assets, and elements of a laches claim. Gloria 
appeals, raising a series of contentions. She claims that 
Lynda had no standing to bring this suit. She also 
claims that the trial court erred in: (i) denying Gloria's 
motions for summary judgment on the statute of li-
mitations and laches issues; (ii) imposing a construc-
tive trust on the sale of the property to Gloria; (iii) 
denying Gloria reimbursement for her expenditures as 
constructive trustee of the trust; and (iv) awarding 
Lynda attorney fees and costs, and in holding that 
these fees had to be paid by Gloria personally or from 
her portion of the trust assets. Because we reverse the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Lynda on the statute of limitations issue, we have no 
occasion to address the other points raised. 
Tl 2 We first state the facts, which we recite in a manner 
most favorable to Gloria, the party opposing summary 
judgment. See Wilkinson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 975 
P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1998). On June 17, 1976, Dr. 
Lyndon Daynes Snow ("Dr.Snow") and Mrs. Glayde 
V. Snow ("Mrs.Snow") created a trust called the Inter 
Vivos Trust of Glayde V. Snow (the "Glayde V. Snow 
Trust"). Mrs. Snow was the trustor and Dr. Snow was 
the trustee. On August 9, 1976, Dr. and Mrs. Snow 
conveyed their family home, located at 381 11th 
Avenue, in Salt Lake City, as well as an adjacent lot, 
to Dr. Snow as trustee of the Glayde V. Snow Trust. 
Mrs. Snow was to receive the net income of the 
Glayde V. Snow Trust during her life, as well as so 
much of the principal as the trustee deemed "necessary 
or appropriate for the health, support and maintenance 
of the Trustor, having in mind the standard of living to 
which the Trustor [had] been accustomed." If Dr. 
Snow survived Mrs. Snow, he was directed to provide 
for his benefit all of the net income from this trust. 
Upon the death of Dr. and Mrs. Snow, Gloria and 
Lynda, if still living, were to receive in equal shares 
any residual assets of the trust. Furthermore, if Dr. 
Snow died or in some other way ceased to be trustee, 
both Gloria and Lynda became successor trustees. 
K 3 On October 15,1977, Mrs. Snow passed away. Dr. 
Snow then approached *264 Richard Rudd, Gloria's 
husband, asking him to purchase the family home. 
When Richard refused, Dr. Snow asked Gloria to buy 
the home, which she agreed to do. On May 8, 1978, 
they entered into a real estate contract under which Dr. 
Snow would be allowed to live in the house rent free, 
and Gloria would make payments to Dr. Snow on the 
purchase price of the home and also assume all the 
financial responsibilities of ownership of the home. 
After a few years, Gloria told Dr. Snow she could not 
afford to continue to pay expenses related to the 
maintenance of the home as well as make payments on 
the purchase contract. She discontinued making 
payments on the contract, but continued to pay the 
operating expenses of the home. 
U 4 In 1984, Dr. Snow consulted an estate planning 
attorney, Mr. Jay Gamble. Dr. Snow informed Mr. 
Gamble of his previous estate plan. Mr. Gamble sug-
gested that Dr. Snow start over by creating a new trust 
and that he complete the conveyance of the home to 
Gloria by a forgiveness of the remaining purchase 
money debt. A meeting in furtherance of this new plan 
took place on December 27, 1984, between Dr. Snow, 
Mr. Gamble, Lynda, and Gloria. At this meeting, Dr. 
Snow's estate plan was reviewed, including his newly 
created inter vivos trust ("the Dr. Snow Trust") and 
the debt forgiveness related to the sale of the home to 
Gloria. Lynda heard references during the meeting to 
the Glayde V. Snow Trust, but, in her deposition tes-
timony some ten years later, she could not recall the 
substance of any specific references to it. 
U 5 In March of 1985, Lynda received a package of 
documents which included a copy of the warranty 
deed transferring the family home to Dr. Snow as 
trustee of the Glayde V. Snow Trust; a copy of the real 
estate contract in which Dr. Snow, as trustee of the 
trust, sold the family home to Gloria; and a copy of the 
warranty deed, which transferred title to the property 
to Gloria. Each of these documents clearly stated that 
one of the parties to the transaction was Dr. Snow, as 
trustee of the Glayde V. Snow Trust. Lynda testified 
that she was confused as to what the Glayde V. Snow 
Trust was. When she approached her father to ask 
about the Glayde V. Snow Trust, he told her not to 
worry and that it had been taken care of. She made no 
further inquiry into the nature of the Glayde V. Snow 
Trust until after her father's death because, as she 
testified, she had no reason to "primarily" distrust her 
father and did not want to call him a liar. But, she also 
testified that she felt that her father lied to her on oc-
casion, and that both Gloria and Dr. Snow were lying 
about the family home. Lynda testified that during this 
time she asked Gloria questions about the sale of the 
family home. She testified that when she questioned 
her father on this issue, Dr. Snow told her that no sale 
had really taken place, and that the terms of the real 
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estate contract were not being fulfilled. Lynda alleged 
that because she always received different and vague 
answers when she asked about the sale of the property 
to Gloria, she eventually stopped inquiring. 
H 6 Dr. Snow died on May 18, 1993, and soon the-
reafter the family home was listed and sold by Gloria. 
Lynda claims that following Dr. Snow's death, refer-
ences to the Glayde V. Snow Trust in his papers 
caused her to search for the actual document estab-
lishing this trust. She contacted retired Judge Joseph 
Jeppson, whom her mother had mentioned in the 
1970s as having helped with the estate plan, and he 
gave her a copy of the Glayde V. Snow Trust. Lynda 
testified that she could have asked Judge Jeppson for 
the document when she first learned of the trust, but 
did not do so until almost ten years later, after Dr. 
Snow's death. She further testified that no one stopped 
her from inquiring as to the terms of the Glayde V. 
Snow Trust or from obtaining a copy of the trust. 
K 7 In January of 1994, Lynda filed a claim to impose a 
constructive trust on the proceeds of the sale of the 
family home. In the complaint, she asserted that the 
sale of the home was without adequate consideration 
and was in violation of the terms of the trust; that the 
sale of the property operated to impose a trust on the 
proceeds "in favor of the Glayde V. Snow Trust and its 
beneficiaries"; and that Gloria was guilty of fraud. 
Gloria answered asserting, inter alia, a defense of 
laches and statute of limitations. *265 There followed 
a series of motions for summary judgment addressing 
various issues. For the purpose of this opinion, it suf-
fices to say that by the time of trial, the trial court had 
determined as a matter of law that the Glayde V. Snow 
Trust gave no power to the trustee to forgive payments 
due on a contract for sale of trust assets. The con-
veyance of the trust property to Gloria was "unautho-
rized and in violation of the trust," and any proceeds 
from the sale were subject to the terms of the Glayde 
V. Snow Trust. As to Gloria's defenses, the court held 
that the statute of limitations period did not begin to 
run until Lynda "could have discerned the existence of 
a cause of action," which point the court fixed as 
"when she obtained a copy of the Glayde V. Snow 
Trust, following the death of Dr. Lyndon Snow in 
1993." Therefore, it concluded that the action was 
timely filed. 
\ 8 In September of 1997, a jury trial began to resolve 
the outstanding evidentiary issues which included the 
question of whether Lynda's claim was barred by 
laches. At the close of the second day of trial, the trial 
court took the laches issue away from the jury by 
ruling that as a matter of law Lynda could not be 
charged with undue delay for waiting to bring her suit 
until she obtained a copy of the trust document. The 
court struggled with whether the statute of limitations 
issue should be decided by the jury. Even though the 
court had decided that the statute of limitations period 
began to run when Lynda received the trust document, 
less than a year before the suit was filed, the court was 
concerned that its decision would be reversed on ap-
peal. Therefore, the court allowed in all evidence 
relevant to the statute of limitations issue. The court 
also asked the parties to propose questions for a spe-
cial verdict that would address whether and when 
Lynda had notice of the breach of trust. Some ques-
tions that appear directed at the statute of limitations 
issues were included in the verdict form, although 
those proposed by Gloria were rejected. And despite 
the inclusion of these questions in the verdict form, 
and a request by Gloria's counsel for jury instructions 
on the statute of limitations issues, when the jury was 
instructed, no mention of the statute of limitations 
defense was included. The matter was submitted and 
the jury returned a special verdict finding, inter alia, 
that "prior to the death of Dr. Snow, ... Lynda Snow 
[did not] know of her rights under the Intervivos Trust 
of Glayde V. Snow," nor was she "fully aware of all 
facts necessary to show that the conveyance of the 
[family home] to defendant was a violation of plain-
tiffs rights as a beneficiary of the Intervivos Trust of 
Glayde V. Snow." 
JJQ H 9 Gloria now appeals, raising a number of issues. 
We address only the trial court's denial of Gloria's 
motion for summary judgment on the statute of limi-
tations issue.— A trial court's grant or denial of 
summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. See 
Gerbich v. Numed. Inc., 977 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 
1999). Here, the trial court held that the statute of 
limitations was tolled until 1993, when Lynda actually 
obtained a copy of the trust document and learned the 
details of its contents. On appeal, Gloria argues that 
the statute of limitations period ran from either Janu-
ary of 1985, when Dr. Snow forgave Gloria's indeb-
tedness, and Lynda contends the breach of trust oc-
curred, or at the latest, in March of 1985, when Lynda 
had information that would have put a reasonable 
person on notice to inquire. Gloria contends that be-
cause the four-year period contained in section 
78-12-25 of the Code applies, the action is barred. 
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FN1. For the purposes of this opinion, we 
assume Lynda has standing to bring suit. 
[2111 10 We have generally held that a statute of li-
mitations period begins to run " 'upon the happening 
of the last event necessary to complete the cause of 
action.' " Berenda v. Lan^ford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 (Utah 
1996) (quoting Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 
(Utah 1981)). Here, that would be when the breach 
occurred. But in certain circumstances, we apply a 
"discovery rule" which benefits a plaintiff by operat-
ing "to toll the period of limitations 'until the discov-
ery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action.' " 
Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 
1231 (Utah 1995) (quoting Myers, 635 P.2d at 86). We 
apply the disco very *2 66 rule only when required by 
statute, when a defendant has affirmatively concealed 
a plaintiffs cause of action, or when exceptional cir-
cumstances exist. See Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51. 
r31[4][51 U 11 Before we proceed with our analysis, we 
must clarify an ambiguity in the law. We have held 
that when a case involves a trust, a trustee cannot take 
advantage of a statute of limitations defense until 
something has occurred to give the beneficiary a 
"clear indication" that a breach or repudiation has 
occurred, or, alternatively, the circumstances must be 
"such that [the beneficiary] must be charged with 
knowledge" of such a repudiation or breach. Walker v. 
Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 404 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah 
1965); Acott v. Tomlinson, 9 Utah 2d 71, 337 P.2d 
720, 724 (Utah 1959). In other words, a statute of 
limitations period will not begin to run until the be-
neficiary knows or through reasonable investigation 
could have learned of a breach or repudiation. 
ffggGeorge Gleason Bogert and George Taylor Bogert 
Trusts & Trustees § 951 (2d ed.1995). What is unclear 
about the rule of the Acott and Walker cases is whether 
that rule is a special statute of limitations rule for 
trusts, or merely a part of what we now term the 
"discovery rule." Although we have never explicitly 
so stated, we now conclude that this special "trust" 
statute of limitations rule is a version of the discovery 
rule. To explain, where a trustee is sued by a benefi-
ciary or claims a violation of the trust, it constitutes an 
"exceptional circumstance" calling for application of 
the discovery rule. We have held that under certain 
"exceptional circumstances" we will find that a rigid 
application of the statute of limitations may be "irra-
tional and unjust," and thus make the discovery rule 
available. Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 
1129 (Utah 1992). To determine when this is the case, 
we apply a balancing test to weigh "the hardship im-
posed on the claimant by the application of the statute 
of limitations against any prejudice to the defendant 
resulting from the passage of time." Seyy v. Security 
Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995) (citing 
Myers, 635 P.2d at 87). In the category of cases in-
volving beneficiaries' claims of trustee misconduct, 
we have, in effect, already conducted this balancing 
test. In Acott and Walker we found, in substance, that 
to not apply the discovery rule would lead to unjust 
results because of the close familial relationship in-
volved. See Acott, 9 Utah 2d 71, 337 P.2d at 724; 
Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 404 P.2d at 257. In such a 
situation, the beneficiary will be less likely to question 
the motives of the trustee and less likely to sue. See 
Walker, 404 P.2d at 257. Therefore, it is appropriate to 
protect the interests of a beneficiary by applying the 
discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations until the 
beneficiary knows or should know of the alleged 
breach or repudiation. 
[61 U 12 We now address how the discovery rule ap-
plies to the facts before us. The issue Gloria presents 
on appeal is whether the trial court should have 
granted her summary judgment motion, finding that, 
as a matter of law, Lynda knew or had reason to know 
of the accrual of a cause of action more than four years 
before she filed suit. In addressing this issue, we con-
sider the facts in a light most favorable to Lynda, the 
non-moving party. See Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, 
Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 399 (Utah 1998). In the December, 
1984 meeting with her father, Gloria, and Mr. Gamble, 
Lynda heard the Glayde V. Snow Trust mentioned, but 
she did not remember the specifics of the references to 
it. In March of 1985, Lynda received the package of 
papers from Mr. Gamble, some of which referred to 
the transfer of the home from her mother and father to 
the Glayde V. Snow Trust, and subsequent transfers to 
her sister. She later recalled that in receiving these 
documents, she was confused about the nature of this 
trust. She confronted her father about the trust, be-
cause he was the named trustee in the documents. 
According to her testimony, she never asked anyone 
for a copy of the trust document and never took any 
steps to get the document until after Dr. Snow's death. 
After her father's death, Lynda approached Judge 
Jeppson, who her mother, almost twenty years before, 
had told her was involved in her mother's estate plan-
ning, and asked him about the Glayde V. Snow Trust. 
Judge Jeppson produced the trust document. She 
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stated that she asked for the document because "she 
wanted to know the history of the *267 [trust] docu-
mentation" and because her mother had told her that 
the family home was going to her two daughters, and 
she was concerned that the sale of the home to Gloria 
was contrary to that wish. Lynda also said in her de-
position that she probably had had that concern since 
she had received the packet of materials mentioning 
the Glayde V. Snow Trust in 1985. When she was 
questioned as to why she did not ask Judge Jeppson 
earlier, she said she was not sure whether he had 
created the trust. But, after her father's death, she did 
contact him "on a guess," because he was the only 
lawyer that her mother had ever mentioned. 
Tl 13 Even considering these facts in a light most fa-
vorable to Lynda, there can be no doubt that, as a 
matter of law, she had knowledge as of 1985 of all 
facts necessary to put her on notice to inquire as to 
whether the sale of the house to her sister breached the 
trust. She knew nothing in 1993 that she did not know 
in 1985, and when she acted on her knowledge in 1993 
she quickly gained the trust instrument and all that she 
needed to file suit. This is a clear case of a plaintiff 
simply sitting on her rights. 
12111 14 Lynda asserts that even if she was charged 
with knowledge of the potential breach, the discovery 
rule should permit the statute to be tolled until she 
received the trust document because the concealment 
version of the discovery rule should apply. Lynda 
claims she was actively misled to not inquire into the 
nature of the trust and her rights under it. We have 
held that "in order to invoke the concealment version 
of the discovery rule it must be shown that given the 
defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not 
have brought suit within the statutory period." War-
ren, 838 P.2d at 1130. Here, because Lynda is suing to 
enforce her rights as a beneficiary of the Glayde V. 
Snow Trust, it is proper to bring suit against Gloria; 
not only for her own alleged concealment, but also, 
because of her role as successor trustee, for all alleged 
wrongdoing under the trust. When Lynda approached 
her father to ask him about the nature of the Glayde V. 
Snow Trust, he gave her various answers which she 
interpreted to mean that the trust had been dissolved or 
at least was not in existence anymore. His claim that 
the Glayde V. Snow Trust did not exist did not erase 
her need to inquire into the actual terms of this trust. 
Even if she was told that this trust did not exist any-
more, she was aware that the family home was sold 
from this trust. If she thought she at least had a part 
interest in the family home, then she should have at 
least inquired as to why the family home was owned 
by the Glayde V. Snow Trust. Lynda never actually 
asked her father, Gloria, or anyone else to see a copy 
of the trust document until after her father's death. It is 
clear that Lynda was not precluded from getting the 
trust document before her father's death and she was 
never told by anyone that she could not have the 
document or that it did not exist. We therefore hold 
that no concealment took place and the concealment 
version of the discovery rule did not toll the statute of 
limitations after the point in March of 1985 when 
Lynda received the documents of conveyance naming 
the trust. 
[81 H 15 Finally, Lynda claims that we cannot decide 
the statute of limitations issue as a matter of law be-
cause there were disputed factual issues that were 
decided by the jury against Gloria in the special ver-
dict. The answers to this assertion are several. First, it 
seems clear that when the trial court submitted the 
special verdict questions purporting to address the 
statute of limitations issues, it was attempting to pro-
tect against having to retry the case should an appel-
late court find error in the grant of summary judgment 
against Gloria on this issue. However, this attempt 
miscarried because the special verdicts are not phrased 
in terms appropriate to the applicable legal standard. 
In the special verdict, the jury decided that prior to Dr. 
Snow's death, Lynda did not "know of her rights under 
the Intervivos Trust of Glayde V. Snow" nor was she 
"fully aware of all facts necessary to show that the 
conveyance of the [family home] to defendant was a 
violation of plaintiffs rights as a beneficiary of the 
Intervivos Trust of Glayde V. Snow."However, the 
standard of knowledge this verdict assumes is neces-
sary, is far higher than what is actually required. As 
discussed above, all that is needed to toll the statute of 
limitations is a finding that through reasonable inves-
tigation, the plaintiff *268 could have determined that 
there was reason to believe there had been a breach of 
trust. The special verdict was not written with this 
standard in mind and no instructions were given to the 
jury on the statute of limitations and discovery rule 
issues. Therefore, we conclude that the jury did not 
consider and resolve any factual issues that would 
establish that the statute of limitations did not begin to 
run until 1993. Second, even if the court submitted 
issues to the jury on the premise that some facts were 
in dispute, those disputed facts are not dispositive 
here. Our decision today addresses the correctness of 
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the denial of Gloria's motion for summary judgment 
on the statute of limitations issue, a motion made 
before trial and one that assumes the facts in a posture 
most favorable to Lynda And we find those facts 
insufficient to warrant the trial court's denial of Glo-
ria's motion 
j^ 16 In conclusion, we hold that as a matter of law, the 
statute of limitations period of four years had run 
when Lynda filed her claim We find the discovery 
rule does not operate to bar Gloria's assertion of the 
statute Lynda had adequate notice to inquire as to the 
terms of the Glayde V Snow Trust, which would have 
led to the discovery of her rights We deem this notice 
to have occurred when she received the documents 
from Mr Gamble, which mentioned the Glayde V 
Snow Trust The statute of limitations period began in 
March of 1985 and closed in March of 1989 Since 
Lynda's claim was filed on January 5, 1994, it is 
b a r r e d ^ 
FN2 Since we reverse on the statute of li-
mitations issue, we do not address any of the 
other issues Gloria raised on appeal 
K 17 We, therefore, reverse 
11 18 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice 
DURHAM and Justice RUSSON concur m Justice 
ZIMMERMAN'S opinion 
% 19 Justice STEWART heard the arguments but re-
tired before he could act on the opinion 
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